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Haccessibility, Autonomy, and Infrastructure:
in the Age of the Abstraction:
by
Patrick Smyth
Adviser: Professor Carrie Hintz
Negotiated Access asks how we can exercise our values from within systems and structures
over which we have little control. The project, fundamentally, is about autonomy, a specific
form of resistance to control, or the ability to act on values or goals despite influence from
outside or above. Negotiation, here, is the ongoing encounter with enclosing or encircling
systems, entities, or spaces. It is the gap, the small room for maneuver, between ourselves
and the physical or social environment.
The project begins with local and concrete challenges and radiates outward to analyze and
critique broader structures, forces, and institutions that universalize and abstract. Chapter
one briefly frames the project in the context of my own experiences as a blind humanist and
hacker seeking to research and write in a field dominated by print, proprietary databases,
and other inaccessible formats and systems. Chapter Two considers how people, and espe-
cially people with disabilities, negotiate the immediate built environment, and introduces
haccessibility, or the use of individual workarounds, prosthetics, or approaches to circum-
vent inaccessible social and physical structures. This chapter considers an alternate model
of disability, the negotiated model, that may be of use in specific contexts. Chapter Three
will engage with two autobiographies of disability. These readings will provide extended ex-
plorations of haccessibility, but more importantly suggest ways autonomy can be exercised
v
in the face of imposed narratives. Chapter Four will consider the humanities as a larger
affinity group and explore its negotiation, or failure to negotiate, in the broader context
of the academy and an encircling society that does not share its values. In doing so, this
chapter examines “lay hermaneutics,” or alternate humanities traditions developed outside
the academy that contrast with our own approaches to engagement with the public. Finally,
Chapter Five will aim at the largest systems at global scale of which we as individuals and
humanity more broadly are components. We’ll term this theorized enclosure “the Abstrac-
tion,” and consider its implications on our collective capability for resistance. In so doing,
we’ll critically analyze the conceptual space occupied by the term “technology” and attempt
to reclaim some small portion for ourselves as “techne,” ways of knowing and doing that
enable, rather than erode, autonomy.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
1.1 Some Useful Vision
In early 2015, after spending long winter evenings poring over a dozen blog posts and how-
to guides, I sat down to jailbreak my iPhone. The process, at that time, did not initially
inspire confidence. Apple, in a sternly-worded support page, warns that “[u]nauthorized
modification of iOS can cause security vulnerabilities, instability, shortened battery life, and
other issues” and that “Apple strongly cautions against installing any software that hacks
iOS” (Apple, 2018). After a harrowing ninety minutes, I felt as if all warranties, now and
forever, had been voided. And yet, on the last page of apps on my phone’s home screen, a
strange little backdoor had appeared.
People, then and now, jailbreak—hack—their phones for many reasons. Some wish to
record phone calls. Some wish to avoid seeing or hearing advertisements. Some wish for
graphical updates, or flashy animations. Some, for reasons I can only speculate, wish to
have hidden apps and app folders. Others are simply curious about those programs that
Apple, for reasons of security or profit, does not allow into its carefully controlled ecosystem.
I, too, had my reasons to break through these restrictions. I am blind—or visually
impaired, low vision, or whatever else you’d like to call it. I was diagnosed with retinitis
pigmentosa, a progressive genetic eye disease, at age fourteen. In a doctor’s report from
2016, I was marked down as 20/800, meaning that I can see at 20 feet what the average
person would see at 800. In an earlier report from 2010, I received a three-word prognosis,
“some useful vision,” that sums things up relatively well. I have a long white cane that I
should probably use more often, but generally I get around without many issues. I have no
central vision, and the last print book I read was in 2007.1 Though I can see some elements
of a computer’s interface under some circumstances, I do most of my work, and all of my
reading, using specialized text to speech and screen reader software.
1Probably unfortunately, this last print book was Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus. I probably could have gone
out on a more upbeat note.
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For me, the two-year period from 2014 to 2016 was something of a crucible. I was at a
pivotal point in my doctoral studies, the orals exam, for which I needed to read, and answer
questions on, approximately one hundred books. Though I was proficient in reading with
the screen reader on my phone, most of these books were in print or behind Digital Rights
Management (DRM) restrictions that prevented their useful transfer to my devices. At the
same time, I was experiencing what my specialist euphemistically called “rapid changes” to
my vision.
Finally, and perhaps strangely given everything else going on in my life, I had developed
an obsession. In 2014, as I was starting a new fellowship related to using technology for
teaching and research, one of my colleagues suggested I try out programming. This was a
revelation. I had so many frustrations with the day-to-day reality of using a computer with a
visual impairment, so many thoughts on how the machine could accommodate my limitations,
and suddenly I had grasped something that could put those thoughts into practice. My first
project connected to a website on audiobooks that I used frequently, one with a frustratingly
inaccessible interface, and grabbed all the data, recasting it in a form that I could use
and enjoy using. The feeling was addictive. Soon I had turned my attention to my orals
examination, and the pile of books I had been laboriously scanning into digital form. I
learned that, with the right software, I could break through the restrictions on digital books
from libraries and from corporations like Amazon, then send these “cracked” books to my
phone for reading and note-taking. I started using Internet Relay Chat (IRC), a somewhat
archaic text-based communications system favored by programmers and the technical, and
talked my way into shadow libraries, clandestine gatherings of bibliophiles on the deep web.2
And, yes, I hacked my iPhone. Apple’s campaign to deliberately slow old iPhones was
causing Voiceover, the screen reader on the device, to periodically freeze for up to fifteen
2Not the dark web, which is something else entirely. The deep web is the part of the web not indexed or
otherwise publicly visible. The dark web is a (small) subset of the deep web hidden using a specific protocol.
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seconds at a time. I bound an aggressive-sounding terminal command, “killall voiceover,” to
a simultaneous press of the volume buttons and, suddenly, I could reclaim my phone with a
movement.
It feels that this should mark the transition to some kind of cautionary tale. One does
not perform such transgressions. I had stolen the Promethian fire, and should await my
just punishment. Order should be restored, perhaps with a well-placed lightning bolt. And
yet, somehow, this did not happen. I read my ill-gotten books. I passed the exam. I kept
learning, and taught what I learned. I started building, and shared what I built. I found
like-minded others, and mentors, and people to mentor.
But there is a sense in which I was marked. I saw the world as a hacker, as a blind
person, and as a student of the humanities. As a hacker, one sees systems, how they exploit,
and how they can be exploited. As a person with disabilities, one sees structures that are
inaccessible, yet must be accessed. As a humanist, one sees injustice, and knowledge not yet
shared. As an individual, or affinity group, within these systems and structures, the question
becomes: How can I usefully encounter the world? How can we, enclosed by systems and
structures over which we have little control, exercise our values?
1.2 Radiating Outward
This project, Negotiated Access, is about autonomy, a specific form of resistance to control, or
the ability to act on values or goals despite influence from outside or above. Negotiation, here,
is the ongoing encounter with enclosing or encircling systems, entities, or spaces. It is the
gap, the small room for maneuver, between ourselves and the physical or social environment.
The primary tension is between the local and the universal, or, alternately, between the
concrete and the abstract. Through autonomy, the local negotiates the universal. Through
abstraction, the universal exercises control over the local.
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In a specific sense, negotiation is about power. Power tends to be exercised downward
and inward. The state exercises power over organizations. Organizations, such as corpora-
tions, exercise power over individuals. There is a limited form of power that can be exercised,
not over a distance, but only in the local, such as over objects in the immediate environ-
ment. Though this construction is demonstrably useful and frequently accurate, it is not
the direction in which this project operates. Rather than starting from above and looking
at the exercise of power on those below, we will instead start with the sought autonomy
of the individual or small group and radiate outward. Chapter Two will consider how the
individual or small group negotiates the immediate built environment. Chapter Three will
consider how the individual or small group negotiates imposed narrative. Chapter Four will
consider how the larger affinity group or discipline negotiates infrastructure, or the instan-
tiated values of an enclosing collective. Chapter Five will consider how individuals, affinity
groups, and organizations negotiate the Abstraction, a theorized enclosing system or entity
at the greatest remove.
Though this project focuses on negotiation, the exercise of autonomy from within an
encircling system or collective, instances of successful negotiation are not held up in isolation.
Negotiation exposes the flawed assumptions and failed abstractions of systems, platforms,
collectives, structures, and entities. To read the above anecdote, in which the use of a 17-
character terminal command bypassed a systemic issue in the platform of a trillion-dollar
corporation, as an unalloyed victory is to ignore the context. Negotiation, whether narrative,
physical, technical, or organizational, exposes a mismatch in values. Occasionally, it can
serve as a basis or starting point for change in the enclosing system. More frequently, it can
help carve out a local space of resistance, which might, in turn, provide the foothold for the
organization of community or the emergence of a narrative.
Each chapter in Negotiated Access examines specific forms of negotiation. Chapter Two
introduces haccessibility, or the use of individual workarounds, prosthetics, or approaches to
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circumvent inaccessible social and physical structures. In doing so, we briefly consider an
alternate model of disability, the negotiated model, that may be of use when considering cer-
tain contexts and dynamics. In Chapter Three, we will engage with two autobiographies of
disability. These readings will provide extended explorations of haccessibility, but more im-
portantly suggest ways autonomy can be exercised in the face of imposed narratives. Chapter
Four will consider the humanities as a larger affinity group and explore its negotiation, or
failure to negotiate, in the broader context of the academy and an encircling society that does
not share its values. In so doing, we will examine “lay hermaneutics,” or alternate humanities
traditions developed outside the academy, which provide a useful contrast in discussion of
the relationship between the academic humanities and the public. Finally, Chapter Five will
aim at the largest systems at global scale of which we as individuals and humanity more
broadly are components. We’ll term this theorized enclosure “the Abstraction,” and con-
sider its implications on narrative and our collective capability for resistance. In so doing,
we’ll critically analyze the conceptual space occupied by the term “technology” and attempt
to reclaim some small portion for ourselves as “techne,” ways of knowing and doing that
enable, rather than erode, autonomy. In this chapter, we will consider possible stances in
confrontation of the vast and the ineffable, including both challenges to the Abstraction and
our responsibility as individuals who stand, in the present, at the crux of potential futures.
1.3 A Note on Language
Language around, and about, disability is fraught, and it seems that any project that con-
tends with disability should, or must, explain its choices. There are currently two philoso-
phies on the deployment of language around disability, person-first language and identity-first
language. Morton Ann Gernsbacher summarizes the distinction:
Person-first language is the structural form in which a noun referring to a per-
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son or persons (e.g. person, people, individual, adults, or children) precedes
a phrase referring to a disability (e.g. person with a disability, people with
blindness, individual with intellectual disabilities, adults with dyslexia, and chil-
dren with autism). Person-first language contrasts with identity-first language;
in identity-first language, the disability, serving as an adjective, precedes the
personhood-noun (e.g. disabled person, blind people, intellectually disabled in-
dividual, dyslexic adults, and autistic children). (Gernsbacher, 2017)
Gernsbacher points out a number of style guides that enshrine person-first language, includ-
ing “American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Speech-Language Hearing Association, and the As-
sociated Press” (Gernsbacher, 2017). While person-first language has been considered the
“correct” way to refer to people with disabilities for some time, proponents of identity-first
language have levied valid criticisms, including that person-first language holds disability at
a remove and thus perpetuates stigma. Yue-Ting Siu and and Ike Presley write that, “[j]ust
as ethnicity or gender is encapsulated within one’s identity, so is disability. Identity-first
language is ultimately a rally-cry against ableist assumptions that perceive disability as a
deficit that requires compensatory grammar” (Yue-Ting & Presley, 2019, p. 3).
Language used in discussions of disability is constantly evolving. With that said, my
best guess is that identity-first language will become more widely adopted over time. In
general, it seems that disability insiders—those connected to disability studies and those with
disabilities that significantly impact many areas of life—tend to favor or adopt identity-first
language. Those in medical or other institutional services, or those who hold their disability
identity more loosely, tend to favor or prefer person-first language.
In this project, and despite a mild preference for identity-first language, I’ve used person-
first language relatively consistently, with the exception of references to the blind. I do not
think any choice here can be considered to be perfect or perfectly correct, and this approach
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attempts to avoid distraction to those not intimately familiar with disability studies or
specific disability affinity groups. The reality is that stigma does attend to disability, and
persists whether we put the word “person” before or after the word “disabled.” Depending on
context, or one’s integration of disability into one’s identity, either identity-first or person-
first language might seem self-evidently preferable. I hope that, to the limited extent that
it is possible to put language aside, my respect for people with disabilities—or disabled
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2.1 Terry Garrett
On May 8, 2011, a blind gamer named Terry Garrett began playing Zelda: The Ocarina of
Time. The game, widely considered a classic, depicts a 3D world populated with puzzles,
enemies, and difficult terrain. It also offers no intentional concessions to a blind player using
only sound cues, memory, and dogged persistence to navigate the game world.
Five years later, Garrett completed his playthrough. Using binaural audio, he had found
that he could map entities and terrain in the environment. Inaudible features could be struck
with objects to produce identifying sounds, and a combination of trial-and-error and external
research allowed him to pass traps and solve puzzles.
What conception of disability allows us to best understand Garrett’s achievement? Two
models have come to dominate narratives of and advocacy for disability. The first, the
medical model, sees disability as a personal tragedy that can be resolved only by a cure or by
mitigation from the medical community. Implicit in this perspective is the assumption that
disability is a social aberration, a condition that must be cured or obscured. The social model
of disability, on the other hand, envisions disability as a societal concern, and contends that
most negative outcomes from disability stem from the ignorance, indifference, or bias of the
wider, largely able, community. Proponents of the social model seek attitudinal and public
policy changes to eliminate difficulties associated with stigma and a lack of understanding
about disabled lives.
How well do these models address the challenges faced by Garrett as he, a blind gamer,
engaged with a creation designed without knowledge of his circumstances? The solutions
offered by the medical model offer only a binary outcome. Either Garrett’s disability is
cured or ameliorated, allowing him to engage with the game in the socially prescribed way,
or it is not. If no cure is forthcoming, then the medical model of disability is silent, offering
no further recourse. Under the medical model, therefore, the challenge Garrett has set for
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himself could only be regarded as an impossibility.
The social model has far more to offer. In the last few years, communication among
disabled gamers and developers has led to the release of a small but notable list of games in
formats accessible to those with mobility and sensory disabilities. This brief list, which has
included titles such as Skull Girls and King of Dragon Pass, has shown that awareness and
advocacy can lead to concrete change even in gaming, a community that is often explicitly
ableist in its outlook and rhetoric. However, though notable, these successes have been
limited in scope. The overwhelming majority of games and game developers do not consider
the needs of mobility- and sensory-impaired gamers, and many developers who become aware
of specific disabilities argue that it’s simply impossible for them to adapt their games for
those with disabilities such as missing limbs or blindness. Even disabilities that are common
and relatively simple to mitigate in games, such as color blindness, have received only limited
attention. Further, widely used platforms that must be navigated to access games in the
first place, such as the menus on the Playstation 4 console or the Steam game distribution
service for PC, remain inaccessible, even in the face of an ADA ruling that requires that, at
minimum, the communications and chat features in games must be made accessible.
When considering Garrett’s struggle to complete a game designed exclusively for sighted
players, it’s clear—and unsurprising to those following disability studies—that the perspec-
tive provided by the social model is more productive than that provided by the medical
model. While the medical establishment would have little or no interest in Garrett’s expe-
rience as a case study, the social model suggests ways that society could change to better
accommodate the goals of Garrett and other disabled gamers. Were developers in games
to equip menus with audio or voice cues, for example, gamers like Garrett would not be
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forced to memorize interfaces through trial and error or with sighted assistance.1 Despite
the salience of the social model to Garrett’s experience, however, there is a critical aspect of
his effort that falls outside the usual scope of the social model as we know it.
2.2 A Negotiated Model of Disability
The disabled experience is typically—though not universally—characterized by distinct rela-
tionships between the individual and the lived environment. Consider the cane, an implement
that, in its differing forms, is almost metonymous with mobility and sensory disabilities. For
the blind and for many who are mobility impaired, the cane is an emblem of independence.
When picking up a cane, the relationship among certain disabled individuals and their lived
environment is powerfully altered. Distances shrink and senses expand. Daniel Kish, an
advocate for unorthodox mobility strategies for the blind, describes the experience:
Now, moving forward, how do I manage today? . . . Fortunately, I have my
trusty long cane, longer than the canes used by most blind people. I call it my
freedom staff. (Kish, 2015)
Yet the cane, and the myriad other rhetorical, physical, cognitive, and emotional strategies
1My point here is that the current state of gaming is, by and large, not accessible, and that it makes sense
for gamers with disabilities to look outside of advocacy for ways to pursue their aims in the present. However,
I do not want to understate the progress taking place in this area or the potential long-term importance of
changes brought about by advocacy.
Developments in this area have included accessibility initiatives by gaming-adjacent communities such as
LEGO (Kacala, 2019) and the incorporation of combination optical character recognition and screen reader
functionality features into game emulator platforms (Matteis, 2019). A number of mainstream games have
implemented accessibility-related features such as color blind and large font modes, and a handful, such as
Madden 2018, have taken steps toward playability for the fully blind (Electronic Arts, 2018). Some more
serious projects, such as the Accessible Player Experiences (APX) initiative by nonprofit AbleGamers, appear
to have enough impetus to potentially move the needle on attitudes toward accessibility.
Finally, due perhaps to FCC rules that went into effect in 2015 mandating that certain game console
functionality be made accessible, there has been an uptick in researcher interest in the challenges associated
with creating accessible games (Garber, 2013, p. 17) and a growing awareness of the central role of gaming in
culture, therapy, and education (Yuan et al., 2011, p. 2). Though these developments are exciting, advocacy
around changing attitudes toward accessibility in gaming is still in its early stages.
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deployed by people with disabilities, are not cures. Their use and deployment is necessarily
idiosyncratic, unique to specific disabled individuals and their affinity groups. Their use or
presence also often visibly sets disabled individuals apart. Unlike the medical cure, which
seeks to normalize pathology and efface difference, the myriad strategies deployed by disabled
people to negotiate physical and cultural spaces are a source of difference. This difference is
primarily one of perception, altering both how people with disabilities perceive society and
the built environment and how others perceive them in turn.
Yet while we know that the medical model often fails to address or encompass disabled
experience, the social model, for all its importance and usefulness, is perhaps more effective
as a tool for advocacy on a large scale than as a means through which to grapple with the
subjective experience of living with a specific disability. Tom Shakespeare offers a considered,
and highly nuanced, appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the social model. In
his analysis, the comprehensibility of the fundamental idea behind the social model—that
disability results from barriers put in place by society—makes it an ideal tool for activism,
including the breaking down of specific social barriers. Secondarily, the social model allows
for a change in affect: “It is not the disabled person who is to blame, but society. She
does not have to change, society does. Rather than feeling self-pity, she can feel anger
and pride” (Shakespeare, 2013, p. 217). Shakespeare contends that the primary strength
of the social model—its straightforward comprehensibility—makes it less desirable as an
academic account of disability. Further, its articulation by a highly specific group—white,
heterosexual men, primarily with disabilities of mobility and primarily in Britain, calls into
question its ability to represent the full spectrum of experiences with disability. Shakespeare
is in agreement with Liz Crow, who argues that,
[a]s individuals, most of us simply cannot pretend with any conviction that our
impairments are irrelevant because they influence every aspect of our lives. We
must find a way to integrate them into our whole experience and identity for the
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sake of our physical and emotional well-being, and, subsequently, for our capacity
to work against Disability. (Crow, 1992, p. 7)
My own experiences with disability lead me to agree with the perspectives offered by
Shakespeare and Crow. The social model, as important and useful as it is, should be ex-
panded, at least in contexts outside of activism, to be sensitive to the full gamut of disabled
experience, a range that includes chronic pain and conditions that may result in early death.
In this project, I offer another imperfect model, a negotiated model of disability, intended
to augment the social model and move toward a more holistic understanding of disability.
I offer it for the same reason the social model was offered: to provide understanding of a
specific aspect of the disabled experience in order to break down barriers and allow for greater
autonomy and independence. In later chapters, I also articulate how a negotiated model can
speak to larger questions of expressing values in contexts where essential infrastructure and
cultural understanding are not present. As with any model, I do not believe we should
view the world exclusively through the lens of negotiation. Yet by focusing not on the
body exclusively (the medical model) or on macro-scale society (a common articulation of
the social model), but rather on the interplay between the individual and the immediate
social and built environment, I believe that one can reach a set of new conclusions and, in
doing so, break down a set of old barriers, barriers different from those targeted in activism
supported by the social model. These conclusions, essentially, revolve around a single idea:
that individuals, and by extension local communities of practice, should be able to have
autonomy over their immediate environment. When put this way, the proposition sounds
agreeable and, perhaps, even simple. Yet nothing could be less simple, and this project
attempts to contend with that reality. The forces arrayed against even the merest individual
autonomy and self-determination are numerous. These forces, unthinking and unfeeling but
purposeful and relentless, are like the Moloch of Alan Ginsberg’s Howl : “Moloch whose mind
is pure machinery! Moloch whose blood is running money! . . . Moloch whose breast is a
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cannibal dynamo! . . . Moloch whose factories dream and croak in the fog! Moloch whose
smoke-stacks and antennae crown the cities! . . . They broke their backs lifting Moloch to
Heaven!” (Ginsberg, 1956, p. 17-18). Whether or not one feels the encroachment of the
Abstraction, Empire, technopoly, or Moloch at the periphery of one’s existence, this project,
and the negotiated model, attempts to contend with forces that make the locus of control
remote, rather than local; centralized, rather than federated; and in processes, rather than
in people.
The negotiated model argues that, in raising a cane—or in lip reading, using a screen
reader, or adapting a vehicle to a mobility impairment—the disabled individual asserts a
kind of power that does not flow from their approval or status in the wider community.
Simultaneously, they assert their own identity, both individually and as part of an affin-
ity group. Drawing on an understanding of their own situation and relationship with the
lived environment, the disabled individual negotiates. That is, they negotiate their environ-
ment, altering or recontextualizing connections between their own body and the physical
world. They negotiate with others, learning to survive in social milieus often characterized
by ignorance and hostility. They share, build, and teach amongst themselves, creating ne-
gotiables—knowledge, physical infrastructure, and social capital that are their own. These
practices are universal and critical to survival but are often invisible and unacknowledged.
Models of disability combine a means of conceiving of or envisioning disability with a
prescribed way forward—that is, a way of improving, or attempting to improve, the lives
of disabled people. For the medical model, this prescribed way forward is the cure, an
effacement of disability. For the social model, the way forward is social change in the wider
society, including advocacy for and understanding of the lives of disabled people. Articulating
and exploring a third model, the negotiated model, is intended to augment the critical work
already done under the aegis of the social model. Like existing models of disability, this
model provides both a way to conceive of and situate disability and a way forward, a means
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of improving the lives of disabled people.
The negotiated model articulated here is not simply a call for new types of work to be done
to improve the lives of people with disabilities, especially given that negotiated forms of access
have been, and continue to be, practiced by individuals and communities in myriad forms.
This model of access has, however, been underexamined in the context of disability studies
and in the academy more widely. A goal of this project, therefore, is to focus attention on
excellent work that is, and arguably always has been, underway by practitioners in the wider
disability community, and to provide a framework to better understand and contextualize
this labor. Further, this project seeks to connect a theoretical understanding of negotiated
access to related work in other domains. These connections include the digital humanities,
with its emphasis on critical making and infrastructure, and utopian studies, which explores
alternative relationships among bodies and their environments. Just as applications of the
social model of disability have advanced discourses in a variety of disciplines, the negotiated
model of disability can contribute to a wider understanding of affinity groups that develop
practices, knowledges, and infrastructure that push back against complicit orthodoxy and
normalizing forces.
So, again: what conception of disability allows us to best understand Garrett’s achieve-
ment—completing, independently as a blind individual, a game designed exclusively for the
sighted? If it’s not yet clear, my answer to this question is the negotiated model of disabil-
ity. While advocacy and social progress on the rights of disabled gamers might have helped,
and could yet help, individuals such as Garrett, it was not this form of social progress that
allowed Garrett to overcome this challenge. It also goes without saying that no (entirely the-
oretical) cure contributed to his victory. Rather, Garrett’s accomplishment was the result of
a successful negotiation of the lived environment. In approaching an apparently inaccessible
game as he did, Garrett forced a redefinition of his relationship with it, creating infrastruc-
ture—a path—where no infrastructure existed before. Garrett’s achievement also shares
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many characteristics of negotiated access that will be discussed in depth in this chapter,
among them an idiosyncratic, exploratory, or free-form approach to the creation of localized
infrastructure—“haccessability.”
Finally, it’s essential to note that negotiated access is not an exceptional or extraordinary
state for disabled individuals. Rather, it’s a daily, or even hourly, fact of life. Case studies
such as Garrett’s and the others that will be discussed below garner focus and attention in
both disabled and non-disabled communities, making them attractive for citation, discussion,
and inclusion in a text such as this one. For disabled individuals, however, negotiation of the
lived environment is simply a fact of life, one generally performed without fanfare or even,
in most cases, acknowledgment. In addition, those individuals whose achievements come
to wider public attention are often, despite their disabled status, privileged in other ways.
While this study will attempt to balance extraordinary examples of negotiated access with
those in keeping with the daily struggles and successes of disabled life, I wish to acknowledge
that “notable” achievements in this context are unfortunately often those marked out by able,
rather than disabled, communities. To the extent that it is possible within the bounds of
this project, I have sought out firsthand accounts and voices of disabled experience whenever
possible.
2.3 What Is Negotiated Access?
Negotiated Access is advocacy, knowledge creation, and the building of infrastructure that
begins within an affinity group and radiates outward. It is rooted in the lived experience
of people with disabilities and its locus is the idiosyncratic capabilities, skills, and practices
that enable people with disabilities to survive and (sometimes) flourish in an able and ableist
society. Negotiated Access addresses aspects of the disabled experience that are marginal or
underacknowledged within current paradigms, particularly methods that do not rely on—or
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that even defy—the approval or approbation of the wider society. In some cases, negotiation
may require, or involve, passing—temporarily merging with the perception of the dominant
able class to extract withheld support or necessary acknowledgment or concessions. At other
times, negotiation involves practices that are considered asocial, resistant, or antisocial by the
wider able community. Negotiation, therefore, tends to be at the periphery of the disabled
experience, in the actions that are not easily narrativized or made legible by the community
at large, but which are a means of survival for individuals and their affinity groups.
Gene Bellinger, a theorist of systems, defines a model as a “simplification of reality
intended to promote understanding” (Bellinger, 2004). The limitations that apply to all
models—that the map, however useful an aid to understanding, cannot reflect the full terri-
tory—also apply to models of disability; perhaps especially so, given the myriad manifesta-
tions of disability and disabled identity. Indeed, one practitioner’s social model—or medical
model, individual model, charity model, administrative model—may, and quite frequently
does, differ in application and interpretation when invoked by another. Mike Oliver, said
to have coined the term “social model,” has gone to lengths to frame it as a “practical tool,
not a theory, an idea or a concept” (Oliver, 2004, p. 19). Oliver contends that too much
effort has gone into debating the applicability of paradigms and models to the phenomenon
of disability and not enough effort into actually bringing about change: “If we imagine that
throughout human history the carpenters and builders of the world had spent their time
talking about whether the hammer was an adequate tool for the purpose of building houses,
we would still be living in caves” (Oliver, 2004, p. 20). Here, Oliver is—pun intended—blunt
with his analysis, and in my opinion there is clear value in theorizing disability in all its com-
plexity. Ultimately, however, my interest in models, including a negotiated model, comes
from my own individual experiences with disability and my participation in, and regard for,
communities of individuals who view disability as part of their identity. In speaking of a
negotiated model, I have little interest in imposing specific narratives on the complexity
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that is disability, but every interest in understanding specific aspects of the disabled expe-
rience. Like any model of disability, or indeed any model, thinking of disability in terms of
negotiation is intended to be useful, but not totalizing or proscriptive.
While negotiated access flows from the personal and the idiosyncratic in the lives of peo-
ple with disabilities, as a practice and as a critical lens it is also a vector for political and
cultural energy. As we will see in later chapters, negotiated access throws light on disability
as an identity and the relationships among disability affinity groups, the narrativization of
disability in media, the rise of transhumanism and the pathologization of humanity, the ar-
ticulation of values through infrastructure, the implications of proprietary and commercial
ideologies on the body, and the imagination and implementation of crip utopias. Negoti-
ated access, and related concepts such as haccessibility, suggest ways we can advance both
on-the-ground advocacy in the disabled community and augment our understanding of dis-
ability through the lens of the social model. Closely examining the unidealized, day-to-day
interactions among disabled people and society, however, also raises a host of theoretical
questions, not only about disabled life but also about how society at large reflects, or fails
to reflect, our values.
2.4 Jaywalking Past Obstacles
Meagan H. Houle, a communications specialist and disability rights blogger, uses a metaphor—
waiting on the curb for a ride—to describe her experience of being blocked by society’s neglect
of essential accommodations:
Being disabled, I realized, is a lot of standing on the corner, waiting for the world
to decide that it’s safe for you to cross. My life as a disabled person involves a
lot of standing still, watching cars fly freely by, wondering when the light will
turn green long enough for me to make some headway. Since the system is more
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complicated than I can wrap my head around, and there’s no handy countdown,
I have no clear idea when that might happen. So I wait, getting increasingly cold
and impatient, for a path forward. Some days, it feels as though the world is
filled with cars, and I am the only pedestrian in sight. They are roaring along
while I walk and wait, walk and wait. (Houle, 2018)
Houle’s experience of living with a disability is not a consistent one—in her metaphor, she
contrasts her waiting with stretches of progress long enough to cause her to forget her own
time spent blocked by a lack of accommodation: “Barriers are overcome, and my journey
picks up speed. . . . The reprieve might even be long enough for me to point at other unlucky
foot travelers, and to wonder loudly what they’ve done—or left undone—to leave themselves
stranded at the corner” (Houle, 2018). However, at points in this metaphorical journey when
she is blocked for too long to bear, when the contrast between her lack of progress and others’
ease of travel becomes too great, Houle describes another way forward:
Then, when the waiting becomes too much for me, I try to jaywalk. I barge right
into the unsafe spaces, the heavy traffic, the uncharted territory. I might get
a warning or a slap on the wrist or even an angry honk from someone’s horn;
occasionally, I retreat to my corner, chastened. I am foolish and fragile. I must
be protected from myself. (Houle, 2018)
Houle’s comparison to jaywalking, part of a larger metaphor that grapples with the subjective
experience of living with disability, describes an almost involuntary reaction to suppression,
a reaction born of anger and frustration. This reaction, I will argue, is not only under-
standable—facing injustice by ignoring or circumventing constraints imposed by commercial
interests, majoritarian apathy, or social propriety can help bring about lasting change. My
own feelings echo Houle’s benediction to the coming generation, that “when the time comes
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to jaywalk, to break the rules and challenge the status quo, they will have the courage to do
it, and the good fortune to emerge triumphant” (Houle, 2018).
2.5 Cementing the Future
Houle’s metaphor—waiting on a corner for change, jaywalking past obstacles—is particularly
fitting in light of a history of civil disobedience by disability rights activists, many of whom,
in the ’60s and ’70s, were explicitly concerned with the inaccessibility of streets and street
corners. One incident—the quiet reshaping at night of particular street corners to make
them accessible by wheelchair—has been mythologized in the retelling.
In 1962, Ed Roberts, a quadriplegic polio survivor, became the first student at Berkeley
with a profound disability. Roberts had to overcome a series of obstacles to enroll, among
them securing dormitory space for his 800-pound iron lung. Famously, a dean at the uni-
versity reportedly claimed that “[w]e’ve tried cripples before and it didn’t work” (Dawson,
2015). Over the next decade, Roberts and a growing circle of activists with disabilities would
create the Center for Independent Living, a community that advocated for students with dis-
abilities on campus and which would prove instrumental in the burgeoning disability rights
movement. In the early years of the Center, however, Roberts was faced with a critical issue:
a lack of curb cuts on street corners made it difficult to organize and attend meetings.2
Ultimately, the activities and advocacy of the Independent Living Movement would result
2Curb cuts, the small ramps or “cuts” in the sidewalk at almost every modern street corner, are generally
taken for granted by the public. Before the rise of the disability rights movement in the 1960s, curbs on
corners were generally raised about six inches off the street, making every block a barrier to those using
wheelchairs. Between 1970-1974, largely in response to advocacy by the Independent Living Movement,
Berkeley created the first accessible wheelchair route in the United States, and by 1990 the passing of the
Americans with Disabilities Act mandated curb cuts on all street corners.
The fact that curb cuts are so useful to every member of the community, not just those with disabilities,
means they are frequently held up as a fundamental example of Universal Design, a philosophy or methodol-
ogy that considers accessibility to be a normal and integrated part of any design process (Williamson, 2012),
and the term “curb cut effect” is sometimes used to describe changes made for disadvantaged groups that
ultimately benefit the wider society (Glover Blackwell, 2017, p. 28).
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in the creation of one of the first accessible wheelchair routes in the United States. Before
these systemic changes took place years later, however, Roberts still needed to move around
Berkeley. As a temporary solution, and in an act of civil disobedience, a number of individuals
connected to the Independent Living Movement went out into the streets at night and, with
bags of cement, created ramps when no ramps had existed before.
In an interview for an oral history of the independent living movement at Berkeley, Eric
Dibner, a friend and sometime medical attendant for Roberts, describes the mythos that
sprung up around this guerilla modification of street corners. The following is an excerpt
from a conversation between Dibner and interviewer Kathy Cowan recorded in 1997-1998 as
part of the Disability Rights and Independent Living Movement Project, an initiative that
created an extensive oral history of the period.
Cowan (interviewer)
I certainly have heard your name associated with ramps over and over again,
Eric. There is this story that you were building curb cuts and ramps in Berkeley
sort of unofficially. Is there a story behind that?
Eric Dibner
Well, you didn’t hear about the nitroglycerin where we were blowing up curbs
and [laughter] and jackhammers in the middle of the night, where we’d go and
we’d jackhammer up all these intersections and then the city would have to fix
them.
Cowan (interviewer)
No, I didn’t hear that story. Is that a true story? [laughs]
Eric Dibner
No, neither of those are true stories, actually. [laughs] That was a little later
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when Ed [Roberts] asked for some ramps to be—there were some corners where
he had problems going from his house to CIL, or maybe it was the Disabled
Students’ Program. So I got a bag of cement and went out. They were real low
curbs, like a couple of inches, at Dana and Dwight, probably at Ellsworth and
Dwight, and I think I did one at Ellsworth and Blake. It was just to bevel the
corner. I mean, we didn’t build curb ramps, we just put some cement down to
make it usable. (Bancroft Library Regional Oral Office, 2000, p. 24)
As can be seen in the above exchange, the intervention made here by Eric Dibner and
others was at once a practical solution to an immediate problem, a provocation to those
representing the status quo, and a galvanizing act. Ed Roberts, a critical individual in the
Independent Living Movement, needed to get to meetings, and get to meetings now—not
years later when the city was finally convinced to create a route. The cement corners also
served as a demonstration, a statement of how things should be, an eloquent way to say that
the corner /should just have a ramp. Perhaps most importantly, however, this intervention,
this infrastructural end-run, provided a rallying point, creating the kind of story around
which a movement could crystallize. This can be seen in how the act was remembered not as
a mere bevel, an addition to the curb, but as an act of demolition, of clearing away the old
order and forcing a new way of doing things. As the mythology around this incident shows,
interventions such as these occupy their own psychological and social space. They create a
history, a narrative, that paves the way, figuratively speaking, for greater social change. The
dramatization of Dibner’s small reshaping of Berkeley infrastructure, transforming a bag of
cement into jackhammers and nitroglycerin in the popular imagination, shows the need for
images of resistance that galvanize activists, shame adherents to the status quo, and show
why change is necessary—and what it might look like in practice.
Dibner’s intervention is a powerful example of what I’ll call haccessibility—essentially,
the use of hacking or a hacking ethos to make things accessible, with or without the ap-
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proval of the broader society. Haccessibility is a radical form of negotiation, a redrawing
of the boundary between the self and the physical and social environment. Though acts of
haccessibility frequently take the form of an individual seeking greater autonomy, they often
serve as a first step toward the creation of useful infrastructure or a provocation with the
potential to lead to social change. Thus, haccessibility is important not only for redrawing
boundaries between an individual and the immediate environment, but also for catalyzing
change that can spread to an affinity group and, possibly, to the broader society.
2.6 Something in the Air
It is no coincidence that these interventions—not just Dibner’s actions with a bag of cement,
but the Independent Living and the broader Disability Rights movement—took place in the
1960s and 1970s. This work resonates, and was informed by, other movements underway
at that time. The parallels with the first, the Civil Rights Movement, were clear to early
disability rights advocates who followed its model of civil disobedience, including the use of
peaceful demonstrations and sit-ins. Similarly, disability rights advocates in this period also
participated in other political movements, such as the nascent environmental movement,
including occupation of wetlands in support of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
(Bancroft Library Regional Oral Office, 2000, p. 279).
Something, clearly, was in the air—or the water—of the California of the ’60s and early
’70s, the counterculture giving rise to the civil rights movement, second-wave feminism, the
disability rights movement, the anti-war movement, the Beat Generation, psychedelia, and
the early environmental movement, among many others. In this period, too, great changes
were taking place in the field of technology and, in particular, computers and computer
culture. The early days of computer culture were also largely focused around the same
places, especially the Bay Area and on college campuses. In What the Dormouse Said, an
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account of the rise of computing in the ’60s, John Marko shows how counterculture ideology
influenced the nascent tech scene. Figures such as Stewart Brand, best known for the Whole
Earth Catalog, were deeply influenced by both the counterculture and the early tech scene,
and the rhetoric, if perhaps not the purpose or spirit, of the counterculture was adopted
wholesale by Silicon Valley startups such as Apple.3
There are a number of historical points of connection between early computing culture
and the disability rights movement, mostly beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
An early, and notable, connection arose out of a chance in-flight meeting in 1974 between
a blind man and Ray Kurzweil, a young inventor who had just patented a new method
for optical character recognition.4 Kurzweil, who had just invented a solution that was in
search of a problem, learned that OCR and speech synthesis might be of use to people with
impairments to vision and, later, mobility (Petrick, 2015, p. 2). After seeing a demonstration
on television, Stevie Wonder became the second owner of the Kurzweil Reader, the device
that followed from this encounter. Kurzweil is now most strongly associated with the futurist
and transhumanist movements, having written books such as The Age of Intelligent Machines
and The Singularity Is Near. Among his beliefs are that technology will fully accommodate,
and ultimately cure, all disabilities, and that this is only one step in the move toward
3One can read about the hippie aesthetic and sensibility that colored the life of Steve Jobs, including his
love of yoga, in a number of relatively anodyne biographies and accounts (Dormehl, 2013; Isaacson, 2011)
. Perhaps more interesting is Žižek’s incisive take on the category of what he calls “liberal communist,” the
now-familiar Silicon Valley disrupter type: “Liberal communists are big executives recuperating the spirit
of contest, or, to put it the other way round, countercultural geeks who take over big corporations. Their
dogma is a new, postmodernised version of Adam Smith’s old invisible hand of the market. Market and
social responsibility here are not opposites. They can be reunited for mutual benefit” (Zizek, 2008, p. 17).
The height (or perhaps the nadir) of “Apple as revolution” rhetoric may well be the famous 1984 commer-
cial, directed with dystopian verve by Ridley Scott, that intones: “[o]n January 24th, Apple Computer will
introduce Macintosh. And you’ll see why 1984 won’t be like ‘1984” ’ (Scott et al., 1984).
I’ll largely be drawing a distinction between the hacker archetype and the disruptor archetype. There is
significant overlap here, however, especially in disruptors self-identifying as hackers, and I acknowledge that
these distinctions may skirt the “no true Scotsman” fallacy.
4Optical Character Recognition (OCR) is a technical field focused on automatically converting printed
text to a machine-readable form. It has a wide number of applications, but is of particular use to those with
print disabilities such as dyslexia and visual impairment.
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the “singularity,” the point at which technological development will experience exponential
growth. In the last chapter of this project, I’ll examine the transhumanist ideology in greater
detail and argue that the philosophy is representative of an emergent social, cognitive, and
technological superstructure that pathologizes humanity, flattens difference, and elevates
system. Though Kurzweil’s inventions have doubtless helped many, he also embodies the
dangers of infrastructure created by outsiders to a community and technological solutions
that encourage dependence rather than independence.
Though the fact that much of the disability rights and early computing movements de-
veloped in roughly the same time and many of the same places is suggestive of some useful
parallels, I do not wish to overstate the historical connections between these communities.
Rather, in invoking haccessibility as a concept, I wish to explicitly compare the values and
practices of disabled practitioners with a specific subculture, that of hackers and hacking.
In the next section, we’ll explore historical and contemporary understandings of “hack” and
“hacker,” controversial terms that can mean quite different things in different contexts. The
hacker ethos as sometimes articulated elevates autonomy, resilience, and collaboration within
small affinity groups, values that I perceive in action in many disabled communities of prac-
tice. Perhaps more importantly, the hacker ethos provides a mode of resistance, focused as it
is on understanding, subverting, and repurposing systems. As we will explore in Chapter 3,
people with disabilities stand outside the social and infrastructural norm, requiring that they
create their own infrastructure and local community. The rest of this chapter will examine
the hacker ethos and draw attention to modes of resistance and creation that can be seen in
current and historical communities of people with disabilities.
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2.7 What Is a Hacker?
“Hacker” is a contested term, one with a set of meanings and associations highly dependent
on context and culture. For most, the hacker is figured as a modern-day boogieman or,
at best, a trickster. In the news, depictions of the hacker have shifted from a suburban
adolescent capable of bringing about nuclear Armageddon to a faceless assortment of criminal
collectives to, more recently, the chosen tool of adversarial state actors for subverting Western
institutions. Casually and less consistently, individuals in government, corporations, or other
positions of power may use the term “hacker” to delegitimize whistleblowers who exfiltrate
data, such as Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, or researchers who point out security
vulnerabilities created by technical or policy decisions on the part of corporations or the
government. In fiction, especially film and television, the hacker appears as an unreliable
guide or, tamed, clears impediments from the path of the protagonist.
The original use of the word “hacker,” one that survives to this day in a number of
subcultures, is quite different from this popular figuration. The terms “hack” and “hacker”
originated at MIT in the early 1960s amongst a group of technically-minded students, many
of whom participated in MIT’s Tech model train club, the AI lab, or both.
The core members hung out at the club for hours; constantly improving The
System, arguing about what could be done next, developing a jargon of their
own that seemed incomprehensible to outsiders who might chance on these teen-
aged fanatics. [O]ne who insisted on studying for courses was a “tool”; garbage
was called “cruft”; and a project undertaken or a product built not solely to fulfill
some constructive goal, but with some wild pleasure taken in mere involvement,
was called a “hack.” (Levy, 1984, p. 9)
For these early hackers, the word “hack” already had a number of related usages. One could
“hack away” on a task or project, artlessly expending effort but making progress. One might
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implement a “quick hack,” a suspect or unreliable solution that solves a problem in the short
term. Most important, however, was the “excellent hack”—a striking or even transcendent
solution that demonstrated intimate familiarity or mastery of a system.
But as the TMRC [Tech Model Railroad Club] people used the word, there was
serious respect implied. While someone might call a clever connection between
relays a “mere hack,” it would be understood that, to qualify as a hack, the feat
must be imbued with innovation, style, and technical virtuosity. . . . The most
productive people working on Signals and Power called themselves “hackers” with
great pride. (Levy, 1984, p. 10)
Hackers, in this early use of the word, were those who worked on a problem—often
technical—out of passion rather than obligation, and who sought a deep understanding of
a system or domain. This early hacker culture valued “playful cleverness” (Stallman, 2002),
collaborative work, and the sharing of resources and results.
Much ink has been spilled over the relative legitimacy of various definitions of the word
“hacker,” particularly whether the term should be applied to curious and playful technophiles.
or to criminals who gain unauthorized access to computers. Hackers who connect themselves
to the subculture that originated at MIT often attempt to distance themselves from the
more widespread usage, insisting that hackers who specialize in gaining access to computer
systems be called “crackers” instead. This effort, by and large, has been unsuccessful, and the
ambiguity surrounding the word “hacker” remains. In comparing elements of hacker culture
to the concerns and practices of the disabled community, however, I will treat each of these
interpretations of the term as legitimate. Therefore, the term “haccessibility” as it is used in
this project draws on both the tradition of hacker as playful, deeply skilled amateur and the
tradition of hacker as specialist in gaining or preventing unauthorized access to systems.
There is a great deal to laud in the hacker ethos, at least as idealized, and this project
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will largely focus on that which is most useful in the subculture. However, I will try to
avoid giving undue credit to the hacker. The notional hacker is an ambiguous figure, and
real-life hackers frequently fall short of even this qualified ideal. Modern hackers focused
on computer security self-categorize into “black hats,” “white hats,” and, occasionally, “gray
hats,” depending on the type and legality of their work.5 Though some black hats are
whistleblowers, hacktivists, or Robin Hood types, many or most are simply criminals without
higher motivations. Though white hats as a class may seem easier to defend, their increasing
presence in corporations6 and government can, in many cases, render them merely employees
upholding the status quo rather than agents of resistance. Old-school hackers of the builder
and tinkerer variety also have notable failings and shortcomings. In 2018, Linus Torvalds,
the creator of the free and open source Linux operating system, voluntarily stepped away
from the project due to a pattern of verbally abusive behavior in his work with volunteers.
In 2019, Richard Stallman, who will receive attention in the next section as the originator
of the free software movement, was forced to step down from his public-facing roles due to
controversial statements made on a mailing list. Though the ethos of the hacker is powerful
and useful for understanding specific modes of creation and resistance, it is worth noting that,
in practice, the hacker community can be destructive, exclusory, and un-self-reflective.7
5The terms come from Western genre films in which “good guys” wore white hats and “bad guys” wore
black hats. Perhaps the best-known conference in the field of hacking is simply called “Black Hat.”
6A 2011 article in the industry publication Network Security declared, “for practitioners who have kept
to the straight and narrow . . . ethical hacking is fast becoming a mainstream career choice” (Caldwell, 2011,
p. 13) and, somewhat ridiculously, that “White hats have come out of the back bedroom and are heading
for the boardroom” (Caldwell, 2011, p. 11).
7In the 17th and 18th centuries in Britain, long before there was an organized police force, the roads were
plagued with highwaymen, mounted robbers who accosted travelers and took their money and valuables.
Despite real highwaymen being mostly a curse on travelers and everyday people, the highwayman as a figure
became a cultural locus and the subject of countless plays, broadside ballads, and early novels. The Irish
highwaymen Redmond O’Hanlon, for example, became an emblem of resistance to the Anglo-Irish gentry.
Macheath, the highwayman protagonist of John Gay’s The Beggar’s Opera, represents a noble and humanistic
resistance to a corrupt and decadent society. In ephemeral broadsides such as The Female Highwayman, the
figure was a site of otherness, an individual defying norms and standing outside society.
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2.8 Shared Concerns
Both hackers and people with disabilities are, fundamentally, concerned with the problem
of access. Old-school hackers—the Stallmans, Drapers, and Wozniaks of the world—care
about access because they have a primal need to dig into the core of a machine, system, or
program. Without the access granted through informal peer groups or initiatives such as
the free and open source software movement, the kind of exploratory work with which these
first hackers are associated becomes impossible. Hackers of the other stripe, those appearing
in news stories about state actors and data breaches, are also concerned with (frequently
unauthorized) access. By definition, these hackers are outsiders seeking entrance to systems
from which they have been excluded.
To illustrate the basis of these shared concerns, we might compare the story of Eric
Dibner’s intervention—illicitly beveling street corners in Berkeley during the height of the
Independent Living movement—to the origin story of one of the most famous hackers of the
MIT scene. As with the beveling intervention, Richard Stallman, in 1980, contended with
a question of accessibility that, like the raised street corner, served as a microcosm for an
existential threat to a thriving culture. In the AI Lab of the 1970s and early 1980s, program-
mers had created an environment based on radical sharing and radical trust. Any individual
could, and did, contribute to the lab’s infrastructure, accessing at will any machine, code,
or account. In 1980, however, a gift from outside the lab—a cutting-edge printer provided
by engineers at the famous Xerox PARC in Palo Alto—threatened to disrupt this ethos.
The printer, a modified Xerox copier, would jam frequently, leading to confusion and a lack
of coordination as jobs piled up and no single individual knew that repairs were necessary.
The figure of the hacker, like the figure of the highwayman, says a great deal about our cultural circum-
stances. If the highwayman is, quintessentially, nobility in the face of venality, the hacker is unrestricted
freedom in the face of rationalizing and racinating system. The figure of the hacker, I hope, can be useful
to us in the same way the highwayman was useful centuries ago, even if literal, real-world highwaymen and
hackers turn out to be disappointing in comparison to the ideal.
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Stallman, in the past, had resolved similar issues by writing additional functionality for the
printer and the network that sent messages about the status of the printer to those actively
using it. However, in this case, when Stallman requested the source code for the printer
from an individual working with PARC, he was refused. Stallman, surprised and mortified
by this breach of the ethos of sharing that prevailed among hackers at the time, sensed that
the incident foretold trouble for the culture of sharing, exploration, and autonomy he had
come to value:
Now that the laser printer had insinuated itself within the AI Lab’s network, how-
ever, something had changed. The machine worked fine, barring the occasional
paper jam, but the ability to modify according to personal taste had disappeared.
. . . From Stallman’s viewpoint, the printer was a Trojan Horse. After a decade
of failure, privately owned software—future hackers would use the term “propri-
etary” software—had gained a foothold inside the AI Lab through the sneakiest
of methods. It had come disguised as a gift. (Williams, 2002, p. 10)
Stallman was correct. In the years following, startups and corporations seeking to monetize
work done in and around MIT and the AI Lab snapped up hackers from the community,
asking them to sign non-disclosure agreements that wore away the culture of openness at the
lab and ultimately led to Stallman’s exile. This experience, a traumatic one for Stallman,
eventually resulted in his creation of the Free Software Foundation, an organization that
has deeply influenced how software is developed, both politically and pragmatically. Stall-
man’s philosophy that comprehensibility and freedom in the development of software are
questions of morality and ethics, and not merely of business practices, has not always been
accepted in the field—the more widely-known open source movement arose as a business-
friendly, “neutral” alternative to the free software movement. Nonetheless, Stallman’s FSF
has been instrumental in developments that serve billions, including the creation of the Linux
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operating system and the innovation that is copyleft licensing.8
Dibner and Stallman’s stories are not equivalent—for one, Dibner’s “hacking” of Berkeley
street corners helped strengthen the community around the Center for Independent Liv-
ing and the early disability rights movement, while Stallman, despite his efforts, failed to
preserve intact the hacker community at the AI Lab. Yet both encountered infrastructure
that threatened their communities and both took steps to change that infrastructure. Each
sought to bring technology in the built environment, technology originating outside of their
community’s locus of control, into tractability, making it serve not only those with the
power to create infrastructure in the first place but also their own community. In both cases,
redesigned infrastructure—curb cuts and improved printer software—would better serve ev-
eryone, not just the community in question, a generally accepted outcome of attention to
accessibility that is today called “universal access.” Finally, these interventions, whether
successful, limited in their success, or unsuccessful, served to galvanize the individual, and
their community, around activism that brought about wider change.
Communities of hackers and communities of people with disabilities share other, arguably
more superficial, similarities. Frequently, the concept of “user-friendliness” is viewed with sus-
picion by hackers and by people with disabilities, by hackers because the ideology frequently
obscures the real nature of a system and by people with disabilities because user-friendly
design too often makes assumptions based on “normal” or “average” users. Both communities
share a tendency toward function over form—that is, appreciating what something can do
over how it looks while doing it. These similar tendencies, far from universal, will be dis-
8According to copyleft.org, “[c]opyleft is a strategy of utilizing copyright law to pursue the policy goal
of fostering and encouraging the equal and inalienable right to copy, share, modify and improve creative
works of authorship” (copyleft.org, 2014). The best-known vehicles for copyleft are the GNU General Public
License (GPL) for code and the Creative Commons suite of licenses for non-code works. Copyleft licenses
have been called viral because when a work with a GPL or CC license is incorporated into or used as the basis
for another work, that work, too, must also bear the same or a compatible copyleft license. This encourages,
and in some cases mandates, the growth of a commons of freely usable works. For copyleft works, the only
restrictive right exercised under copyright law is the right to further restrict.
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cussed further in Chapters 2 and 3. For now, however, the most important correspondence
between these communities—hackers and people with disabilities—is a desire, grounded in
both moral urgency and pragmatic self-interest, to make technology, especially infrastruc-
ture, serve the local as well as the remote, the low as well as the high, the distributed as well
as the central, and those without power as well as those with power.
2.9 What Is Haccessibility?
If infrastructure comprises material and social circumstances, such as roads, housing, com-
munications systems, organizations, laws, and resources, that determine what is practical
and possible, then haccessibility is the creation of personal infrastructure that expands the
boundaries of the possible in ways that are personal, small-scale, and resistant to larger
forces. The term can apply to anyone, whether teenagers (mis)using mentions of promoted
brands on Facebook to receive a signal boost from its algorithm or the business executive
who uses a desktop computer as a footstool. However, the term is highly significant for
people with disabilities, since adaptations, workarounds, prosthetics, individualized skills,
and acts of provocation and resistance are critical to their ability to survive and thrive in
an able world. Beyond its tendency toward self-determination, another critical aspect of
haccessibility is its indifference to propriety and the need or desire to “pass” in wider society.
Like the old-school hackers from which the term is derived, those who practice haccessibility
often violate boundaries in order to expand their capabilities, explore their environment, and
play at the boundaries of the acceptable, the possible, and the expected.
To put it another way, haccessibility is about creating infrastructure—for oneself or for
one’s community—with resources that are local to the immediate environment. Practically
speaking, this often means repurposing resources or infrastructure already present. In its
ideal form, haccessibility means the creation of a certain kind of infrastructure, one that
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is responsive not only to its creator but also to its users. This is not user-friendliness,
since user-friendliness as an ideology attempts to anticipate the needs of its users, and
this anticipation cannot take into account the full gamut of preferences and capabilities
of all groups and individuals. Rather, it is the acknowledgment that such anticipation is
impossible and the encouragement, in design and intent, of further repurposing by users. In
this sense, haccessibility is what programmers would call recursive, or self-referential and
repeating. This is because a well-designed piece of haccessible infrastructure will lead to
further repurposings, hacks and contributions, which may in turn lead to their own, and so
on.
Joshua Miele, a blind scientist and designer at the Smith-Kettlewell Eye Research Insti-
tute, has articulated this recursive property in discussions of making a meta-maker move-
ment. In these presentations, Miele describes meta-making as creating tools for creating
tools. The projects Miele himself has initiated, such as Blind Arduino, perfectly embody
this meta-making ethos. Arduino is a low-cost, open source electronics platform used for
prototyping devices. As the project description observes, “while blind people could inde-
pendently develop projects using Arduino, many of the important accessibility steps were
undocumented and unknown” (Smith-Kettlewell, 2015). The project, which included a work-
shop series and continues as a blog, provides essential knowledge for working eyes-free with
Arduino. As the project brings blind and low vision individuals in from the cold, they, in
turn, are likely to contribute to a growing ecosystem of hackers and developers. Similar
projects, such as the Raspberry VI—short for Visually Impaired—mailing list, centered on
the popular Raspberry Pi series of single-board (read: small) computers, have enabled com-
munities of knowledge creation to form around technologies that are flexible and inexpensive.
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2.10 Hacking High Costs
Haccessible infrastructure is, or should be, low-cost. Living with a disability is expensive. In
developed countries, limb prosthetics, though they vary widely in cost, generally are priced
in line with a car and must be replaced every few years—three years on average, but as low
as a few months in some cases. Hearing aids, in 2018, cost between $1500 and $3000 for a
single ear, about the cost of two months’ rent for the average American household (Freuler,
2014). Screen readers, an essential piece of software for the blind, can also cost a great deal.
The JAWS screen reader, by some measures still the most popular, cost $895 in 2018, or
$1095 for the professional version. A refreshable Braille display, necessary for using Braille in
conjunction with a computer, can range in cost from around $3500 to around $15,000. The
high costs for these and countless other forms of infrastructure for people with disabilities
mean that these technologies do not generally respect the autonomy of their users. Because
they are based on proprietary—secret and legally protected—technology, they are generally
not easy to repair and cannot be modified by the user. In addition, their high cost means
that an external contributor—a family, a neighborhood, a school, or a government—must
frequently step in to pay. While such costs are often gladly shared, such reliance can provoke
feelings of guilt and can be a blow to independence for people with disabilities. Arguably
the worst outcome of these high costs is their reinforcement of other forms of inequality,
particularly class based, racial, and geographic inequality. For example, while many children
in the Global North can take advantage of programs to subsidize prosthetic limbs—though
non-veteran adults frequently cannot—limb prosthesis in the Global South is almost uni-
versally nonexistent or unaffordable. According to the World Health Organization, 80% of
those with a physical disability live in countries classified as low-income, and of that 80%,
fewer than 2% have access to rehabilitative services (Dally et al., 2015, p. 66).
A number of communities have begun to coalesce around the creation and modification of
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low-cost alternatives to proprietary technologies for people with disabilities. Many of these
communities are small and, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, suffer from issues of algorith-
mic effacement—that is, interested individuals frequently cannot discover such communities
through online means due to the inherent majoritarianism of search and social platforms.
Online communities of people with specific concerns related to disability often resemble the
early internet of the ’90s or the modern dark web, operating primarily through vectors such
as word of mouth, a loose federation of links, and serendipity.
Hearing Hacks (hearinghacks.com), a self-described “community of hearing aid users,
hackers, #audpeeps, audiologists and hearingcare innovators who care about improving life
with hearing loss,” is one such group. The community was founded by an individual with
moderately severe hearing loss who, in 2014, was inspired by the experience of helping a
startup develop a smartphone-based hearing test and hearing amplifier, realizing that, in his
own words, “change is possible even if it seems too hard. And that it’s easier with a group”
(Trombetta, 2015). The group is organized around a blog and occasional small conferences
and meetups. “Hacks,” as envisioned by the group, are not necessarily technical, but can
equally be social or even philosophical. The group includes both technical and non-technical
contributors. A recap of one recent meetup involved a session brainstorming ideas for more
effective communication with friends, family, and colleagues, including plans to draft a script
to explain hearing loss to others and a filter for TripAdvisor to find quiet venues in an area
(Trombetta, 2016). Groups such as Hearing Hacks represent both the fragility and resilience
of small communities of people with disabilities online. Communities like Hearing Hacks
have, in recent years, been instrumental in galvanizing support for low-cost and modifiable
alternatives to expensive proprietary hearing aids, and ongoing work toward open source
software, such as Leibnitz University’s Cape4all, and commoditized hardware, based on
inexpensive microcomputers such as the BeagleBoard, is encouraging.
In the blind community, one low-cost, modifiable, and community-oriented revolution
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has already taken place. For many years, blind computer users were faced with a dilemma:
pay an extremely high, and often recurring, price for the JAWS screen reader, or not use a
computer at all. Frequently, the cost of even the initial license for JAWS would be more than
the cost of the computer itself. Though JAWS allowed many blind and low vision people
to work with computers, this high cost shut many out and was a significant burden even on
those able to afford it. In 2007, two blind programmers, Michael Curran and James Teh,
set out to create a screen reader that would be open source and free of charge. This was
a monumental undertaking—screen readers are an esoteric technology, and unlike operating
systems, compilers, or other significant forms of software infrastructure, there are no books
or university courses for learning how to create one. According to Curran, speaking of the
creators of other, proprietary screen readers, “ ‘[w]hatever they created couldn’t be leveraged
because we couldn’t see their code, so we had to pretty much invent everything ourselves.
. . . That really depended on trial and error” ’ (Preusler, 2017). The new screen reader,
Non-Visual Desktop Access (NVDA), has proven successful, popular, and, perhaps most
importantly, free of charge. In addition, NVDA users can write and share their own add-ons,
allowing individuals to change the behavior of the screen reader to their own preferences or
to adapt it to specialized tasks. NVDA add-ons have, for example, allowed blind hackers
to use previously inaccessible editors for programming, play certain previously inaccessible
games such as Pokemon Crystal, speak with one another through Internet Relay Chat (IRC),
and work with quantitative data in the form of tables and equations.
2.11 Hacking To Live
As we have, if briefly, observed, disability is expensive, and access is often a premium good
reserved for those in the developed world with ample resources. In this context, infrastructure
following a hacker ethos can be life-changing, allowing people with disabilities to live their
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lives to their full potential. In some cases, however, the need for specific hacks to live life is
fully literal—that is, some people with disabilities are dependent on specific hacks for their
health and even their continued existence.
The Mayo Clinic defines sleep apnia as “a potentially serious sleep disorder in which
breathing repeatedly stops and starts” (Mayo Clinic, 2019). The condition increases risk of
metabolic syndrome, diabetes, and heart disease, and can increase the chance of complica-
tions related to surgery. One of the main forms of treatment for sleep apnea is through use
of a CPAP, or Continuous Positive Airway Pressure, machine, which keeps nasal passages
open and prevents the cessation of breathing during sleep. CPAP machines are considered
medical devices, and though they collect data for diagnostic and research purposes, that data
is not made available to users in any form. Instead, patients are supposed to bring an SD
card to their medical appointment, have a doctor read the data, and make changes to the
settings and usage of the device based on their recommendations. Though this requirement
sounds initially reasonable, just as a person with diabetes benefits from feedback on blood
sugar levels to identify problems and patterns in real time, those with sleep apnea benefit
from access to their own data to resolve highly local problems. This post on MyApnea.Org,
a web forum for those with sleep apnea, shows the usefulness of user access to sleep data:
After one of those nights from h-ll, waking up initially on the machine after 1.5
hours and not being able to get back to sleep right away, I looked at Sleepyhead
software with the expectation I wouldn’t find anything significant. I was totally
wrong as it looks like a large leak woke me up. I then realized that the eye-ware
mask I woke last night to block out light on a new humidifier that I bought to
use in addition to the machine, probably dislodged the mask. Anyway, I turned
the humidifier around this morning to block out the light and hopefully, that will
solve the problem. (UnassumingOrangeRedCormorant9252, 2015)
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In the case of the CPAP user above, it is much less likely that, after waiting days or weeks to
see a doctor, and being removed from the immediate circumstances of the machine’s failure,
they would have had a similar insight. At the same time, as they waited for a meeting with a
doctor, their machine would not have been functioning properly, jeopardizing their sleep and
their health. Further, many doctors do not have the training, time, or inclination to analyze
and interpret the data generated by a CPAP, while the patient, often in cooperation with
an online community, is highly motivated to uncover patterns and can more easily correlate
them with their own subjective experience of impaired sleep.
The software used in the above example, Sleepyhead, is a powerful example of haccessi-
bility:9
The free, open-source, and definitely not FDA-approved piece of software is the
product of thousands of hours of hacking and development by a lone Australian
developer named Mark Watkins, who has helped thousands of sleep apnea pa-
tients take back control of their treatment from overburdened and underinvested
doctors. The software gives patients access to the sleep data that is already being
generated by their CPAP machines but generally remains inaccessible, hidden by
proprietary data formats that can only be read by authorized users (doctors) on
proprietary pieces of software that patients often can’t buy or download. (Koe-
bler, 2018)
One patient whose CPAP was not resolving her apnea and who had a doctor who was largely
uninterested in examining her data observed that her CPAP experience using the software
was “night and day” and that she is “possibly alive because it exists” (Koebler, 2018).
9In 2019, Watkins discontinued his involvement with the Sleepyhead project somewhat acrimoniously
after disagreements with members of the community over development priorities (Watkins, 2019). The
project’s code base has been forked (the free and open source term for split off and continued under different
management) and development continues under the name OSCAR.
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Though sleep apnea is a serious and potentially life-threatening condition, the CPAP
machines that treat it, and the data they generate, are still located outside of our bodies.
In other cases, the boundaries among the medical device, the data it generates, and the
self are more indeterminate, making control of medical data by private corporations even
more troubling. Hugo Campos, a programmer, designer, and, more recently, an advocate for
patient rights, has for years sought access to a device, a cardiac defibrillator, that is implanted
in his chest and which is hooked up to the internet. The device regulates the electric system
that controls the beating of his heart, detecting any abnormalities and administering a
corrective shock if necessary.10 Implanted in 2007, the model Campos received was one of
the first to stream data over the internet, first to the manufacturer, Medtronic, and then
to his doctors. Despite the fact that this data is data about his body, and generated by a
device within his body, Campos was refused access to the information it generated. In a
profile for The Economist, Campos recalls his initial reaction: “ ‘I remember thinking that
I’d be able to get alerts from the device, to see what it was doing. I asked my doctor to
point me to the patient website. And he looked at me and said, ”Oh, this is all for us, not
for you“” ’ (The Economist, 2019). Though Campos was frustrated by the proprietary nature
of the data created within, and about, his own body, the situation became more dire when,
in 2012, he lost access to his health insurance. In practice, that meant losing all insight
into the operation of the defibrillator implanted in his chest, the data for which includes
essential dimensions such as battery life of the device, fluid buildup in the chest, and the
amount of time it takes to administer a life-saving shock (“Fighting for the Right to Open
10In researching Hugo Campos and the e-patient movement, I encountered a group, “Hu-manity.co, advo-
cating for the creation by the UN of a 31st human right, the ”right to legal ownership of . . . [one’s] inherent
human data as property,“ to be ”added to the existing 30 human rights adopted by the United Nations in
1948“ (Hu-manity.co, 2020). The group appears to be creating an app, ”ClubPrivate,“ that would serve as in
intermediary so that consumers could sell their own personal medical data to companies, a fee, naturally, go-
ing to Hu-manity.co. I’m not sure how late capitalism a society has to be to have hybrid for-profit/nonprofit
legal entities pushing through new internationally-sanctioned human rights to create first mover advantage
in a new market, but we’re there.
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his Heart Data,” 2011). In response, Campos purchased a pacemaker program on Ebay and
flew to South Carolina for a course on how to read his data—a course at which he was the
only non-doctor in attendance (“Hugo Campos,” 2016). Campos’s largest victory to date
came in 2015, when the Librarian of Congress granted a three-year special dispensation for
Campos and three other patient researchers to circumvent technical measures put in place
by medical device manufacturers to block patient access to data (Sellars, 2015). Though this
ruling represented a hard-won legal victory for patients’ rights, it was still only a first step
and, years later, there are still not widespread protections in place to allow patients access
to data created by their own bodies and for their own treatment. Dave deBronkart, another
patient rights advocate, noted at the time of the ruling that “this is a far cry from what
e-patient advocates really want (medical device interoperability, standardized data formats,
and better data access through open APIs) to help pave the way toward transparency, which
is critical for patients to know what’s happening in their bodies” (deBronkart, 2015).
Since the late 2000s, there has been increased advocacy and awareness for patients’ rights
and, specifically, the right to access devices and data protected by industry DRM.11 As med-
ical information available online is increasingly consumed by patients as well as doctors, an
e-patient movement has formed around this new form of participatory medicine. “E-patient,”
originally coined to refer to “electronic patients” or patients that perform their own research
on the web, has become a self-designation for those who are, according to a white paper
released by the Society for Participatory Medicine, “empowered, equipped, engaged, [and]
enabled in their health and healthcare decisions” (Ferguson, 2007). In 2009, a self-designated
11Digital Rights Management, or DRM, is software or software features intended to restrict a user’s use of
the software or an associated device. Essentially, DRM is a digital lock, or an attempt to put something like
a lock in place in an environment, the general-purpose computer, in which such restrictions are inherently
technically difficult. Cory Doctorow observes that “DRMs are technologies that treat the owner of a computer
or other device as an attacker, someone against whom the system must be armored. Like the electrical meter
on the side of your house, a DRM is a technology that you possess, but that you are never supposed to
be able to manipulate or modify” (Doctorow, 2008). DRM is often more of a legal barrier than a technical
one—putting in place technical restrictions gives corporations the ability to pursue violations in court under
laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
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e-patient, Dave deBronkart, was invited to give a keynote at a medical conference from a
patient perspective and, out of frustration, titled his talk “Gimme My Damn Data, Because
You Guys Can’t Be Trusted” (deBronkart & Eysenbach, 2019). The talk, and the provoca-
tive title, became a rallying cry and sub-movement of the larger patients’ rights, e-patient,
and participatory medicine movements. These developments are paralleled in recent, and at
least mildly successful, advocacy initiatives such as the Right to Repair movement. There
is a sad irony in the fact that farmers seeking access to the repair specifications and data
products of their tractors share almost identical concerns to patients seeking insight into
the operations of their pacemakers, glucose monitors, bladder stimulators, and hearing aids.
However, due to the enclosure of fundamental rights through the application of technolog-
ical and legal measures such as DRM and the DMCA, the e-patient and Right to Repair
movements are natural allies, and progress in advocacy, infrastructure development, and the
law might prove broadly beneficial.12
A final, sobering example shows the need for the local, informal expertise, embedded
in communities, that I associate here with haccessibility. Polio is a virus that, in some
infected individuals, can result in paralysis of the legs and, in severe cases, the head, neck,
or diaphragm. After the development, approval, and introduction of the polio vaccine in
the mid-1950s, occurrences of polio were dramatically reduced worldwide. However, even in
the United States there are individuals who continue to be affected by exposure to the polio
virus, and who require major interventions, including the use of a tank respirator, better
12Past decades have seen dramatic market concentration in the United States (De Loecker & Eeckhout,
2017; Grullon et al., 2019; Gutiérrez & Philippon, 2017), including the emergence of a winner-take-all (or
most) dynamic in the medical and technology industries (Van Reenen, 2018, p. 3). As anti-trust laws go
unexercised and sectors coalesce into oligopolies, corporations begin to wield disproportionate market and
policy power over consumers (or, as we were once innocently known, the public), and regulatory capture
and undue industry influence in government become endemic. Concentration, however, comes with certain
liabilities, and there is some reason to believe that widespread disgust with the excesses in these industries
could mean that the pendulum swings the other way. A strong and history-aware introduction to the
reemergence of oligopoly and market power is The Curse of Bigness (Wu, 2018), especially Chapter 7, “The
Rise of the Tech Trusts.”
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known as an iron lung, to live. The last iron lungs were manufactured over 50 years ago,
and there are no extant manufacturers of either the devices or the parts needed to maintain
them.
A commonality in the stories of those who continue to need an iron lung to survive is hy-
perlocal—community or family—technical expertise. In a 2017 profile on the last remaining
users of the iron lung, we see this necessary dependence on informal—sideways rather than
top-down—community know-how, but also the terrible consequences that follow when it is
absent:
Recently, an ice storm knocked [polio survivor Martha Lillard’s] . . . power out
for three days and the generator malfunctioned. The fire department came over
but they wouldn’t run a power line from down the street or provide a temporary
generator, Lillard said. Fortunately, one of the firefighters came by when he was
off-duty and fixed the generator. During the panic, Lillard thought about Dianne
Odell, a polio survivor who died in her iron lung in Memphis in 2008, after she
lost power during a storm. Her father and brother-in-law took turns pumping
the bellows by hand but couldn’t sustain the rhythm long enough to keep her
alive. (J. Brown, 2017)
As we see here, the upkeep of an iron lung is not a matter of top-down infrastructure or
political organization. There are too few polio survivors who require an iron lung to live
to make the manufacture, sale, or maintenance of these devices economically feasible, and
too few survivors to formulate or advocate for political measures to remedy the situation
from above.13 The above recounting of Lillard’s experience should be chilling, and not only
on one level. Superficially, her story is moving as a close call, relatable in the same way
that any life-threatening emergency is relatable.. On a deeper level, her experience reveals
13We will explore this dynamic more thoroughly in the next chapter.
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a fundamental disconnect, an inability of the polis, of society at scale, to intervene on the
meso or human level, to adapt to a set of conditions where a fundamental need is not as
assumed.
The level at which this experience should disturb, however, is this: those who needed an
iron lung, and who did not have access to specific skills through their immediate community,
were already dead. Over fifty years, the breakdown of such a machine as an iron lung is
not a matter of if, but when. In reality, these devices require constant maintenance, with
a major intervention or overhaul every few decades—Lillard’s cuff, for example, needed to
be replaced more than ten times. The fact that each of these survivors has access to an
individual capable of such interventions is not a coincidence, but rather a precondition.
It may seem that these iron lung survivors, as an example of the absolute need for hac-
cessibility in some situations, constitutes an extreme example. I would argue, however, that
their stories are extraordinary only in that the exigent nature of their need is comprehensi-
ble to outsiders. We are all dependent on informal community relationships and structures
for survival. In the cases of many people with disabilities, the need for informal, meso-level
knowledge and infrastructure is absolutely essential. However, structure and community that
meet these needs are, by definition, resolving issues that resist comprehension from outside,
commonality across larger groups, and top-down intervention. Locality, fundamentally, is
not broadly legible. To the extent that fundamentally local needs, fundamentally local con-
cerns, can be understood at the level of society, they cease to be local. The extent that the
society can accommodate locality is not the extent to which it can hand down tailor-made
solutions to individual situation and circumstances. Rather, it is in relinquishing control to
the local, to the meso-level, in granting autonomy, a concept that will be a major concern
of the following chapter.
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2.12 Stepping Back From the Hacker
Occasionally, the straightest path between two points is a straight line. This chapter opened
with Terry Garrett and his goal to play a particular game to completion. In realizing this
goal, Garrett, unfortunately, did not bring sweeping changes to the video game industry.
Even less surprisingly, Garrett did not uncover a universal cure for blindness. Yet it would
be unfair to say that, in completing Ocarina of Time, Garrett accomplished nothing in the
wider world. Brush was cleared from a path. A lamp was lit. A thought became easier to
think. A small impossibility became, briefly, a small possibility.
In this chapter, I’ve drawn a series of parallels between people with disabilities and
hackers. There is a sense in which I mean this as a notable, highly literal, and perhaps
underrealized comparison. Hacking, as a practice, is broadly useful to many people with
disabilities. Many people with disabilities, myself included, consider ourselves hackers. Many
who are unaware of, or uncomfortable with, the term would be a credit to hackers everywhere
should they choose to embrace it. People with disabilities and hackers, as we have seen,
challenge the status quo, defy norms, disdain barriers, create strong affinity groups, and
build our own stuff.14, 15, 16
Though I think this comparison is productive in itself, I also use it here as a starting
point for a larger set of questions and concerns. These, fundamentally, revolve around auton-
omy—that is, the nature of the relationship between a subject and its environment, or the
inside and the outside. In this chapter, we’ve focused on hacking as a mode of negotiation
between the individual and the physical and social environment. In the next, we’ll theorize
autonomy in the context of disabled identity. Among other things, we’ll consider autobi-
ographies of disability, seeing how—and whether—they resist the majoritarian worldview
14Because no one else will.
15Pretty cool, right?
16Hackers and the accessibility-obsessed also send a lot of annoying emails to companies and expect them
to change their websites and apps. And once in a while we even get paid for these services.
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enforced by society.
As we move forward in this project, we’ll move outward. Haccessibility, fundamentally,
is a mode that aids an individual, or an affinity group, to negotiate the immediate physical
and social environment. Sometimes, it inspires or enables the creation of infrastructure,
such as hackable hearing aids or the Non-Visual Desktop Access screen reader. It can also
precipitate broader advocacy-based change. In focusing on autonomy and autobiography
in the next chapter, we’ll consider the ways individuals with disabilities express their own
identities, but we’ll also explore the relationship between a shared, constructed disability
identity and the broader society. In Chapter 3, we’ll examine larger built structures, specif-
ically infrastructure, and while we’ll still be concerned with the individual we will begin to
consider threatened subject positions of larger entities and collectives such as the humanities
or the academy. By the final chapter, we’ll consider humanity’s autonomy in a totalizing
environment—one which, knowingly or unknowingly, we have constructed around ourselves.
Though we step away from the hacker as representative of a mode of negotiation, we’ll
ultimately revisit haccessibility and the ethos of the hacker as we search for solutions to
larger questions of autonomy. Though hacking itself is limited as a mode of resistance and a
vector for change, the hacking ethos, which holds up decentralization, locality, repurposing,
and sharing, may provide us with ways forward as we contend with systems that promote
injustice, inequality, waste, disenfranchisement, and exploitation. Though hacking frequently
only grants autonomy to the hacker, and hacking itself requires forms of privilege that are not
widely available, in building social and physical structures that are alterable and responsive
to local needs it may be possible to democratize the kind of autonomy that is currently only




CHAPTER 3. AUTONOMY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY 48
3.1 Encountering Stuff
In the previous chapter, I used the word “autonomy” to describe certain arrangements among
people and things, or among people and people. The term, at least in the context of a
community of hackers or a Center for Independent Living, has positive connotations, evoking
associated concepts such as freedom, dignity, and self-actualization. But what does it mean
to be autonomous—or, for that matter, independent— in this sense? Upon cursory reflection,
it seems obvious that we are all enmeshed in a complex web of relationships, that our lives are
contingent on forces and processes beyond our direct control, and that we are all dependent
on others to some greater or lesser extent. In an absolute sense, then, no individual is truly
autonomous. Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing drives this home in a passage evocative of Daniel
Kish’s sentiments on his long white cane:
In order to survive, we need help, and help is always the service of another, with
or without intent. When I sprain my ankle, a stout stick may help me walk, and
I enlist its assistance. I am now an encounter in motion, a woman-and-stick. It is
hard for me to think of any challenge I might face without soliciting the assistance
of others, human and not human. It is unselfconscious privilege that allows us
to fantasize—counterfactually—that we each survive alone. (Tsing, 2015)
It seems clear that no individual can be entirely independent. Yet terms such as autonomy,
used to describe the nature, kind, and quality of subjective actions and connections, have
weight. This chapter, concerned primarily with subjective experiences of disability as ex-
plored through autobiography, is concerned with accounts of day-to-day experiences in the
lives of people with disabilities, and in particular the interactions between the individual
and the immediate physical and social environment. But on what basis do we evaluate these
relationships? Are independence and autonomy chimeras, products only of a refusal to ac-
knowledge one’s presence in an interconnected web of people and things? If the concept of
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autonomy is actually useful, should it be applied as a subjective evaluation, or can we fit it
into a broader theory of a world full of people and things, narratives and perspectives?
Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time, provides a framework for conceiving of the relation-
ship between the subjective self and the immediate physical environment. In a well-known
example, that of the hammer, Heidegger contends that entities in the world have a property,
handiness, that is revealed through their use:
Hammering does not just have a knowledge of the useful character of the hammer;
rather, it has appropriated this utensil in the most adequate way possible. . . .
[T]he less we just stare at the thing called hammer, the more we take hold of it and
use it, the more original our relation to it becomes and the more undisguisedly it is
encountered as what it is, as a useful thing. The act of hammering itself discovers
the specific “handiness” [“Handlichkeit”] of the hammer. We shall call the useful
thing’s kind of being in which it reveals itself by itself handiness [Zuhandenheit].
(Heidegger, 2010, p. 69)
In this Heidegarian paradigm, the world is given shape through the use of entities that are
to hand. When we tell time using a clock, the nature of the clock is revealed. Heidegger
does not mean that we learn objective truths about the clock—rather, our experience of the
clock becomes that of an entity useful for telling time.
Though Heidegger describes the use of a hammer or the reading of a clock as discovering,
as our own subjective self, a property of handiness, we might, more or less equivalently,
construe the change as a forging of a relationship between our self and the thing at hand.
When we use the hammer, we draw it towards us. It becomes part of our sphere of influence,
a thing over which we have, and through which we exercise, autonomy. However, thinking of
the subjective universe in terms of Heidegger’s handiness ignores a critical vector. Heidegger’s
das Zeug, typically translated as “equipment” but which, more critically but still accurately,
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might be called “stuff,” suggests a passive or receptive world waiting to be seized. However,
as anyone who has caught themselves on barbed wire can attest, stuff is neither passive nor
neutral. Whoever uses stuff should see to it that in the process they are not used by stuff.
And as you reach out through stuff, stuff will reach out through you. To put it another
way, the built environment around us isn’t just composed of neutral artifacts waiting for us
to discover their useful properties. Instead, they are frequently the equipment of another,
serving another’s purposes. In the modern environment, when we reach out for an artifact
such as a vending machine, a card reader, a park bench, or a cell phone, we do not simply
find useful equipment, but become useful equipment. While these objects are “to hand”
and, ostensibly, serve our immediate purposes, their use coopts us into broader systems over
which we have little control. In raising these tools, we, in turn, become equipment in distant
hands.
Does this get us closer to an understanding of autonomy, or suggest whether the concept
is useful for understanding how we, as people, negotiate our environment? In this chapter, I
propose to consider autonomy as the condition of not being acted through. To be autonomous,
by this view, is to not be the tool of another. If we are drawn closer to someone or something,
if we become “to hand” in the Heidegarian sense, then in that regard we are not acting with
autonomy. This more specific definition of autonomy will be useful because this chapter,
and this project as a whole, is concerned with negotiation—points or surfaces where the
individual encounters the world. Autonomy, or a lack of it, provides one way to describe
not only the shape and substance of these interfaces, but also a directionality: outward or
inward, acting or acted upon. In this sense, we are concerned with autonomy because it
allows us to understand the nature and direction of our relationships and connections, the
weft of our encounter with the world, or, as Anna Tsing would describe it, the precarity of
our place in a greater assemblage.
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3.2 Ghosts and Levers
How, in encountering the world, finding that which is handy or to hand, and using stuff
for our own ends, might we, in turn, become equipment? How do we, in acting, become a
medium through which another can act?
The phenomenological perspective articulated by Heidegger in Being and Time regards
space in a sense that is holistic, rather than literal. Objects and entities to which we are
habituated, or through which we act, are near to us. Entities that are unfamiliar to us, or
through which we cannot act, can only be near to us in the trivial sense of being literally
proximate to us.
Thus, we cannot understand by this the objective presence of a corporeal thing
[Korperding] (the human body [Menschenleib]) “in” a being objectively present.
Nor does the term being-in designate a spatial “in one another” of two things
objectively present, any more than the word “in” primordially means a spatial
relation of this kind. “In” stems from innan-, to live, habitare, to dwell. “An”
means I am used to, familiar with, I take care of something. It has the meaning
of colo in the sense of habito and diligo. (Heidegger, 2010, p. 54-55)
Literal, physical space is not unimportant to Heidegger, since physical space does matter to
whether an object is “to hand” and thus part of the world as we encounter it—it’s difficult
to drive a nail with a hammer located in another country. But the nature of the relationship
to the entity is at least as important. If books are a feature of our ongoing encounter with
the world—what Heidegger calls Dasein—then learning to read will bring us closer to them.
Since space, in this conception, depends on the nature of our encounter with the world, we
can think of a wheelbarrow as making objects lighter, a bicycle as making a city smaller, and
socks as making a room warmer. Though Heidegger’s examples, such as his hammer, are
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mostly in this vein, he does begin to apprehend more dramatic alterations to the nearness
and distance of things in their relationship to us imposed by technology:
Initially and for the most part, de-distancing is a circumspect approaching, a
bringing near as supplying, preparing, having at hand. But particular kinds of
the purely cognitive discovery of beings also have the character of bringing near.
An essential tendency toward nearness lies in Dasein. All kinds of increasing
speed which we are more or less compelled to go along with today push for
overcoming distance. With the “radio,” for example, Dasein is bringing about
today a de-distancing of the “world,” which is unforeseeable in its meaning for
Dasein, by way of expanding and destroying the everyday surrounding world.
(Heidegger, 2010, p. 102)
The Heideggerian worldview, where space is a function of our own nature and the nature
of our relationship to the objects and people around us, has implications for how we think
about autonomy, not as a separation or independence from the world around us but as a
measure of our ability to meaningfully act, to draw things closer to us or to distance ourselves
from them.
There are other implications to this worldview. One is that stuff has allegiance. While
we make demands on the built environment—sitting in chairs, opening doors, looking out
windows, climbing up stairs—the built environment makes demands on us. The locked door
or gate bars passage, creating demarcations where there is distance for one and nearness for
another. Adversarial equipment (fences, walls, doors, signs, checkpoints), in a social context,
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functionally determines geography, how space for us is constituted.1
Thinking of the phenomenon more broadly, however, we see a key threat to the exercise
of our autonomy. The more we look around our built environment, the more we see that it
is filled with entities that reach out to and through us, but do not allow reaching back in
return. That is, these objects, though close to us in a literal sense, are distant from us in the
real way that we encounter the world. Though we will engage with this idea more fully in
the next chapter when we consider the implications of infrastructure for negotiation, we can
see this reality most plainly and obtrusively in the object, and ideology, of the smartphone.
These interfaces constrain behavior, encouraging specific sanctioned uses, and especially
passive consumption, while reporting detailed information on user behavior and location.
Though the smartphone is an intimate companion—a majority of Americans keep them in
reach as they sleep—they are, in a Heideggerian sense, alarmingly distant from the users they
appear to serve. Despite their intimate physical proximity, the smartphone as an artifact is
itself never drawn closer to us and is never “to hand” in the sense of the hammer—ironic,
given the German word for cell phone is the faux-loanword Handy. The smartphone does not
conform itself to us, but conforms our interactions and behavior to its abstract affordances.
Some artifacts—a cane, a pot, and, yes, a hammer—create energy, connections, impetus that
flow from us and our volition outward to our immediate environment. Other artifacts—the
codex and the letter come to mind—allow for others in far places and times to reach out to us,
and the impetus flows in great part from the world and toward ourselves. These artifacts,
however, allow us to encounter them largely on our own terms—my trade paperback of
Twilight won’t report my reading habits back to Stephenie Meyer, but my Kindle edition of
1I use the term adversarial equipment here to contrast with Heidegger’s concept of equipment as handy
or to hand, and as a more general term that can apply equally to objects, devices, and architecture. In
architecture more specifically, this concept has been called hostile architecture, defensive architecture, exclu-
sionary design, or unpleasant design. Examples include spiked park benches to discourage overnight sleeping,
irritating sounds to deter youth congregation, or blue lights to make it difficult for drug users to find veins.
See Callous Objects: Designs Against the Homeless (Rosenberger, 2017) and Unpleasant Design (Savicic &
Savic, 2016).
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Snowden’s Permanent Record will happily, and with great irony, report on me to Amazon.
The smartphone, and its eReader and tablet cousins, are not artifacts in the sense of the
hammer—without constant two-way communication they are fit only for the landfill. Rather,
they should be thought of as interfaces, processes, or, most evocatively, presences.2
The corporate and government organizations that gather data and influence behavior
through our smartphones exert influence that is a palpable but indistinct influence, invisible
but nonetheless determinant of our subjective experiences. These ghosts are felt only in the
exercise of their agendas, whether through dark patterns3 crafted to extract money or data
or through the discouragement of actions or technologies that might disrupt the status quo.
Therefore, when we pick up a smartphone, we are using the device, but not appropriating it,
making it “to hand” in the sense of the hammer or the pot. Instead, we become ourselves “to
hand,” becoming a vehicle, a point of leverage, for distant and dimly apprehended presences.
We attribute a bold claim to Archimedes: “Give me a lever long enough and a fulcrum
on which to place it, and I shall move the world.” Imagine, for a moment, a world of warring
Archimedes, straining, with their levers, to wrest the world in their preferred direction. To
us, the fulcra, these engineers are hidden from our view, the reach of their levers too long for
us to follow. We can only feel the torque, and note the movement of the world as a distant
contender finds purchase. When we raise a phone, scroll through a feed, and touch the
screen, we know that we communicate with distant others. But there is another presence or
presences with us, determining what we see and do not see. These presences set the ground,
2The ubiquity of the term “creepy” to describe the feeling of presence evoked by a literally proximate but
subjectively distant piece of equipment alludes to the ambiguous relationship we have with these interfaces.
Our cell phone is creepy for the same reason a ghost is creepy: it is both present and not present, and its
nature, goals, and relationship to us can only be engaged with, at least for most of us mortals, on the level
of intuition.
3In programming, a design pattern is a broad approach to solving a common problem or category of
problems. In 2010, Harry Brignull, a user experience designer, created darkpatterns.org to draw attention
to a trend in user experience design that pushes users toward choices counter to their own interests, such as
sending invites to a service to email contacts or signing up for recurring payments. “Dark pattern” is now
an accepted term for design decisions that leverage an understanding of behavior in the aggregate for ends
that are coercive or user-hostile.
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creating the environment in which we exercise volition and benefiting from our actions. The
shift of the lever might create or suppress a movement, determine the outcome of a close
election, destroy a business, start a trend, or alter public opinion.4
Another presence can be felt through the preferences of the normative majority in the
lived environment. Conveniently, Heidegger presents another term for this normative entity:
das Man, derived from the German equivalent of “one,” as in “one must not do that.” Das
Man shapes the nature of our built environment, determining who is included and who is
excluded. Das Man has working legs, and so the built environment gives precedence to
stairs. Das Man can drive, and so the dominant mode of transportation is the car. Das Man
is not pregnant, carries government-issued identification, and does not experience chronic
pain. The environment around us is built for Das Man, and the presence of this normative
entity, this demographic chimera, is felt in every assumption about our capabilities as we
move through the world. To draw once again on our spatial metaphor, Das Man exists in a
world of short distances, open portals, and unimposed restrictions.
4These are rapidly becoming uncontroversial claims. It is superficially true that, throughout history,
powerful, influential, or talented groups or individuals have suaded populations by various means. Though
sophistry, demagoguery, and appeals to self-interest and group affiliation are ancient, the sophistication,
reliability, and marked effectiveness of methods developed in this connected era make for a qualitative
change. In the mid-2000s, scholars such as Phillip Howard noted that modern information technology was
creating, and would continue to create, large differences in how political campaigns were conducted (Howard,
2006). Roughly contemporaneously, in industry, an awareness of the susceptibility of consumers to stimuli
that could be effectively tested in real time began to coalesce under the loose designation “neuromarketing”
(Fisher et al., 2010; Renvoisé & Morin, 2008; Zaltman, 2003), which used, or misused, techniques from
neuroscience such as electroencephalogram, eye tracking, and facial coding to sell people more stuff. In 2009,
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler released the popular Nudge, coining the terms “libertarian paternalism”
and “choice architect” and advocating for the more concerted use of modern technological and scientific
influence to public-facing domains such as law, commercial finance, and medicine.
In 2000, Google ran the first known A/B test of the internet age, using a specialized, though simple,
statistical and scientific technique to determine which of two choices would be preferred by users, later
using the method to choose the optimal blue for advertisement links from 41 options (Hern, 2014). As a
former Google engineer said, chillingly enough, of a later A/B test at Amazon: “Everyone must be able to
experiment, learn, and iterate. Position, obedience, and tradition should hold no power. For innovation to
flourish, measurement must rule” (Linden, 2006).
Tracing this history could be another dissertation and not a footnote, but after revelations of emotion
inducement at Facebook, promotion of extremism in pursuit of engagement at YouTube, and the use of
platform data by foreign powers to influence elections, this area is receiving a great deal of attention from
academics and public intellectuals and is unlikely to go unexplored.
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In an incisive application of Heidegger’s conception of space to a disability studies context,
Josephine A. Seguna outlines the differing relationship with space experienced by Nancy
Mairs, a writer who moves through the world with the use of a wheelchair:
Heidegger (1962) maintains everything an individual deals with or engages, is ei-
ther near or far relative to that individual and therefore the understanding of such
“nearness” and /or “farness” becomes how an individual familiarizes or learns to
represent oneself as space. This “proximity” is the basis of how humankind comes
to represent itself, not through containment or objective measurement but as a
state of Being. Yet . . . Mairs (1996), eloquent in asserting her personal perspec-
tive of the world, demonstrates the capacity of Heidegger’s theory to question the
alienation of the presupposed “subjective” province of the able-bodied experience
. . . (Seguna, 2015)
Seguna argues that Heidegger’s phenomenological worldview—that a bicycle makes a city
smaller, that a sweater makes a room warmer—is a useful model for disability studies in that
it moves exclusionary practices from the subjective (“I feel excluded”) to an understanding of
the real nature of the world (“She is not allowed to be present”). If we take this proposition
seriously, and perhaps we should, we might understand personal accounts and autobiography
differently—that is, not as a peek into an isolated subjectivity, but as a description of the
world, a universality reflected through locality. Consider briefly a passage from Mairs cited
by Seguna:
[N]ot one of them seemed to think that any life was going on below the level of
her or his own gaze. “Down here!” I kept whimpering at the hips and buttocks
and bellies pressing my wheelchair on all sides. “Down here! There’s a person
down here!” My only recourse was to roll to one side and hug a wall. (Mairs,
1996, p. 59)
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A naive commentator, reading this moving passage, might appreciate some insight into the
disabled experience and perspective. I would argue, however, that this view is limited and
self-protective, an act of separation. We are all tyrannized by das Man, the normative and
the majoritarian, yet some of us feel the disconnect between the local and the universal every
day, every hour, or even every minute. For Mairs, this physical and social separation is not
just a perspective, but the world as it exists.
So far, our discussion of autonomy has been largely abstract. Mairs’s plea immediately
and powerfully reifies the concept and its stakes. Autonomy is our ability to meaningfully
act, to be fully present in the world, to be fully empersoned, to be not only an end but also
a middle and a beginning. This brief passage is local to Mairs and her experience, but we
easily abstract it to our own experience, drawing a connection to our understanding of the
broader world and back to ourselves. In the remainder of this chapter, we will engage with
other local experiences and understandings as expressed through personal accounts and, in
particular, the autobiography as a form. Our concern is with the world as encountered,
how built structures and presences as das Man constrain autonomy, and how individuals
negotiate through practices such as autobiographical recursion—that is, writing that reflects
and affects life, and life that affects and reflects writing.
3.3 The Thin Thread
In the previous chapter, we situated negotiated access at meso level or person scale—that
is, somewhere between a decontextualized self and a distant, universalized, or wide-angle
view of society. Autobiography, as a form, traditionally draws a line between these points:
the particular and the universal, the self and the society, the body and the body politic. In
Reading Autobiography, Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson place the emergence of autobiogra-
phy in the eighteenth century and with a preoccupation with the universal and metaphysical
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as manifest in the self:
Autobiography, now the most commonly used term for life writing, thus describes
writing being produced at a particular historical juncture, the period prior to
the Enlightenment in the West. Central to that movement was the concept of
the self-interested individual of property who was intent on assessing the status
of the soul or the meaning of public achievement. By the eighteenth century,
notions of self-interest, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge informed the figure
of the “Enlightened individual” described by philosophers and social and political
theorists. (Smith & Watson, 2002)
For Smith and Watson, autobiography “privileges the autonomous individual and the univer-
salizing life story as the definitive achievement of life writing” (Smith & Watson, 2002). This
formal preoccupation of autobiography with seeking out the universal within a life makes
it a fraught site for depiction of lives experienced outside a universal norm. In Negotiated
Memory, Julie Rak wrestles with this question, observing how non-Western epistemologies
that emphasize connections among individuals and a communal spirituality cannot readily
be mapped onto the Western autobiographical tradition: “It is hard for people raised in
liberal traditions that assume that all people are unique and should exist as individuals, or
who believe implicitly that spiritual matters are separate from material ones, to imagine this
other set of ideas about what the production of knowledge and personhood itself can mean”
(Rak, 2005, p. 1). The generic form of the autobiography exerts a gravitational pull away
from consideration of the local environment or community and toward the relationship of
the self, and especially personality and morality, to the universal.
Post-colonial, feminist, and Marxist critics have rightfully regarded the autobiography
with suspicion given the history and limitations of the genre, including the privileging of
voices and perspectives that can be easily universalized and the distortion of those that
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cannot. Despite the unsuitability of the form to convey the stories of the minoritarian, the
disenfranchised, or the simply different, those with perspectives resistant to imposition of a
universal narrative still attempt to communicate their experiences through the form. Rak,
with empathy and pragmatism, touches on why this might be the case:
Whether autobiography critics want to admit it or not, the “traditional” discourse
of autobiography still carries much cultural capital in the West. People who have
historically been unable to secure representation inside of the Welds that guaran-
tee authenticity and legitimacy in Western discourse are often very much aware
of the power of autobiographical discourse when they choose to enter it. This
makes it important to understand why people who do not enjoy the automatic
assumptions of the representability of their lives in texts use the forms that may
seem to exclude them. (Rak, 2005, p. 2)
In short, autobiography, reliant as a form on representability, the thin thread between the
personal and the universal, does not easily serve stories and experiences that do not conform
to a more general narrative. Despite this, the promise of the autobiography for self-expression
and advocacy is such that those with truly divergent experiences cannot resist taking up the
genre and conforming to, or attempting to transcend, its limitations.
In the previous chapter, we shifted our attention away from the isolated self, associated
with the medical model of disability, and the broad collective, associated with the social
model. Instead we focused on the local physical and social environment, the points at which
an individual negotiates the world around them. This chapter on disability autobiography
will share a similar concern with the local, and will consider disability autobiography from
three perspectives. First, taking the texts of autobiographies at face value, we will draw
on these works for examples of negotiation—local knowledge, community, and infrastruc-
ture that led to survival, autonomy, or self-actualization. Second, we will consider these
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autobiographies not from the inside, but from the outside, regarding the texts themselves
as instances of negotiation. Considering the autobiographies themselves as pieces of infras-
tructure or as products of a community, or as failed or successful attempts to transcend
an imposed narrative, sheds light on ongoing struggles for autonomy among people with
disabilities. Finally, we will draw on the tensions between individual and society within
autobiography to explore how people with disabilities negotiate between the local and the
universal. As we will see, people with disabilities frequently struggle against narratives im-
posed on them by society. In biographies of disability, we see the struggle for purchase on
the universal, the strategies employed by people with disabilities to contend with a casu-
ally hostile social consensus—the ignorant, apathetic, and sometimes cruel das Man. Like
Scheherazade, they must tell a story to change the story, and the stakes are high.
Many autobiographies of people with disabilities are further troubled by questions of
authorship or influence, placing them somewhere between an autobiography and a family
biography—in this chapter, I refer to such works as “auto-ish biographies.” This chapter will
attempt to read instances of disability autobiography not only for examples and instances
of negotiation within the text, but also as sites of negotiation in and of themselves. In
these cases, an autobiography is not only a way of conveying a freestanding experience of
disability, but in itself is an artifact of negotiation, one that, by its existence, allows the
disabled individual to reconsider their relationship to those around them and to society.
At the same time, many disability autobiographies demonstrate an awareness of the form,
leveraging it to intervene in imposed narratives or otherwise escape the limitations of the
genre. At their best, these autobiographies can use the recursive or self-referential nature of
the form to transcend it, speaking directly to the experience of life with a disability.
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3.4 Movement and Expression
Two autobiographies, published more than fifty years apart, provide a useful case study in
the forms of negotiation discussed here, including specific strategies such as hacking the im-
mediate physical and social environment and recasting, through self-expression, a narrative
imposed on an individual by society. My Left Foot is a 1954 autobiography by writer Christy
Brown, who was born with cerebral palsy in a society, mid-twentieth century Ireland, where
the condition was poorly understood. Double Take is an 2009 autobiography by photog-
rapher Kevin Michael Connolly, who was born with no legs in Helena, Montana in 1985.
Both Brown and Connolly were poor, but had the full, and often unconventional, support of
family members. Both find creative ways to fully participate, and eventually excel, in cho-
sen domains—painting and writing for Brown, skiing and photography for Connolly. Both
Brown and Connolly find ways to mitigate disabilities of mobility relatively early on, but for
each the primary challenge is to find a mode of expression that enables a redefinition of their
relationship to society. Though their stories are similar in many ways, important differences,
including their relationship to the medical establishment, show how the treatment of people
with disabilities by society has changed since the mid-twentieth century, but also how the
concerns of people with disabilities between these periods are fundamentally similar. More to
our point, these accounts are useful entry points into a larger discussion of negotiation—that
is, how autonomy can be exercised at the physical, social, and cultural places where the indi-
vidual encounters society. Brown and Connolly’s accounts detail encounters with the limits
of specific physical infrastructure, including a few almost transcendent moments of hacces-
sibility. Perhaps more significantly, their experiences, up to and including the publication
of the accounts themselves, represent attempts to change the narrative and, potentially, the
culture, to draw that thin line between the local and the universal.
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3.5 His Left Foot
In 1932 in a suburb of Dublin, Christy Brown was born the tenth of an eventual 22 siblings,
nine of whom would die in infancy. When he was four months old, his mother noticed that
he had difficulty holding up his head during feeding. As he grew older, it became evident
that Brown struggled to control his movements. His hands remained clenched at all times,
he had trouble opening and closing his mouth, and by one year he was still unable to sit up
on his own.
Almost every doctor who saw and examined me, labelled me a very interesting but
also a hopeless case. Many told mother very gently that I was mentally defective
and would remain so. That was a hard blow to a young mother who had already
reared five healthy children. The doctors were so very sure of themselves that
mother’s faith in me seemed almost an impertinence. They assured her that
nothing could be done for me. (C. Brown, 2014, p. 10)
Though these doctors offered little hope, Brown’s mother refused to believe that the condition
of her son’s mind reflected the condition of his body or that he was irredeemable as a member
of the family. Rather than hide Brown in a back room, a common practice at the time, and
focus only on his physical needs, she persisted in working and speaking with him: “[w]hile
my father was out at bricklaying earning our bread and butter for us, mother was slowly,
patiently pulling down the wall, brick by brick, that seemed to thrust itself between me and
the other children, slowly, patiently penetrating beyond the thick curtain that hung over my
mind, separating it from theirs” (C. Brown, 2014, p. 12).
Brown’s bridging of the gulf of communication between himself and his family, his jus-
tification of the faith placed in him by his mother, comes in a transcendent moment of
haccessibility. On a typically overcast Irish day, gathered around the fire, Brown watched
his older siblings practice spelling on an old slate:
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It was the chalk that attracted me so much. . . . Suddenly I wanted desperately
to do what my sister was doing. Then—without thinking or knowing exactly
what I was doing, I reached out and took the stick of chalk out of my sister’s
hand—with my left foot. (C. Brown, 2014, p. 15)
After his left foot, “apparently on its own volition, reached out and very impolitely took the
chalk out of . . . [his] sister’s hand” (C. Brown, 2014, p. 15). His mother, picking up on
the tension in the room and seeing Brown gripping the chalk, pushes Brown across the final
divide:
I stiffened my body and put my left foot out again, for the third time. I drew one
side of the letter. I drew half the other side. Then the stick of chalk broke and
I was left with a stump. I wanted to fling it away and give up. . . . I tried once
more. Out went my foot. I shook, I sweated and strained every muscle. My hands
were so tightly clenched that my fingernails bit into the flesh. . . . Everything in
the room swam till the faces around me were mere patches of white. But—I drew
it—the letter ‘A’. There it was on the floor before me. Shaky, with awkward,
wobbly sides and a very uneven centre line. But it was the letter ‘A’. I looked
up. I saw my mother’s face for a moment, tears on her cheeks. Then my father
stooped down and hoisted me on to his shoulder. (C. Brown, 2014, p. 17)
What stands out in Brown’s recounting of this first achievement is the narrowness of the pas-
sage from noncommunication to communication. The description is powerfully reminiscent
of a difficult labor—“I sweated and strained every muscle. My hands were so tightly clenched
that my fingernails bit into the flesh.” The shaky “A,” with “awkward, wobbly sides,” even
has a fragile, newborn quality.
The overwhelming suggestion here is of an event that might not have occurred, and
which, in fact, was unlikely to occur. The specific circumstances—the chalk and slate, the
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couching of the event as a miracle, the necessity of the family presence, the difficulty of
the “labor”—suggest a moment, the appearance of a path forward, that is as fragile as it is
powerful. Here, the thread between the individual and the universal is notably attenuated.
Brown’s transformation, a necessary precondition for his telling of his own story, might just
as easily not have come to pass.
Haccessibility, here, provides a narrow, but absolutely essential, way forward for Brown,
one that is a precondition for his later work. Brown’s writing of the character “A” is maxi-
mally local—one room, one slate, one piece of chalk, one foot, one letter. The chalk is not
any chalk, but “a long, slender stick of vivid yellow” (C. Brown, 2014, p. 15). The foot is
not a foot, or his foot, but his left foot. The “one letter, scrawled on the floor with a broken
bit of . . . chalk . . . , was my road to a new world” (C. Brown, 2014, p. 17). The event is not
one that can “scale,” or that can be easily applied in other circumstances. And yet, in itself,
it is indisputably powerful.
Another hyperlocal adaptation from Brown’s childhood, essential but fragile and con-
tingent, was “Old Henry,” a wagon (“go-car” in Irish parlance) used by Brown’s brothers to
take him with them on their adventures around Dublin. In a chapter called simply “Henry,”
Brown describes these adventures—swimming in a local creek, going to the cinema, telling
stories around a fire, hiding fruit stolen from a garden in Brown’s wagon:
It was a ugly, battered old thing that nobody ever treated well. It was always
being kicked, knocked over, shoved about and trampled on. Everybody joked
about it. But to me it was something lovable, almost human. . . . I had seen my
first glimpse of out-door life sitting on its seat with the feathers sticking out of
it. I can remember the wet wind on my face that day as they raced me along
through busy streets. I can remember sitting in it as my brothers sat playing
cards with their pals under a street lamp on a dark winter night when the gutters
on the road were running with water and the lamplight was reflected in them so
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that they looked like little rivers of gold in the dark. (C. Brown, 2014, p. 37)
For Brown, Henry meant inclusion. The wagon allowed him to be a full participant, to go
anywhere in the city and its environs with his brothers. Despite staring and odd looks from
others, Brown, at eight, was not aware of his own difference. This changed when Old Henry
broke down and was put away in the coal shed to rust:
I was lost without it. My brothers could no longer bring me with them when
they went out to play. Mother talked of getting me a new car when father went
back to work, but I hardly heard her; I was bewildered. . . . It wasn’t just that I
missed the old car so much. It was the way I felt when I could no longer go out
with my brothers. Everything was changed. I was thrown upon myself at last.
That queer idea that there was something wrong which had entered my mind
sometimes before now loomed larger. (C. Brown, 2014, p. 47)
The breaking down of the go-car forces a reckoning for Brown. Before, his full participation
in the adventures and antics of his brothers insulated him from substituting his own image
of himself for an image forced on him by others. After his exclusion, Brown begins to see
himself as others see him:
Up to then I had never thought about myself. True, there had come sometimes a
vague feeling that I wasn’t like the others, an uneasy sort of stirring in my mind
that came and went. But it was just one dark spot in the brightness of things
. . . I began to hate the sight of those hands, the sight of my wobbly head and
lop-sided mouth as I saw them in the mirror, so that I soon came to hate and
fear a mirror. It told me too much. It let me see what other people saw . . . (C.
Brown, 2014, p. 50)
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Without Henry and the full participation it facilitated, Brown is forced to see himself as
others see him—dependent, ugly, other. Henry, an incidental piece of the environment,
almost the definition of local infrastructure, shows how critical individualized adaptations
can be for negotiation, not only in everyday physical interactions but also in the creation
of an image of self. The informal nature of these adaptations makes them contingent and
vulnerable, but can also facilitate a defiance of social conventions that seek to restrict the
actions of people with disabilities.
Haccessibility, as a mode, provides a bridge between the individual and the immediate
environment. It requires no special permission, no approbation from the wider society. In
Brown’s case, this is critical. Not only did doctors not believe that Brown was capable of
communication through writing, they would later forbid him as a young adult from using
his left foot to express himself, thinking that it would interfere with a medical cure. If
Brown’s writing of the letter “A” were dependent on a prior understanding by the broader
society—das Man—it would not have occurred. Likewise, if Brown’s childhood adventures
with his brothers needed the permission of those Dubliners giving him “queer looks,” he
would not have been able to participate.
Haccessibility here, as it frequently does, throws the tyranny of the idealized normal, the
elusive das Man, into sharp relief. Brown’s writing with his left foot makes clear a lack of
understanding on the part of those that write with the “right” hand. There is a sense in
which these acts of haccessibility are more powerful for their limitations. By creating ways
forward that are contingent, local, and born of necessity, they show the narrowness and
inflexibility of the physical and social environment and its inadequacy for meeting the needs
of its inhabitants.
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3.6 Seeking Expression
Haccessibility—the creative use of his left foot—made communication possible for Brown.
However, to understand the extent of Brown’s negotiation, his drawing and redrawing of
the thin thread that connected the particulars of his life to a legible universal—we should
consider his repeated redefinition of self through new forms of expression.
Brown’s first redefinition of self related to the conditions of his immediate environment
and his relationship with his family. At five, Brown’s writing of the letter “A” allowed him to
remain physically present—that is, to not be institutionalized. It also redefined his identity,
marking him a full member of the family. At the age of ten, Brown is faced with another
crisis of identity. After his exclusion from full participation in the adventures of his brothers
and the realization that he is different from those around him, Brown withdraws and is
considerably unhappy: “I was now ten and a half and beginning to sink deeper and deeper
into myself. . . . [N]othing . . . could bring back the happy child that used to be me. . . . In
his place was a tense, silent, great-eyed creature who had nerves as sharp as broken glass
and as taut as telegraph wires” (C. Brown, 2014, p. 54). At this crux, Brown once again
redefines himself through the discovery of a new form of expression.
When one of Brown’s brothers receives a set of watercolors for Christmas, Brown trades
for it, and, after the holiday, begins to practice. Before long, Brown has become so immersed
in painting with his left foot that he has little attention left for unhappiness: “As I became
further attached to painting I began to feel happier and more tranquil within myself. I was
less inclined to snap at the others if they asked me anything or even spoke to me, as I did
before. Painting became the one great love in my life, the main pivot of my concentration.
I lived within the orbit of my paints and brushes” (C. Brown, 2014, p. 62). Painting
allows Brown to redefine himself as productive and useful, and he receives relatively early
validation after winning a contest in the Irish Independent, a widely circulated newspaper.
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At age fifteen, however, Brown finds himself in another crisis of identity. Brown develops an
attachment to a local young woman, but finds his feelings are reciprocated only with pity.
At the same time, his siblings rapidly develop into young adults with their own romantic
attachments, and, eventually, family responsibilities.
Brown, as a young adult, is once more thrown into a crisis of identity by his disability,
beginning to resent his family and regard his home as a prison. In the Ireland of the 1960s,
this crisis becomes centered on two hopes for a cure: the seeking of a miracle at Lourdes, a
Catholic holy site, and an involvement with a nascent Irish medical establishment at the early
stages of an understanding of cerebral palsy. Though Brown is not particularly interested
in religion, he agrees to a trip to Lourdes partly for the experience of travel and partly for
the prospect of a miracle. Though the miracle, perhaps unsurprisingly, is not forthcoming,
Brown does find, for the first time, that he is not the only individual with a disability:
As I saw all those people each with his or her own suffering, a new light began
to dawn upon me. I was rather bewildered; I had not imagined there could be
so much suffering in the world. I had been rather like a snail shut away in his
own narrow little shell and that was only now beginning to see the great crowded
world that lay beyond. Not only were all those people afflicted, but, to my
surprise, their handicaps were actually worse than my own! (C. Brown, 2014, p.
94-95)
Brown’s experience at Lourdes holds a suggestion of the universal, a narrative into which
he might fit. Leaving aside the possibility of a cure and inauguration into das Man, in this
experience he sees for the first time that he is not alone in his disability. Religion suggested
a prescribed path for Brown, one of the few available in the Ireland of the 1960s—embrace
temporal suffering and look for deliverance and commonality in the coming world. This path
to the universal, however, is not for Brown:
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I remembered Lourdes and the people I had met on the way to the Grotto,
and again I tried to be like them—patient, cheerful, resigned to their suffering,
knowing the reward that awaited them in the next world. But it was no use. I
was too human. There was too much of the man in me and not enough of the
humble servant who submits willingly to his Master’s will. I wanted to see and
to know more of this world before I thought about the next. (C. Brown, 2014,
p. 101)
Religion, should Brown choose to embrace it, would provide a path to the universal, granting
legibility and meaning through an approved narrative. His local circumstances, his aspira-
tions, his struggle to participate and communicate would all be subsumed into a larger story.
Though Brown senses this path at Lourdes, he finds it impracticable at home. To use another
term from Heidegger, the narratives experienced at Lourdes, and the contrasting narratives
at home, are apophantic—“to let something be seen in its togetherness with something, to let
something be seen as something” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 31). Brown, here, is struggling with
received wisdom, a shared vision of the nature of the relationships among people, places, and
things that includes a defined, if decidedly marginal, place for himself. To reject the roles in
which he is cast—holy cripple, pitiable cripple, medicalized cripple—he must reject not only
that specific role, but some significant portion of the social and cultural reality that situates
and contextualizes his identity. It is for this reason that Brown’s gradual emancipation is
at once greatly impressive and entirely piecemeal. Though, after his experience at Lourdes,
Brown consciously and unambiguously rejects the role of the holy cripple, he cannot fully
reject the roles of pitiable cripple, with which he struggles, and medicalized cripple, which
he largely accepts, without first rejecting his family and community, a practical impossibil-
ity given his environment at the time of writing My Left Foot and the social and historical
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context.5
Though Brown’s inspired act of haccessibility as a child was a necessary, if precarious,
precondition for his full participation in society, it is ultimately his writing that enables him
to recontextualize his social reality and exert a measure of autonomy over his circumstances.
After Brown receives what he and his family perceive to be a rare opportunity—being invited
to visit a specialist at Middlesex Hospital in London—Brown receives another promise of a
miracle, one that comes at much higher cost to his identity:
“Well, Christy,” she said. “You haven’t come to London in vain. I can find
no reason why you shouldn’t be cured eventually. . . . But—” here she paused,
looked steadily at me, and went on—“you must first make a big sacrifice. Nothing
good is ever obtained without one, and yours is—you must resolve never to use
your left foot again.” . . . My left foot! But that meant everything to me—I
could speak only with that, create only with that! It was my only means of
communication with the outside world, my only way of reaching the minds of
other people and making myself articulate and intelligible. The rest of me was
useless, worthless, and that one limb, my left foot, was the only workable thing in
my whole body. Without it I would be lost, silent, powerless.6 C. Brown, 2014,
p. 123
A modern reading of Brown’s experience with doctors and clinicians is frustrating—though
5The significance of Brown’s immediate physical and social environment on the writing of My Left Foot,
written while Brown lived with his family in the 1940s and ’50s, can be seen by contrasting the autobiography
with his semi-autobiographical novel Down All the Days (1970). The latter was written after the death of his
parents and thus under entirely different social and, given the elapsed time, cultural circumstances, and in
it Brown is far more candid about topics omitted or downplayed in My Left Foot. These include his father’s
alcoholism and his sexual awakening and frustrations.
6There seems something notably perverse about this injunction for Brown not to use his foot for commu-
nication. I am reminded of Anderson’s The Little Mermaid, in which the title character gives up her speech:
“this voice you must give to me; the best thing you possess will I have for the price of my draught.” . . .
“But if you take away my voice,” said the little mermaid, “what is left for me?” “Your beautiful form, your
graceful walk . . . ” (Andersen, 2011, p. 69).
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Brown generally has an unambiguously positive opinion of the medical professionals he en-
counters, therapy for cerebral palsy in the ’40s and ’50s was at an early stage and it is unclear
what, if any, benefits he received from his treatment. At the same time, the loss of the use of
his left foot for Brown’s ability to express himself represented another crisis of identity—“I
felt as if I was about to lock myself up and throw away the key” C. Brown, 2014, p. 125.
Contained in Brown’s forbiddance from using his left foot is the germ of a new oppor-
tunity for identity and communication. At St. Brendan’s, where Brown goes to receive
physical therapy, Brown encounters Robert Collis, a doctor who was also a noted author.
Collis, finding that Brown spent much of his time writing and had attempted to write an
autobiography, mentored him, found him a tutor, and, eventually, drew on connections to
help see My Left Foot published. The autobiography was, and continues to be, successful,
setting Brown on a different life trajectory. The book was popular enough to be adapted into
a 1989 film that won Brenda Fricker and Daniel Day-Lewis academy awards.7 Materially, the
novel allowed Brown to live a markedly different economic and social life that, eventually,
included romantic partnerships, independent living, and aspirations and personal relation-
ships that exceeded the expectations of Ireland’s rigid mid-twentieth century class system.
In writing My Left Foot, in writing about his life, Brown altered that life. And, because these
changes are, themselves, reflected in his writing, the act of autobiography, and the assertion
of autonomy, create a resonance. This self-referential relationship between life and narrative,
autonomy and autobiography, is, like haccessibility, a powerful form of negotiation, one that
has some capability, though always tenuous, to provoke significant change.
7In a, perhaps excessively Irish, twist, Brown’s semi-autobiographical Down All the Days also inspired a
U2 track by the same name.
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3.7 Recursion, Recounting, Re-Creation
There is a strong recursive element to Brown’s My Left Foot, especially as expressed in re-
lation to his life and identity. This is not unusual for autobiographies of disability, though
My Left Foot serves as a particularly powerful example. Recursion, in symbolic logic and
programming, is the property of being defined in terms of oneself. Though recursion can
seem like a logical contradiction or tautology—“a dog means a dog”—interdependent, mu-
tually recursive relationships actually inform or underlie many or most abstract or symbolic
systems. The OED defines ability as “[s]uitableness or adaptation for a purpose; fitness,
aptitude.” It defines aptitude as “[n]atural capacity, endowment, or ability; talent for any
pursuit.” (The entry for disability opens boldly with “lack of ability.”) The fact that the
definitions are defined in terms of one another in endless referentiality is not a problem for
the integrity of the symbolic system. As Douglas Hofstadter observes, “[a]nyone can see
that all words eventually are defined in terms of some fundamental set that is not further
reducible, but simply goes round and round endlessly” (Hofstadter, 1985, p. 433). Language,
at least as it is formalized and encountered in a dictionary, can be conceived as a network
of mutually recursive definitions. In programming, this form of paradox is common—not
only can a function refer to itself in its own definition, but a programming language can be
self-hosted, or itself written in itself.
One might also think about identity, autobiography, and lived experience as mutually
recursive, defined in mutual reference to one another. As one lives, one forms an identity
that is presented to the world. The identity necessarily is defined in terms of one’s lived
experience, and one’s life is shaped by one’s identity. When one writes an autobiography,
one draws on lived experiences and identity, but once it exists in the world one’s identity and
future experiences cannot be fully described without reference to the autobiography. Placing
an autobiography in the world creates an odd sort of resonance. The identity is founded on
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the life, and the autobiography on the identity, but once published the life and the identity
must contain the autobiography. The autobiography, in a sense, anticipates and contains its
own existence.
It feels intuitively as if the relationship among life, identity, and autobiography should
be an unstable one. However, recursion is only a paradox, not a contradiction. Language is
mutually recursive and, though language changes over time, this recursive property does not
invalidate language or mean that it is fundamentally unstable. In computation, a recursive
function either resolves itself or settles into a stable loop. What is remarkable about autobi-
ography is not that it exists unstably or uncomfortably in relation to its subject, but rather
that it can create something from nothing. Once an autobiography is written, a new stable
equilibrium must emerge between it and the author’s life and identity. Though, in order
to be legible, an autobiography must attend to commonly shared or universal concepts and
archetypes, writing an autobiography can also be a powerful act of self-creation, an exercise
in autonomy.
This recursive property of autobiography is in powerful evidence in My Left Foot. Funda-
mentally, the autobiography centers around Brown’s writing of the autobiography. Its first
chapter, “The Letter A,” recounts Brown’s first step toward telling his own story. The last
chapter, recursively enough, recounts a recounting of the first. My Left Foot closes with a
description of a charity concert for cerebral palsy organized by Robert Collis, the doctor who
encouraged Brown in his writing. At the concert, his first chapter about the use of his left
foot to write the letter “A” is read to the public:
For the first few minutes there was still a good deal of noise in the audience,
people shuffling their feet, and coughing. I saw one man reading a morning
paper. Obviously he had come to enjoy a concert, not to be made listen to a
lecture on cripples. . . . Gradually, however, as the doctor read on, movement
and noise ceased; there was silence, complete stillness. I looked down at the faces
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before me, but now they were no longer just questioning faces with peering eyes,
but intent friendly faces full of interest, no longer seeming to look at me, but
fixed on the doctor as he went on reading my chapter. They were listening. . . !
(C. Brown, 2014, p. 182)
In this final scene of My Left Foot, we see the stable emergence, the renegotiation, of Brown’s
locality to the universal and of the universal to the particularity of Brown’s experience.
The scene here echoes and recasts Brown’s earliest traumatic encounters with das Man,
exemplified in the casual indifference of the man with the newspaper and the “peering eyes”
that judged him as a child on the streets of Dublin. What we see here is negotiation. Brown
has eased—partially, imperfectly, and temporarily—a relationship with the universal that
is, in his own words in this scene, “tense, . . . taut as a telegraph wire” (C. Brown, 2014, p.
182). The thin thread between the local and the universal, between the feeling person and
das Man, grows a little less tenuous.
3.8 Double Take
If the recursion of Brown’s My Left Foot suggests the recursion of language, another disabil-
ity autobiography, Kevin Michael Connolly’s Double Take, suggests the visual recursion of
an infinity mirror.8 Double Take is a 2009 memoir by Kevin Michael Connolly, a photog-
rapher and skier born without legs to a working-class family in Helena, Montana. As with
Brown, Connolly’s autobiography is characterized by the support of family, unconventional
adaptations for mobility, and a negotiation of the bounds of self-expression in an able society.
Coming from a working-class background in Montana, Connolly’s family, for better or
worse, emphasized toughness, resilience, and a tolerance for pain. After a formative episode
8An infinity mirror is a set of two (or more) mirrors that, in concert, create the effect of reflections
receding to infinity. I’ll elaborate on this image more fully when we return to it later in the chapter.
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at a McDonalds playplace that mirrors Brown’s realization, upon the breakdown of the go-car
Old Henry, that he is different from others, Connolly’s mother prepares him for anticipated
slights at school by playing a game called “What if?”
“Kev?” Mom asked, her head twisting so her eyes could make contact with mine.
She smiled. “Let’s play a game.” . . . The rules to “What If” were simple. At
the beginning of every game, a hypothetical scenario was thrown out, and I tried
to field the answer. . . . “What if you look up in the grocery store, and I’m not
there?” . . . “What if someone starts beating on you on the playground?” . . .
And, of course, “What if someone comes up to you and says, ‘You don’t have
legs’?” (Connolly, 2009, p. 23)
At school, Connolly faces a variety of physical and social challenges with a tolerance for
bodily and social discomfort. When drawn into a fight on the playground, for example,
Connolly, unable to throw a punch while controlling his wheelchair, chooses to simply take
the blows. In Connolly’s family, and in rural Montana more broadly, competitive sports are
highly valued, and with his strong upper body Connolly opts to join his school’s wrestling
team. After joining, however, Connolly finds that his lack of height, and thus leverage, can
be exploited for a win by physically weaker opponents. Despite the fact that he has little
chance of winning, Connolly and his father agree that the correct action is for him to take
the punishment in order to complete the season, seeing through to the end his commitment
to the team. When Connolly tries skiing as a possible new sport, he is introduced to a new
subculture: “dirtbags,” hard-drinking skiers with no attention to their appearance and only
little attention to self-preservation on the slopes. Connolly is given a literal crash course
in skiing by his dirtbag instructor, becoming proficient and even talented within the sport
but not without serious injury, including multiple concussions. Connolly’s tolerance for risk
and pain mirrors the attitude demonstrated by family members such as his father, who
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exacerbates back and eye injuries sustained on the job in order to drive Connolly to ski
competitions.9
3.9 Taking the Low Road
Like Brown, Connolly’s experience of disability is characterized by a single, transcendent
hack that changes his relationship with his environment, and which, even more so than
Brown, requires a defiance of social norms. Like Brown, Connolly also resolves the tension
between himself and das Man through an act of self-expression that redefines his relationship
to those around him. At an early age, Connolly is exposed to haccessible infrastructure
created specifically for him. The year of Connolly’s birth, 1985, saw the airing of MacGyver,
a television show in which the title character solved problems through quick thinking and
mechanical improvisation. Connolly traces how each successive season of the show coincided
with a new adaptive invention by his father, a fan of MacGyver. These adaptations included
thick “leathers” which prevented Connolly from wearing out his pants, levers at ground level
to control lights, and a special device—the “throne”—that prevented Connolly from falling
9It almost goes without saying that disabled people have something to prove. There’s a prevailing and
reflexive disregard, even a contempt, for displays of disabled athleticism, a disregard recently demonstrated
in the poor treatment of the Paralympic Games when they were hosted by Brazil in 2016 (Ashley, 2016).
In many cultural and historical contexts, disabled people were largely excluded from exercise, which was
more socially regimented (D. Jackson et al., 2014, p. 12), and means of social advancement via physical
prowess, almost a prerequisite for any success in some cultural and historical contexts, was barred or limited.
When not being treated as contemptible for their efforts, people with disabilities are frequently painted as
superhuman, again minimizing their achievements and setting them apart—the “supercrip” trope (Hartnett,
2000; Silva & Howe, 2012). There is a machismo to Connolly’s desire to excel in sports and to the wider
cultural context that drives him to prove himself in this specific way, and on that basis, and on the basis of
his taking on risk and pain, one might be tempted to consider his efforts ridiculous. On the other hand, one
might also fethishize his efforts, attaching him to a narrative of the superhuman or the supercrip. I think his
flexibility, pain tolerance, and persistence are most productively conceived not as something to reflexively
denounce or commend, but rather as something idiosyncratic, a local set of circumstances that affect how
he moves in the world. These choices, and the self-narrative that accompany them, are significant because,
and not despite, the fact that his solutions cannot be universalized, or consistently implemented by others.
For a deeper take on intersections at disability, masculinity, and sport, I recommend “The Wheelchair’s
Rhetoric: The Performance of Disability” (Kuppers, 2007) along with Murderball, the 2005 documentary it
critically examines.
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into the toilet. Connolly’s relationship with more conventional technology for accessible
mobility was more strained. Though he loved the Reeboks that came with his prosthetic
legs—“you know your marketing is solid when you can get a no-legged kid excited about
buying a new pair of sneakers” (Connolly, 2009, p. 18)—he found the superficial appearance
of normalcy that came with his prosthetics to be a poor trade-off for their weight and lack of
mobility. On the other hand, Connolly found the more conventional narrative of disability
that accompanied his use of a wheelchair to be equally restrictive.
Ultimately, Connolly’s chosen, and highly individual, technology of mobility became the
longboard, a variant of the skateboard optimized for cruising over distances rather than doing
tricks. Here, Connolly explains why the longboard, and not the wheelchair, fit his approach
to life and travel:
I had found that the longboard was a much more practical tool than a wheelchair
for getting around in another country. It was fairly cheap, as my full setup cost
$150. Another crucial element was that it was replaceable. Unlike a wheelchair
or set of legs, I could buy a longboard off the shelf of a local skate shop—a hugely
comforting convenience. Most important, though, was its speed. On flat land, I
could nearly keep up with a bicycle, and on it I was able to get almost anywhere.
(Connolly, 2009, p. 85)
Connolly’s reasons for choosing a longboard resonate with the philosophy of the patient
rights, e-patient, and Right to Repair movements discussed in Chapter 2—that is, he can
exercise autonomy over a device that is, in a broader sense, essential to the working of his
own body. Another way of thinking about the longboard, however, is as a negotiation of
his position in relation to das Man. Skateboards, because they are non-essential recreational
goods for a mass audience, are cheap and widely available. Wheelchairs, more frequently
regarded as institutional infrastructure, are typically available only within a defined physical
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and social structure that makes extensive assumptions about how they will be used.10
Once Connolly had chosen to use a longboard for transport, there were two forms of
challenge he still needed to overcome to use it while traveling the world. The first, and the
more surmountable, was practical and physical. Extended time on the board could be bumpy,
and to better absorb shocks Connolly had a friend create a device similar to his childhood
“leathers,” essentially a combination shoe and seat that, in Connolly’s words, resembled a
“leather flowerpot.” Another issue was propulsion. While Connolly had tough hands, using a
hand all day to propel his board would normally be untenable. To resolve this, Connolly took
a glove and wrapped it in so many layers of duct tape that it resembled a gauntlet. After
burning through layers of duct tape during the day—the object was “incredibly smelly”—he
could simply add more tape.
These clever (and inexpensive) approaches to the physical challenges of moving through
a wide variety of environments came relatively easily to Connolly. A second category of
challenges to his free movement, social challenges, proved more difficult to resolve. Wherever
he went, Connolly encountered stares and dramatic reactions. Some of these were simply
rude or ignorant. Frequently, however, Connolly learns that his encounters with others
are mediated through their own historical and cultural narratives. In Sarajevo, Connolly
is apologized to, seen by locals as a childhood victim of a legacy of war. In coastal New
Zealand, a child questions whether he was attacked by a shark. In his own Montana, he is
often mistaken for a veteran of the Iraq War, while in central Europe he is frequently accosted
for blessings and intercessions by religious individuals. Connolly resents these narrative
impositions on his own image of self, yet also questions whether he, as an outsider, has
the right to resist these readings of his disability. In practice, however, these aggregated
10This isn’t a criticism of the wheelchair, which can be non-institutional, modified for the needs of specific
individuals, and hacked on. But given his use case—international travel, often to out-of-the-way locales—and
his relative tolerance for pain and social opprobrium—Connolly makes a strong argument for his embrace of
the cheap and flexible but unvetted and somewhat dangerous longboard.
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interactions are difficult for Connolly, and the way these reactions wear on his own story of
self make him question whether he should, or can, continue his travels.
3.10 Looking Back
Like Brown’s revelation—grasping chalk with his left foot and opening the door to self-
expression—a means for Connolly to resist these imposed narratives comes in a sudden
moment of inspiration. In Vienna, after being strong-armed to accept money, and pity, from
a stranger on the street, Connolly finds himself at his wit’s end after being stared at, and
photographed, by a group in a public square:
“Really?” I said out loud, as they began to scatter, trying to avoid being called
out. I’d had people sneak photos of me before, but what really offended me was
the fact that they used their camera phone. I was just something shocking on
the street; a grainy photo to send their friends. Who knew where that photo
went or how many laughs were gotten out of the image? . . . Everyone nearby had
begun to stare. Real anger—the sort of emotion that makes you puff out your
chest and clench your jaw—burned in my gut. Connolly, 2009, p. 127
After these early experiences in the city, Connolly finds himself avoiding crowds. But, upon
encountering the familiar stare one more time, Connolly tries something different:
His steps stuttered for a moment as he did a double take. Still fuming from my
earlier encounter, I did something impulsive. I looked across the street and tried
to keep my eyes from meeting his. My right hand still had a white-knuckle grip
on my camera as I held it at my side, floating mere inches off the concrete, and
I hoped he wouldn’t notice the lens slowly aiming up at him. . . . I pushed the
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button and heard the muffled chik-ticht . . . I’d used my own form of staring.
(Connolly, 2009, p. 127-128)
On getting back to his hostel and viewing the photo, Connolly is taken by surprise. The
photo is striking, the sharp low angle, combined with the shocked expression of the subject,
gives it an urgent feel. The photo captured his reality, holding the potential to concretely
convey his day-in, day-out lived experience to others. Perhaps more importantly, the photo,
and the moment of taking it, reverses a fundamental dynamic, exchanging the positions of
observer and subject and recasting Connolly’s self-narrative from pitied to proactive. All at
once, Connolly did not wish to hide from reactions to his legless condition, but sought them
out.
Taking this form of photo became a challenge for Connolly—he took over 900 viable
photos during the remainder of his trip—and Connolly was soon able to transform his “double
takes” into a major artistic endeavor. In 2006, Connolly had embarked on his trip around the
world, taking photos for what he called his Rolling Exhibition. By 2008, the exhibition had
been featured in NPR, CNET, ABC, and the Washington Post, among others (Beckman,
2008; B. Brown, 2008; Handel, 2008; H. Jackson, 2008). Following this media coverage,
The Rolling Exhibition was featured as part of the Kennedy Center for the Performing
Arts. This media attention led HarperCollins to invite Connolly to write the memoir that
would become Double Take. Since the publication of Double Take in 2009, Connolly has
continued to receive media attention, including an appearance on the Today Show. In 2013,
Connolly starred in Armed and Ready, a one-season series for the Travel Channel that saw
him attempt challenges such as surfing, street luge, jousting, and moving in zero gravity.
As occurred with Brown, Connolly’s ability to recontextualize his disability and tell his own
story led to changes in his life, changes that largely resulted in greater autonomy.
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3.11 Recurring Images
Connolly’s inspired moment in Vienna—taking a picture of a man staring at him—does
a great deal of work along many dimensions. First, it renders legible to others, to the
universal, the reality he lives in, one in which movement in public is fundamentally fraught.
Second, it resists a forcible rewriting, an unthinking narrativization as an object of pity,
hilarity, or curiosity. Third, it creates and sustains a stable identity, that of artist and
photographer. Fourth, in depicting the same reaction in broad contexts, the larger project
of the Rolling Exhibition gestures toward an underlying reality, that of a universal manifest
in local contexts. Lastly, the moment shows a crack, a small way forward, in the edifice of
the tyrannical relationship between the particular and the universal.
Connolly’s Rolling Exhibition captures something fundamental in the relationship be-
tween the particular and the universal, the identity of the self and the understanding of
the collective. The photographs, in depicting a collective response to difference, suggest an
imposition of identity from above. These reactions, as experienced by Connolly prior to his
taking of that first photograph, cast him not as an independent agent with a self-created
identity but as an object of surprise, curiosity, or pity. In capturing and representing these
impositions, Connolly establishes a recursive relationship with the universal. The reactions
of the collective become a basis for a new identity. Though the new identity is based on re-
sistance through art, it also contains within itself the initial reaction. Connolly’s autonomy,
achieved through his photography, is not complete independence, a cutting off of the tyranny
of the universal, but the redefinition of the relationship from a form that is unidirectional to
one with push and pull. His identity contains the gazes directed at him, recontextualizing
them and, through the exhibition and the autobiography, reframing them for consumption
by the universal.
In the opening to this discussion of Double Take, I suggested that the central image of the
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autobiography was that of an infinity mirror—that is, a set of two opposed mirrors that create
a series of endlessly receding reflections. The image is apt for describing Connolly’s approach
to photography, but also the line between local and universal drawn in autobiography. In
mathematics, the name for the endlessly narrowing geometrical figure created in an infinity
mirror is “Gabriel’s horn.” The figure resembles a horn due to the widened area subjectively
close to the viewer that narrows into a flute as it moves further away. The reference to
Gabriel, the archangel who will blow a horn to announce judgment day, suggests an encounter
between the finite and the infinite. The image also seems suggestive of the near-to-hand,
meso-scale local—the first few reflections one sees in an infinity mirror—and a universal that
is distant, able to be glimpsed but never seized in its entirety.
Looking into an infinity mirror, we understand, see, and affect our near-to-hand reflec-
tions, those close to us. Our relationship with reflections in the distance, however, is more
ambiguous. The connection is there, but attenuated—the relationship is technically recipro-
cal, but not evenly so. Looking at the shape of Gabriel’s horn, with one end broad and one
increasingly narrow, we feel, perhaps, that every aspect of our individual reality is touched
by, imposed on, by the universal, but the concessions to our particularity on the part of the
universal are small, even minute. How, then, can we blow Gabriel’s horn? How can we cul-
tivate autonomy, resisting the tyranny of das Man and creating an immediate environment
adapted to our needs as individuals and members of local communities? And, if it is even
possible, how can we affect real change, not only in our immediate locality, but in contexts
that widen out from where we stand?
3.12 Getting Across
Brown (My Left Foot) and Connolly (Double Take) understand, as many people with dis-
abilities must, that their stories are in some sense unrepresentative. The challenge, then, is
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not so much to do as most autobiographies do—hold up the subject as representative of a
larger collective narrative or identity, a worthy subject of broad interest—but to do so while
honoring real difference. Locality cannot always be rendered legible, and some truths are
too particular to be universalized. The result, naturally, is compromise—in autobiographies
of disability, it is not generally the universal that accommodates the disabled identity, but
the disabled identity, the local difference, that must be shaped to the limited understanding
of das Man. The perennial hope in these circumstances is potential for reciprocity: that,
through repetition, inspiration, rhetoric, or chance, the universal will shift to incorporate a
new understanding, that something lasting will come of powerful but transient local experi-
ences.
Can autobiographies of disability really be representative? That is, can they convey local
truth, some fundamental understanding of a complex context, to the broader society? It
is also possible here to take an even more pessimistic view, which might prompt the ques-
tion: “Can autobiographies of disability even be fully or faithfully representative of their
local context, of the lived experiences of their authors?” There are powerful forces, among
them various narrative, structural, and pragmatic headwinds, arrayed against a person with
disabilities who wishes to communicate their local circumstances and life experiences in the
form of autobiography. Naturally, even at the best of times, communicating one’s experi-
ences to a broad and unknown audience is a difficult proposition. However, of the many
challenges facing the disability autobiographer, one stands out as of particular concern: nar-
rative incommensurability.
When communicating outward—that is, not to one’s local community but to a broader
collective that does not share critical context—it becomes necessary to adopt a suitable
narrative, one that reconciles the local context to the concerns and understanding of the
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larger group. These narratives are abstractions,11 rendering high-context understandings of
local circumstance legible and comprehensible to a collective that has less immediate interest
or relevant knowledge. This dynamic should be immediately familiar to any academic who
attempts to convey their specialized research to a broad audience—or, for that matter,
explain their work at a dinner party. Unfortunately, when choosing narratives with which
to render experiences of disability to a wider audience, the problem is twofold. First, there
exist a variety of narratives related to disability in the public consciousness, many or most of
which are regressive and have little relation to specific experiences of disability. Second, other
narratives, those not directly related to disability, are likely to be inadequate when conveying
11Abstraction is a term that, perhaps, needs little elaboration. However, I am somewhat concerned that my
use of the term in the following sections might be colored by an understanding of abstraction as considered
in the context of programming and computer science, and to a lesser extent philosophy and philosophy of
mind. Briefly considering abstraction here might also be useful in considering the larger theme here—the
relationship between the particular and the general, or the local and the universal.
Locke writes, by way of definition, that “[t]he use of words then being to stand as outward marks of our
internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in
should have a distinct name, names must be endless. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas
received from particular objects to become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the mind
such appearances, separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence, as time, place,
or any other concomitant ideas. This is called Abstraction” (Locke, 1777). In summarizing this definition,
philosopher John Linnell gets at the heart of the matter: “Abstract ideas are framed by the mind from
particular ideas (perceptions) by a process of omission. . . . Perception becomes conception through omission
of context” (Linnell, 1956, p. 404). That is to say, abstraction is the process of moving from the particular to
the general. This process involves finding commonalities in the particular, dropping their associated context,
and leaving in their place some idea or concept.
For our larger purposes here in this chapter, we should take away two insights about abstraction. The
first is that, as described above, abstraction leads to a loss of context, a flattening. As we create ideas, as we
generalize, we lose sight of the local. Second, abstractions, as they are conjured from nothing, seem fictive,
easily dismissed or reconceived. This is not the case. Abstractions, once loosed, may be difficult to recall.
On the first page of Structure and Interpretation of Computer Programs Sussman and Abelson write that
“[c]omputational processes are abstract beings that inhabit computers.. . . . A computational process is
indeed much like a sorcerer’s idea of a spirit. It cannot be seen or touched. It is not composed of matter at
all. However, it is very real. It can perform intellectual work. It can answer questions. It can affect the world
by disbursing money at a bank or by controlling a robot arm in a factory. The programs we use to conjure
processes are like a sorcerer’s spells” (Abelson et al., 1996, p. 1-2). We live in a time when abstractions, in a
concrete and literal sense, perform physical and intellectual labor. However, broadly speaking, abstractions
have always had a similar power. The abstractions we choose to create and embrace determine what we
attend to and what we ignore, and what questions are answered even before they are asked.
Abstract, literally, means to move away, to increase distance. Part of this project is to do the opposite,
something we have little vocabulary for. (Intract? Reparticularize? Concretize? Or, as we will discuss in the
next chapter, instantiate?) However, this project is, and will continue to be, guilty of many an abstraction,
even more so as we forge ahead.
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these experiences. The result is narrative incommensurability—the lack of a common basis
for understanding premised on the inadequacy of existing narratives to convey experiences
of disability.
3.13 Facing Narrative Incommensurability
In Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse, David Mitchell and
Sharon Snyder make the case that disability is conceptualized as fundamentally unknowable,
and that that unknowability, when it presents itself, demands explication and resolution:
Most basic to the identification of character through disability is the way in which
physical and cognitive differences have been narrated as alien to the normal course
of human affairs. To represent disability is to engage oneself in an encounter with
that which is believed to be off the map of “recognizable” human experiences.
Making comprehensible that which appears to be inherently unknowable situates
narrative in the powerful position of mediator between two separate worlds. . . .
[I]t is the narrative of disability’s very unknowability that consolidates the need
to tell a story about it. (Mitchell & Snyder, 2000, p. 5-6)
Narrative, as it is typically encountered, is not forgiving to accounts from a disability per-
spective. Mitchell and Snyder suggest that disability reads as alien, and that alienation reads
as unknowability. That unknowability, when it appears in a narrative, demands explana-
tion—in their words, “disability inaugurates the act of interpretation” (Mitchell & Snyder,
2000, p. 6). Paradoxically, the perceived unknowability of the disabled experience has not re-
sulted in underrepresentation in media and culture, but a combination of over representation
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and misrepresentation.12
These representations, as they have appeared in narratives over centuries, have worn
tracks in the collective consciousness, and these tracks take a limited number of predictable
forms. In a powerful 1974 address to the National Federation of the Blind, for example,
Kenneth Jernigan argued that there were only nine identifiable narratives that adhered to
the blind as they appear in literature:
Yet, upon closer examination the principal themes and motifs of literature and
popular culture are nine in number and may be summarized as follows: blindness
as compensatory or miraculous power, blindness as total tragedy; blindness as
foolishness and helplessness; blindness as unrelieved wickedness and evil; blind-
ness as perfect virtue; blindness as punishment for sin; blindness as abnormality
or dehumanization; blindness as purification; and blindness as symbol or parable.
(Jernigan, 1974)
In this address, Jernigan calls out literature dependent on these well-worn tropes, from the
preposterous—blind detective shooting by sound—to the infuriating, such as Maeterlinck’s
The Blind, which depicts a grotesquery of sightless groping to make a philosophical point.
Whether or not there are, as Jernigan contends, nine—or five, or twenty—interpretations
that adhere to blindness is beside the point. The address gestures toward a disturbing truth:
depictions of the disabled in literature are rarely about the disabled experience. Rather,
they serve an outside view of disability, or, more confoundingly, they provide a vector for
commentary about something completely unrelated to disability. Jernigan’s final listed trope,
“blindness as symbol or parable,” is perhaps most damaging to public consciousness of the
12Narratives of disability are surprisingly ubiquitous. Michael Bérubé remarks that, “[a]fter a decade of
working in disability studies, I still find myself surprised by the presence of disability in narratives I had
never considered to be ”about“ disability, in animated films from Dumbo to Finding Nemo; in literary texts
from Huckleberry Finn to Joan Didion’s Play It As It Lays; and, most curiously, even in the world of science
fiction and superheroes, a world that turns out to be populated by blind Daredevils, mutant supercrips, and
posthuman cyborgs of all kinds” (Bérubé, 2005, p. 568).
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real lives of people with disabilities. Take, for example, the 2008 film Blindness, directed
by Fernando Meirelles, which leans into the use, or exploitation, of blindness as metaphor
or parable. The Los Angeles Times, in a glowing profile written during the shooting of
Blindness in 2008, inadvertently provides a summary of the film’s distortions in service of a
universalizing metaphor:
Mark Ruffalo and Julianne Moore are traipsing through a trash-strewn urban
wasteland, scavenging for salvation. All around them, dozens of pitiful human
beings dressed in filthy, mismatched clothes grope their way past wrecked cars
and graffiti-splattered highway ramps, like dancers in some grotesque ballet of the
damned. . . . In both book and film, blindness is not only a physical condition but
a metaphor for the darker side of human nature: prejudice, selfishness, violence
and willful indifference.13 (Johnson, 2008)
The IMDB page for this film appears as a top-ten Google result for the search term “blind-
ness,” and its Wikipedia page is about two-thirds the length of the article for visual im-
pairment. It is no exaggeration to say that this film, for many, will be some combination
of their first, their only, their strongest, or their last exposure to the concept of blindness
or visual impairment, and what they will take away from it will be blindness as depravity,
blindness as helplessness, and blindness as inhumanity. Though I have used the domain of
visual impairment for this example, this problem is shared across depictions of disability.
When attempting to share or depict the real lives and experiences of people with disabilities,
whether in literature or autobiography, one must not simply ignore, but actively compensate
for, this unreformed cultural slurry. Without active compensation—and, frequently, even
after great effort—depictions of disability will fall into well-worn tracks, riding on rails to
13If this description makes it sound like Blindness is a somewhat pretentious zombie flick that casts blind
people as zombies, that’s because Blindness is, in fact, a somewhat pretentious zombie flick that casts blind
people as zombies.
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false, unflattering, malign, or irrelevant destinations.
The problem facing autobiographies of disability, therefore, is not simply a lack of rel-
evant narratives with which to convey local experiences to the universal. The issue is also
not limited to counteracting existing narratives of disability. Not only must autobiography
contend with the above, but it must engage with the fact that disability, in cultural represen-
tations, has been used as a medium and not as an end. To speak once more of threads—lines
connecting the rich local to the more abstract universal—disability, as a concept, has been
used to entwine associations between concrete characters and situations and universal ideas
and structures. When we are conditioned to read disability as a conveyance—a depiction
of punishment for sin, a representation of universal human folly, an unredeemed tragedy
suggesting the indifference of the world or the triumph of the spirit—how are we to attend
to disability as a valid subjectivity, something not to learn from but to learn about?
In On Being Ill, Virginia Woolf laments a lost literature, one that does justice to the
day-to-day struggle of occupying a body:
[I]t becomes strange indeed that illness has not taken its place with love, battle,
and jealousy among the prime themes of literature. Novels, one would have
thought, would have been devoted to influenza; epic poems to typhoid; odes to
pneumonia, lyrics to toothache. But no; with a few exceptions, . . . literature
does its best to maintain that its concern is with the mind; that the body is a
sheet of plain glass through which the soul looks straight and clear, and, save for
one or two passions such as desire and greed, is null, negligible and nonexistent.
(Woolf, 2009, p. 101)
Woolf notes that it is not only our inclination, but our language, that is ill-suited to de-
picting the realities and vicissitudes of inhabiting an unwell body, that “English, which can
express the thoughts of Hamlet and the tragedy of Lear, has no words for the shiver and
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the headache” (Woolf, 2009, p. 102). Indeed, in the case of disability, it is not simply that
there is little vernacular for communicating experience, or even that stories of disabled life,
self-told or otherwise, must distort themselves to some other shape or plot to get across.
Worse, experiences of disability have themselves become a vernacular. When we see a cane
or a crutch on stage or screen, we are not in the habit of preparing ourselves to embody a
radically different experience. Rather, we parse these experiences, not as ends, fully real-
ized subjectivities, in themselves, but as metaphors and patterns aimed at speaking to the
universal. In making disability a language, we make it so that there is no language for disabil-
ity. Woolf criticized literature for treating the body as a vessel, incident rather than object.
Those who wish to convey their experiences of disability to a broader audience must not only
contend with antipathy and discomfort, but also a similar sort of transparency—disability
becoming “a sheet of plain glass,” something through which to look upon the universal but
not itself a fitting subject for understanding.
3.14 The Disabled Condition
In a discussion of the public realm and its separation from the private, Hannah Arendt, in
The Human Condition, offers insight into the incommensurability of specific experiences that
is in accordance with Woolf’s:
Indeed, the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out
all other experiences, namely, the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same
time the most private and least communicable of all. Not only is it perhaps
the only experience which we are unable to transform into a shape fit for public
appearance, it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that
we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. There seems to be no
bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no longer “recognizable,”
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to the outer world of life. (Arendt, 2019, p. 50)
As we struggle with the relative incommensurability of the disabled experience, the inherent
difficulties in communicating outward a subjectivity that cannot be easily universalized,
Arendt’s work on the dynamics of the individual’s relationship with the broader society
may provide a complementary framework. In the opening to The Human Condition, Arendt
conceives of the fundamental activities of humanity, vita activa, as labor, work, and action. In
this trichotomy, labor is the realm of activity bound to cycles and seasons and concerned with
the basic processes of life. Work is the realm of artifice, of craft and devices, what we might
now call the built environment, and which Arendt calls “worldliness” or “the world.” The
realm of action is concerned with history and immortality, that which sustains itself through
time, such as institutions and, in an elevated rather than conventional sense, politics.
Though Arendt is primarily concerned with the vita activa of action, The Human Con-
dition is not prescriptive, not a guide to bringing about desired change through action. This
is partly due to a definition of action similar to our concept of das Man—that is, creation
of new institutions or movements is inherently unpredictable, and the realm of action, defi-
nitionally plural and collective, does not, or perhaps cannot, regard the individual and the
local. Further, Arendt’s conception of action suggests that certain kinds of knowledge, as we
suspected from our explorations of narrative incommensurability, cannot survive the harsh
light of the public realm: “there are a great many things which cannot withstand the impla-
cable, bright light of the constant presence of others on the public scene; there, only what
is considered to be relevant, worthy of being seen or heard, can be tolerated, so that the
irrelevant becomes automatically a private matter” (Arendt, 2019, p. 51).
If there is an incommensurability between experiences of disability and the current un-
derstanding of what is relevant in the public sphere, where does that leave us? Our first
impulse, reasonably, is to look outward and upward, focusing away from our local circum-
stances and toward the broad political, the realm of action. How can we make change in
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the larger society, in the collective in which we are embedded? Our impulse is to abstract,
to generalize, to translate our local knowledge to the universal. We wish to make them
understand, to make change.
This is, perhaps, where we will be served by our early distinction between autonomy and
power. As we abstract ourselves, as we grow upward and outward, as we chase das Man or
enter the realm of action, we are seeking power. We take our local context above and, in
bringing about change, we cannot help but to reflect our subjectivity, our experiences, on
those left below. This may help, or harm, or, perhaps most likely, help and harm. We are
become das Man—for better, or worse, or both.
Autonomy, in contradistinction, does not require abstraction, a surrender of the local to
create a chink in the armor of the universal. Rather, in the ways we have explored in this
chapter, it reparticularizes. We intract, rather than abstract.14 We make the universal serve
our local need. We take something designed with no thought, or active hostility, to us—a
skateboard, a stick, a piece of chalk, or, more broadly and speculatively, a gig economy job,
a park bench, an app that reports on us—and, improbably and imperfectly, we make it our
own.
This attention to autonomy is not a call to non-action. We need, and will likely always
need, contestants on the public stage, activists and advocates, those who will boldly aspire
to action. However, local negotiation, the exercise of specific forms of autonomy, can create
ripe conditions for action. The hacking of a CPAP, the writing of a free screen reader, the
transformation of household materials into a medical mask—in an age that restricts and
limits our autonomy for the ends of the powerful, these become political acts, and ones
that can have far-reaching consequences. Rather than “tend your garden,” a conclusion here
might be: “Let your garden grow wild.”
14Note that we don’t even have vocabulary for thought in this direction. Reparticularize? Intract? Yes, I
am offering my failure to neologize here as evidence.
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Finally, we might consider that autonomy, rather than power—change from the side,
rather than from the top—might be all we get. We can strive to survive, to build our local
community, and to determine our own stories as best we can. Every student taught, word
written, package delivered, line of code compiled, or post shared has the chance to ripple
outward, and, perhaps, to touch on the universal. Finally, as we move forward to a chapter
on infrastructure and its role in negotiation, I will gesture here to a proposal that will be
elaborated on there in greater detail: that, if and when we necessarily enter the realm of
activism, advocacy, or action, we continue to attend to the local even as we aspire to the
universal. In the structures we create, the grand and abstract utopias we envision, we should
leave room for broken wagons, ones that can be fixed up with a can of oil and a little care.
3.15 Fighting the Man
In the last chapter, we considered the immediate social and physical environment and in-
troduced haccessibility, a mode of negotiation that is hyperlocal and contingent, a way of
interacting with the world that is resistant to scale but which, in certain circumstances, can
presage or catalyze a larger change. In this chapter, we have considered a broader concept,
autonomy, through an understanding of how the local (individual and close communal ex-
periences and identity) relates to the universal (narratives and structures that encompass
commonality or purport to represent a majority). In doing so, we figured the universal as
das Man, a creature of broad generalities and overdetermined commonality. Based loosely
on linguistic constructions that imply a universally representative individual (“one” or “your”
in English, “man” in German, as in “One does not do that”), das Man represents normality,
and deviating from narratives comprehended by das Man risks a response from the encircling
collective based on apathy, misunderstanding, or pathologization.
In this chapter, I have depicted das Man as a faceless foe, an entity that effaces local
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difference, that refuses to make accommodations, that is shocked by stories and bodies that
don’t fit its (his?) preconceptions. In this context—people with disabilities telling their own
stories or struggling against inflexible physical and social environments—this feels apt and,
perhaps, just. This project, however, is not merely concerned with cataloging slights and
injuries against the local perpetrated by the universal. As we seek ways to move forward, to
propagate real change not only in the immediate environment but also on a broader scale,
we must consider ways of contending with the universal that do not only resist impositions
on the local from above, but also change the above to accommodate we below.
If Chapter 2 of this project is concerned with the individual negotiating the immediate
physical and social environment, then this chapter has been concerned with the relationship,
the thin thread, between the individual and the broad universal, the society as an abstraction.
Our theme here, negotiation, is the experience of being embedded in something larger, a
structure which we have limited ability to resist and, likely, an even more limited ability to
change. Yet change, however unlikely, is conceivable, even possible. Change happens. How
can we, embedded as we are in structures we did not choose, travel, first from survival in
adverse circumstances, to thriving in ourselves and in our communities, to creating change
on a larger scale? How can the local, at first scrabbling but with increasing confidence, find
purchase on the universal?
As we conclude this chapter, and gesture to the next, I will increasingly commit the
sin of das Man: abstraction. Our next chapter will consider infrastructure, and, while
the individual and the small collective will continue to be prominent, we will also consider
the position of larger institutions and organizations—specific fields of research within the
academy, the academy within a broader, and often hostile, social context, and so on. In the
final chapter, we will consider humanity as embedded in a larger system, an Agaia of our own
creation. As we matryoshka our way up and out, we will continue to leaven a concern for the
increasingly universal with a continued regard for the local. Fundamentally, we wish to ask:
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How is it to be local in a world so interconnected, so dominated by larger and larger entities
over which we have less and less purchase? Though the thread, that thin line between local
and universal, will be stretched to its limit, we will hope that it does not break. In looking
into the infinite, we will grasp tightly the finite. And, as we look outward to the universal,
we will stand firmly in the local.
Chapter 4
Infrastructure and the Humanities
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4.1 Values in Concrete
Infrastructure resists analysis, and especially hermaneutic analysis. First, as scholars such as
Susan Leigh Star have observed, it is boring: “Many aspects of infrastructure are singularly
unexciting. It takes some digging to unearth the dramas inherent in system design . . . , to
restore narrative to what appears to be dead lists” (Star, 1999, p. 377-378). Further, infras-
tructure is large. In The Stack, Benjamin Bratton describes a subset of global infrastructure,
the cloud, in language that makes clear its geographical, geopolitical, and even geological
scale:1
Cloud infrastructure’s energy and water appetite demands specific landscape ac-
commodations, including putting data centers in unexpected locations (inside
office towers, ice caves, underground bunkers, coal mines, carved-out mountains,
dead malls, inhospitable islands, old churches). . . . Above ground, Cloud infras-
tructure is serviced by torqued logistics networks of warehouses, roads, factories,
containers, ports of call, airports, and package routing hubs (Bratton, 2016, p.
116)
Infrastructure is contiguous, not just interconnected but comprised of interconnections, and
in its size and interdependency it becomes difficult to analyze without reduction or ellision.
Finally, infrastructure is obscured, in the sense that there are many who, for their own
reasons, do not want us to understand these structures. While infrastructure’s large (and
largely unexciting) nature is often enough to deter close scrutiny, those who benefit from
the infrastructural status quo can use a variety of means to hide the internals of a system,
making infrastructure into a black box that is intentional, rather than incidental.
1Saying that infrastructure is large is close to tautology, but it is difficult to get an intuitive sense of its
scale. Star suggests that it is difficult to breathe life into the “dead lists” that are, in many cases, our only
insight into the breadth that is infrastructure. Bratton makes of these dead lists a litany, making us feel the
elipsis: “And warehouses. And roads. And factories. And containers. And ports. . . . ”
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The OED offers that infrastructure is a “collective term for the subordinate parts of an
undertaking; substructure, foundation” (OED, 2020d). The definition is suggestive: infras-
tructure seems to occupy a level below that of a goal—it is subordinate to the purpose at
hand, more techné than telos. We also see that infrastructure is collective, implying that it
is non-discrete and interconnected but also, perhaps, that it is more concerned with society
in the abstract, das Man, than local concerns. Finally, if infrastructure is foundational, we
may understand that it is necessary, and that a lack of infrastructure might preclude specific
actions, even posing a threat to survival.
In this chapter, we will be concerned with the implications of infrastructure on negoti-
ation—that is, how does infrastructure shape potential action and, importantly, thought?
Though we will continue to concern ourselves with the local, local in the context of infras-
tructure—in the shadow of great scale—has a substantively different valence. Our focus,
therefore, will broaden—though we will still be concerned with the hyperlocal and the indi-
vidual, we will primarily examine how the humanities, as a disciplinary collective, negotiates
within the academy and, in turn, how the academy negotiates within the broader society.
Here, our working definition of infrastructure will be that of values instantiated.2 That is,
infrastructure is the concrete product of collective decisions about what is worthy and, by
implication, what is not. By studying infrastructure, therefore, we can discover the core
goals and revealed beliefs of the encircling collective. What can we learn, by implication,
from the choices crystallized in infrastructure, choices that have become the environment we
2Instantiation is the act of bringing something concrete into being based on an abstract ideal or template.
The term is used in modern philosophy to describe the concept that in Platonism is called “participation,”
the correspondence between a Platonic form or universal and a substance, an object or thing. From Phaedo:
“you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by
participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the
participation in duality—this is the way to make two” (Plato, 2012, p. 77).
In object-oriented programming, abstractions (“classes”) can be defined that then serve as a template for
the creation of an object or objects. Creating an object based on the concept laid out in a class is called
“instantiation.” For example, one might define an Animal class, and based on that class instantiate Owl,
Frog, and Horse objects.
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below must negotiate? And how do we retain our values when we must use infrastructure
that crystallizes ends incompatible with ours?
Through an examination of a number of interfaces3 —both to software and to commercial
systems—we will continue to engage the larger concept of negotiation, or the places indi-
viduals or small communities encounter an environment or encircling entity. Our primary
subject or case study here will be the humanities, and, to a lesser extent, the academy.
How can the humanities, and the institution of the university, retain and exercise its values
while negotiating a society largely antithetical to those values? Specifically, we will focus on
the production and dissemination of thought, and how our infrastructure, from our systems
of writing and research to our repositories for dissemination and preservation of scholarly
literature, live up to, or fail to live up to, our stated values. Our analysis, therefore, will
focus on specific boundaries between the humanities and the encircling collective, including
our systems of scholarly publication and humanities fields that actively engage with infras-
tructural processes or the broader society. We will also compare how alternate humanities
traditions—“lay hermeneuticists”—build infrastructure, and consider what we, as academic
humanists, might learn from these approaches. Finally, we will consider the phenomenon of
de facto infrastructure, systems and interfaces that we have adopted but that do not reflect
our values, and call attention to humanists working to resist these trends.
3In “ ‘Stuff You Can Kick’: Toward a Theory of Media Infrastructures,” Lisa Parks notes that, while
disciplines such as Urban Studies, Science and Technology Studies, and Communication frequently engage
with physical infrastructure, digital humanities scholarship has focused on more obviously cultural produc-
tions—networks, corporations, and interfaces. This analysis will largely depart from her admirable radicalism
in theorizing physical infrastructure in a humanities and, specifically, digital humanities context, and the
objects of study here will, unfortunately, remain largely unkickable. (Though, in the case of our analysis of
an interface to a proprietary scholarly database, you may wish you could kick it.)
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4.2 Humanities Values on the Margins
In think pieces, journal articles, and a broad array of books, a perennial topic of discussion
is why we—as a society, as academics, or even as humanities scholars—should care about
the humanities. In Humanities in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Utility and Markets,
Eleonora Belfiore and Anna Upchurch trace a taxonomy for this genre of writing, what they
call the “value debate.” The first presentation of this genre is writing that diagnoses the
myriad difficulties facing the humanities, “the seemingly ineluctable (and ongoing) demise of
the humanities as an academic area of scholarship in the context of a progressively more and
more marketised higher education sector” (Belfiore & Upchurch, 2013, p. 1). The second
presentation of this genre is “a more positive (if often instrumental) idiom in debates sur-
rounding higher education policy and funding,” in which “the humanities have a contribution
to make to the national economy (by virtue of their natural affinity with the cultural and
creative industries) to the social cohesion of the country and to the policy-making process”
(Belfiore & Upchurch, 2013, p. 21). As corporatism and marketization increasingly push
the university toward measures of success such as job preparation, therefore, the humanities
seeks to justify its existence by these same measures.
These justifications, attempting to square the work of the humanities with values not of
the humanities, tend to ring hollow. Justin Stover, in “There Is No Case for the Humanities,”
argues that the humanities has not become less relevant to the outside world over time, but
that the university, which once placed the humanities in a central position, has become
something other:
The contemporary university is a strange chimaera. It has become an institution
for teaching undergraduates, a lab for medical and technological development
in partnership with industry, a hospital, a museum (or several), a performance
hall, a radio station, a landowner, a big-money (or money-losing) sports club,
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a research center competing for government funding, and . . . a hedge fund.
. . . What is fascinating and perverse about the current situation is that what
was once peripheral to the university—engineering and technology—is now at its
center, and what was once its center has been reduced to the margins and forced
to make a case for its continued existence. (Stover, 2017)
Stover argues that the humanities cannot be defined through external values, such as claims
that the humanities develops, in its students, traits useful to society such as artistic ability,
critical thinking, or ethical depth. Rather, the humanities can only be justified within
its own epistemological framework, and that, ultimately, we need not make a case for the
humanities—it is enough to know, ourselves, that the humanities is important and “put our
hand to the plow” (Stover, 2017).
Stover’s diagnosis of the position of the humanities at the margin of the modern university
is accurate. As far as it goes, too, the assertion that the humanities is autotelic, being an
end in itself, is admirable enough—many or most humanists will agree that the humanities,
as a project, has inherent worth. It is true, also, that there is much more work to be
done in the humanities, that, in his agricultural metaphor, there are “whole fields untilled”
(Stover, 2017). However, it does not follow that these points, conceded, mean a future for
the humanities as we know it—humanists, and the humanities, might well die of hunger amid
rich but fallow fields. Stover implies that the humanities, by way of lending cachet to the
university as an institution and by taking advantage of historical inertia, may make it intact
through successive and unrelenting crises. Dubious of this assertion, James McWilliams
writes:
I’m absolutely certain that almost every high-ranking administrator at every uni-
versity in the U.S. wakes up every morning prepared to fathom the case that the
university is about serving the innovative needs of a globalizing economy—and if
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gutting the humanities would further that goal, they’d look at the numbers and
make the call. . . . Can you imagine, beyond the university, a swell of popular
opinion rushing to defend the department of comparative literature . . . from
oblivion? (McWilliams, 2018)
It seems relatively unlikely that the humanities, in a strict and literal sense, will cease to
exist. However, the future of the humanities might be that of an institution that is moribund,
a nominal shell. Distressingly, the humanities may already be internalizing an acceptance of
this fate. A hallmark of this “rhetoric of gloom” is that, over the past half-century, as the
humanities has moved from crisis to crisis—low enrollment, budget cuts, poor job prospects
for graduates—the situation has become simply a recognized, ongoing reality. As Geoffrey
Galt Harpham writes, “[t]alk of crisis has been around for so long . . . that it has become
simply incorporated into the most accustomed ways in which humanistic scholars understand
themselves and their work. Once considered an affliction, crisis has become a way of life”
(Harpham, 2011, p. 23).
4.3 The Digital Humanities and the Public Humanities
The interdisciplinary field of the digital humanities has come to occupy a specific space
in the narrative of the demise, and potential revitalization, of the humanistic project. If
commentary on the decline of the humanities, and the corresponding assertions of its ongoing
relevance in modern life, have become something of a genre, then the discourse around digital
humanities has taken on a similar cadence. On the one hand, in a variety of takedowns and
critiques, the digital humanities has been accused of complicity with technocratic forces, the
marketization of the university, or the abandonment of core tenets of the humanities. On
the other, DH is positioned as a breath of life, a bridge to a rapidly changing world, or, more
crudely, the “next big thing” in the humanities.
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Two essays, “Technology Is Taking Over English Departments” by Adam Kirsch and “Ne-
oliberal Tools (and Archives): A Political History of Digital Humanities” by Daniel Allington,
Sarah Brouillette, and David Golumbia, provide a fairly representative sample of a genre of
critique that positions the digital humanities as quisling, the beachhead for a technocratic
takeover of the humanities. In his framing, Kirsch provides a blunt precis for what many
find troubling in the field:
The humanities are in crisis again, or still. But there is one big exception: digital
humanities, which is a growth industry. In 2009, the nascent field was the talk of
the Modern Language Association (MLA) convention: “among all the contending
subfields,” a reporter wrote about that year’s gathering, “the digital humanities
seem like the first ‘next big thing’ in a long time.” Even earlier, the National
Endowment for the Humanities created its Office of Digital Humanities to help
fund projects. (Kirsch, 2014)
There is much going on by implication here, though many of these critiques are later made
more explicit. The digital humanities is suspect through its association with technology.
It is an “industry,” by implication connected with Silicon Valley, surveillance capitalism, or
worse. In its misguided legibility to outside forces, it receives money and, as such, is not
pulling alongside other fields in the perennial crisis of the humanities. Kirsch continues:
If ever there were a chance to see the ideological construction of reality at work,
digital humanities is it. Right before our eyes, options are foreclosed and demands
enforced; a future is constructed as though it were being discovered. By now we
are used to this process, since over the last twenty years the proliferation of new
technologies has totally discredited the idea of opting out of “the future.” (Kirsch,
2014)
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Kirsch suggests that opting out of technology—the examples cited in this 2014 essay are
“word processors, iPods, and e-mail”—would be opting out of the future. But might this
kind of refusal—Kirsch cites Bartleby in this paragraph—not instead be opting out of the
present?
Part of the issue here may be something touched on by Kirsch in his critique: the digital
humanities is broad, and perhaps, for some purposes, too broad. “But it would be unfair
to generalize from the obviously anti-humanistic manifestations of digital humanities to the
entirety of the field itself, for the simple reason that the field has no common essence: it
is not a species but at best a genus, comprising a wide range of activities that have little
relationship with one another” (Kirsch, 2014). Perhaps, in a more ideal environment freed
from the austerity of the modern university, digital humanities would not exist as a construc-
tion—instead, platform studies, modern textual studies, critical code studies, computational
literary studies, critical infrastructure studies, and many other fields would coexist and
cross-pollinate. In practice, this is not far from the case—these are all thriving fields with
independent scholarship, seminal texts, and active discourses. For pragmatic reasons, such
as the necessity to be legible to colleagues and administrators, and historic reasons, such as
the shared reference to foundational texts and discourses, the term digital humanities as a
rubric for disparate forms of scholarship has been, and continues to be, useful, or at least
expedient. However, the broad nature of the digital humanities, the amount of ground it
is required to cover, causes critiques of specific aspects of the humanities and its relation
to technology, or the humanities and its relationship to the outside world, to take the form
of debates and discourses that are low granularity, sensational, and repetitive. These dis-
courses are frequently based on, or evoke, simple binaries, which, at their most reductive,
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might resemble “humanism is good, technology is bad.”4
A piece in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Nan Z. Da’s 2019 “The Digital Humanities
Debacle,” demonstrates how this dynamic frequently plays out. Though the article is framed
as a broadside against the digital humanities, it is actually a critique of computational literary
studies (CLS), a subfield within the digital humanities. Da’s observations, though positioned
as polemic and framed broadly, are, in fact, particular and largely reasoned as they apply
to CLS.5 Despite this, the framing of the article is not “CLS needs to produce some results
to back up its claims,” but rather, capitalizing on the larger discourse of suspicion around
humanities engagement with technology, “The Debacle of the Digital Humanities.” Rather
than a particularity—is CLS, a relatively, but not excessively, well-known subfield of the
digital humanities, not living up to its self-stated potential?—the polemical title evokes a
generality—should we in the humanities concern ourselves, sully ourselves, with technology?
4.4 Negotiating the Boundary
In the genre of the digital humanities takedown, the field is positioned in a specific way—as
an entity that represents a porous boundary between the humanities and the outside forces
poised to undermine its values. The role of the digital humanities, in this mode, is to provide
a legible site of ingress, a site at which to contest sweeping impositions from without. The
too-broad surface area of the digital humanities—what Matthew Jockers, perhaps naively,
4This is not at all an issue exclusive to humanists. Tech boosters who think everyone should get with the
program are guilty of their own form of this—something like “progress good, objections bad,” or, even more
reductively, “new good, old bad.” If someone is being called a Luddite in a conversation, this dichotomy is
in play. And, while I am building to a critique of the humanities’ engagement with outside forces here, I
would note that erring on the side of progress boosterism likely has a far higher potential for damage.
5Da argues that methods practiced in computational literary studies, including “distant reading” studies
of formal or cultural trends in large text corpora, do not produce novel results—that is, results that could not
be achieved through traditional methods such as close reading. Da further criticizes a relatively prevalent
defense in CLS: couching weak or underpowered results as exploratory. Though I don’t agree with all the
assertions in the paper, the call for technical and rhetorical maturity in the field is timely and the specifics
of the article were and are productive. Criticism here is reserved for the article’s framing in a larger context
of the humanities’ suspicion of any engagement with technology.
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termed the “big tent”—facilitates this positioning of the field: reliably, some activity under
this capacious canvas will fit the needed mold. Allington, Brouillette, and Golumbia’s “Ne-
oliberal Tools (and Archives): A Political History of Digital Humanities” makes this form of
positioning relatively explicit:
What Digital Humanities is not about, despite its explicit claims, is the use of
digital or quantitative methodologies to answer research questions in the human-
ities. It is, instead, about the promotion of project-based learning and lab-based
research over reading and writing, the rebranding of insecure campus employment
as an empowering “alt-ac” career choice, and the redefinition of technical exper-
tise as a form (indeed, the superior form) of humanist knowledge. . . . While
many will be able to say, with some justification, “But that’s not my Digital
Humanities!” what we discuss here is the Digital Humanities that is helping to
transform the academy, because this is the Digital Humanities that has proved
itself so useful to university administrators and to funding bodies. (Allington
et al., 2016)
The digital humanities is not what it says it is about. Rather, the digital humanities is the
“redefinition of technical expertise as a form (indeed, the superior form) of humanist knowl-
edge.” In the genre of the digital humanities takedown, the field is essentially a metaphor,
an expedient site for the forces and trends—Tailorism, mass automation, surveillance cap-
italism—that threaten the humanities and our shared values. If the digital humanities did
not exist, then, for the arguments in this genre, it would have to be invented.6
Participants in the genre of the DH takedown are partially right. The digital humanities
is, indeed, a boundary field, in the sense that DH engages with specific forces and trends—in
the larger society. Nor is this form of engagement unique to the digital humanities. Besides
6Rather than reinvented, as it is here.
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New Media Studies, with which DH is to a great extent enmeshed, fields such as composition
and rhetoric, textual studies, and archival studies make use of methodologies shared with
fields outside the humanities, and study objects and phenomena sometimes disregarded in
other fields.
Perhaps more importantly, these fields, along with the digital humanities, attend to
the (frequently invisible) structures and processes that make scholarship, and the life of
the university, possible—what we might broadly call infrastructure. Scholars in textual
scholarship, paleography, book history, and related disciplines “study process (the historical
stages in the production, transmission, and reception of texts), not just product (the text
resulting from such production, transmission, and reception)” (Greetham, 2015, p. 2). In
Naming What We Know, Elizabeth Wardle and Linda Adler-Kassner lay out a notably clear
precis for writing studies and related fields that is similarly oriented toward the incorporation
of process into scholarship:
Writing is created, produced, distributed, and used for a variety of purposes. In
this sense, it is an activity in which individuals and groups engage. However, the
production, consumption, circulation, distribution, and use of writing are also
areas of inquiry. Researchers in a number of fields (including, but not limited to,
rhetoric and composition, linguistics, and literacy studies) investigate questions
about writing. (Adler-Kassner & Wardle, 2015, p. 15)
Besides engaging with writing as a process and an area of inquiry and teaching as a process
and an area of inquiry, composition and rhetoric also engages program administration, not
as a necessary evil, but as a process and an area of inquiry.
The relationship of these fields to the discipline of English parallels the situation of dig-
ital humanities within the humanities. While practices such as writing and bibliography
might grudgingly be considered necessary technical skills, their consideration as areas of
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inquiry—that, say, writing, thinking about writing, and then writing about writing might
be a productive feedback loop for the generation of useful scholarship—is not widely cred-
ited. Humanities scholars might use computers to do their work, writing in word processing
software and researching on library infrastructure, but this process is incidental, and, by
preference, not worthy of sustained scrutiny. Like the administration of writing programs,
the arrangement of information in a scholarly database, or the painstaking construction of a
copy text, attention to the process that is infrastructure creation is a necessary evil that, if
possible, should be abstracted from real scholarship. The hermaneutic and critical method,
as rigidly defined, must be read, think, write, publish, not, for example, build, think, write,
publish, or, with more complexity, build, read, think, write, publish. From the reductive
perspective implied in the genre of the digital humanities takedown, or held by critics of
practice-oriented fields such as writing studies or textual studies, the incorporation of any
form of practice into the generation of knowledge sullies, rather than enriches, the critical
or interpretive process.
The reality is that, for two decades now, engagement with technology is unavoidable
for the humanist. This is because, for better or worse, the world outside the academy, the
world in which the culture we study is created and with which our values might be shared,
is profoundly enmeshed with technology. For some humanists, many falling somewhere
within the loose affiliation of the digital humanities, engagement with technology is necessary
because particular cultural products—digital books, contemporary film, games, computer
code, community derivatives7—demands a knowledge of the underlying technical and social
medium. Alternatively, technology is required for the application of a specific method (as
with computational literary studies), or is used to create infrastructure, such as archives, of
use to other humanists. Of course, many—most—humanists do not engage with new media,
the social influence of platforms, computer code as a cultural product, and so on. These
7Such as fanfiction and memes.
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humanists, however, must still engage with technology to publish or otherwise share their
scholarship, and, increasingly, to research, write, and think. To opt out of writing interfaces
and scholarly databases is, realistically, to opt out of scholarship.
The argument here, crucially, is not that technology is the next best thing, and we must
get on board or be left behind. Rather, we have been left behind, and the modes in which
technology has been exercised in society have resulted in a profound disjunct between our
values and those of the encircling collective. In order to speak to that which we cannot
agree with in the broader society—surveillance capitalism, pseudo-sovereign corporations,
algorithmic bias, power in the hands of a few—we must have an understanding of the tech-
nological basis of the structures we oppose. Further, we must have in hand our own vision
of an opposing technê, a craft to practice, build, and live in autonomy or resistance. At the
least, we must be able to apply our core methods as humanists, our interpretive faculty, in
difficult and epistemologically alien circumstances.
Alan Liu, in a draft for the book Against the Cultural Singularity, supports this perspec-
tive in an argument that the study of infrastructure has begun to approach the study of
culture in furthering comprehension of modern social contexts:
“[I]nfrastructure,” the social-cum-technological milieu that at once enables the
fulfillment of human experience and enforces constraints on that experience, to-
day has much of the same scale, complexity, and general cultural impact as the
idea of “culture” itself. Indeed, it may be that in late modernity when the bulk
of life and work occurs in organizational institutions of one kind or another, the
experience of infrastructure at institutional scales (undergirded by national or
regional infrastructures such as electricity grids and global-scale infrastructures
such as the internet) is operationally the experience of “culture.” Put another
way, the word “infrastructure” can now give us the same kind of general purchase
on social complexity that stuart hall, raymond williams, and others sought when
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they reached for their all-purpose word, “culture.” (Liu, 2016)
Technology, of course, is not something that stands apart from humanity. It is, inherently, a
social phenomenon, collections of shared practices for acting upon the world in specific ways.
Yet, since the turn of the century,8 developments in infrastructure, interfaces, and platforms
have led to technology exerting an inescapable pull on culture. The humanities may not be
able to resist these developments,9 but it may be that we can regain some lost autonomy,
and find significant purchase in a society that may have need for our values.
4.5 Breaking the Boundary
The positions of scholars such as Stover (the humanities is autotelic, and we should tend our
garden) or Allington, Brouillette, and Golumbia (the unsullied interpretation of traditional
texts is the only way to do humanities scholarship) provide little way forward. For isolated
pockets of humanists, primarily tenured professors at the most elite institutions, continuing
on as if the humanities is not in crisis may be possible, at least for the foreseeable future.
Similarly, repeatedly knocking the straw from an effigy of the digital humanities may con-
tinue to provide some catharsis. However, the humanities faces a crisis, and not only one of
diminishing numbers—enrollments, grant awards, and tenure-track positions. The human-
ities faces a problem of negotiation, of exercising its values in an encircling context that is
largely indifferent or hostile to our concerns.
Rather than retreat from the world, the humanities should, and perhaps must, engage
8As with defining any trend or era, demarcating beginnings and ends is frequently difficult and always
reductive. Steven Jones marks 2004-2008 as significant years for a shift from a cyberspace (the digital
as fundamentally circumscribed and isolated from the real world) to the “eversion,” in which the physical
and digital worlds become inseparably enmeshed (Jones, 2013). N. Katherine Hayles marks a mid-2000s
shift from a “third phase” of virtuality, to a “fourth phase” of cybernetics, in which technology is entwined
with bodies and space, including the prevalence of ubiquitous computing in the form of overlays and actual
objects—for example, GPS, phones, and RFIDs (Hayles, 2010).
9Though we can be audacious in our hopes and aspirations.
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with it. However, there are a number of obstacles in place to sustained engagement with
the world outside the academy. These include an elitism that interferes with outreach to the
public, an infrastructural agnosia that impedes larger readings of modern culture, and a lack
of introspection about the tools and methods we use to research, teach, publish, and think.
Interpretation—of texts, of culture, of structures of power—will, and must, remain core to
the work of the humanities. However, humanists should acknowledge, and learn from, the
interpretive work that takes place outside the academy. Further, we must build on the work
of scholars who are turning their critical and hermaneutic faculties on a broader array of
structures and texts: systems, interfaces, platforms, hardware, networks, and algorithms.
Finally, we must acknowledge that lack of access is not rigor. Currently, our lack of atten-
tion to infrastructure shuts new, and diverse, scholars out of the humanities, prevents us
from sharing our work with wider audiences, and makes us reliant on entities, particularly
corporations, that are antithetical to our values. Just as teaching—though many choose not
to recognize it—informs and sustains research and scholarship, acts of technological mainte-
nance, care, and creation should be recognized for their impact on scholarly inquiry into the
interplay between social structures and technical systems.
A thread underlying these criticisms is a concern for cachet, reputation, and intellectual
capital that becomes pathological in the context of scarcity and precarity. Jan Parker alludes
to this in a discussion of a student protest that led to an nine-day occupation at Cambridge:
A classic marketing strategy lies in making distinctive and less accessible the
product you want to promote; some of the Ivy League and UK Russell Group
universities have endeavored to claim elite exclusivity for their research. The
sciences while so doing have also been prominent in showing that their research
outcomes have public benefit, and they have promoted the public understanding
of science. A similar exclusivity in humanities research, to public involvement,
and it has been made to seem part of an excluding agenda. . . . [I]t is the divorce
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between the humanities elite and wider society that has led on both sides to a
devaluing of real discourse (Parker, 2013, p. 47)
As Parker suggests, while the sciences struggle with issues of accessibility and exclusivity,
there is a countervailing tradition of engagement with the public that facilitates broader
understanding of the importance of science. A humanities tradition of engagement with the
public is significantly less developed. This lack of engagement, combined with the dwindling
resources directed at the humanities, causes suspicion to be levied at boundary fields, such
as the public humanities and the digital humanities. In the following section, we will explore
some of the differences between how the humanities and the sciences share research and
engage the public. Before we move on to considering a humanities fully committed, not to
circling its wagons and fighting over diminishing resources, but negotiating, broadly engaging
in the world, I would like to once again echo the sentiments of Susan Leigh Star in her “call
to study boring things” Star, 1999, p. 37.
In the following sections, I will advocate for a series of approaches that demand either
a disregard for cachet or an attention to the boring. This includes a reexamination of our
de facto infrastructure for thought and its dissemination—word processors and scholarly
databases—but also an examination of how interpretation is taking place in communities
held in little regard within academic humanities. The digital humanities, unfortunately, has
not always been an apt model for full-throated support of the boring. DH practitioners, too
often, have benefited from the positioning of projects as new and exciting.10 The field should
move beyond this rhetoric. At the same time, the humanities may need to look to a full
10As a digital humanities practitioner, I, too, have benefited from this positioning. A 2018 paper by Paige
C. Morgan makes a reasoned critique of the positioning of DH projects as “easy” for those not approaching
them from a supported and resource-rich context, using as one example DH Box, a project on which I am
a contributor (Morgan, 2018). I do understand these pressures, and that scholarship that embraces the
boring may not be what is rewarded by tenure committees, university presses, and grant officers, and there
is frequently a line to walk between work that is essential and work that allows for survival in a resource-
constrained environment. If enough scholars embrace the unexciting—maintenance, standards creation,
infrastructure development, critical engagement with everyday structures—perhaps these norms can shift,
and offer more room for essential work that is not the “next big thing.”
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set of boundary fields—among them the public humanities and the digital humanities—in
a contemplation of broad, two-way negotiation with the world. We need not alter the core
values and methodology of the humanities, but we do need to acknowledge those who, as
a component of their scholarship, take on the boring and frequently unremunerative work
of bridging the divide between the humanities and the outside, whether it be wrangling
legacy XML, reshelving books, or administering a community college writing program. We
are not debased, but rather enriched, by service that takes us beyond our intellectual and
social boundaries, and brings new insight to bear on our exercise of the hermaneutic. In the
following sections, we will attend to the infrastructure that mediates the boundary between
the humanities and the encircling culture, noting how an inattention to infrastructure on the
part of the humanities—allowing it to be created by entities such as corporations—has led
to a failure to exercise our values in a broader context. The final portion of this chapter will
consider areas within the humanities that are modeling engagement with infrastructure and
will indulge some utopianism—that is, imagining what a fully realized relationship between
the humanities and the public might look like.
4.6 Enclosing the Intellectual Commons
In 2006, nine board members of Topology, an Oxford University mathematical journal pub-
lished by Elsevier, resigned in protest. In their letter, the researchers wrote:
As you are well aware, the Editors have been concerned about the price of Topol-
ogy since Elsevier gained control of the journal in 1994. We believe that the
price, in combination with Elsevier’s policies for pricing mathematical journals
more generally, has had a significant and damaging effect on Topology ’s reputa-
tion in the mathematical research community, and that this is likely to become
increasingly serious and difficult, indeed impossible, to reverse in the future. . . .
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Therefore, with great reluctance and sadness, we have made the difficult decision
to resign. (Bridson et al., 2006)
The editors of Topology were concerned primarily with the pricing of the journal, which under
Elsevier’s control, was entirely out of their hands. The 2006 Topology resignation, though
not the first indication of discontent among academics with Elsevier and similar publishing
enterprises, did coincide with the beginning of the open access movement and an increased
consciousness of the strange and exploited position in which the academy has found itself.
Elsevier, and other commercial academic publishers such as ProQuest and Springer, have
placed themselves in a position of almost astonishing advantage. The situation has been
aptly described by scientist Stephen Buranyi in a 2017 analysis in The Guardian:
Scientists create work under their own direction – funded largely by governments
– and give it to publishers for free; the publisher pays scientific editors who
judge whether the work is worth publishing and check its grammar, but the
bulk of the editorial burden – checking the scientific validity and evaluating the
experiments, a process known as peer review – is done by working scientists on a
volunteer basis. The publishers then sell the product back to government-funded
institutional and university libraries, to be read by scientists – who, in a collective
sense, created the product in the first place. (Buranyi, 2017)
In 2012, a boycott movement, The Cost of Knowledge, was organized to protest Elsevier.
Over 17,000 researchers have pledged not to fuel Elsevier’s enormous and growing publication
empire with their labor, citing exorbitant pricing, the corporation’s practice of bundling
journals together for greater leverage over libraries, and its support for SOPA and similar
anti-speech measures in service of copyright.
Scientist Tal Yarkoni, noting that the corporation was frequently reflexively defended
by academics, attempted in a 2016 post to answer the question, “Is Elsevier really evil?”
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The post identified a series of business practices that few practitioners in the humanities
would condone, including selling false journals to pharmaceutical companies, selling access
to articles they do not own, extensive lobbying for closed-access legislation, and, alarmingly
and incongruously for an academic publisher, organizing arms trade fairs (Yarkoni, 2016).
More recently, libraries in Sweden and Germany have refused to renew subscriptions in
protest of the poor value offered by Elsevier and the disproportionate power wielded by the
corporation.
While much impetus for the open access movement has arisen from mathematics and
the sciences, the humanities has been similarly affected by proprietary gating of research,
and humanities practitioners are increasingly concerned. Though the Cost of Knowledge
boycott of corporate scholarly publishers was organized primarily by scientists, over 1500
practitioners from the arts and humanities signed in solidarity. Increasingly, researchers in
the humanities are speaking out. The Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ), currently
lists over 350 OA journals in the “language and literature” category alone.11 Despite this
progress, open access as a movement faces stiff challenges, and particularly in the humani-
ties. The leading humanities journals in most disciplines and subfields (Publications of the
Modern Language Association, Oxford Art Journal, Transactions of the American Philolog-
ical Association, and others) are not open access. Further, discourse around open access in
the humanities has become enmired in technical discussions of the merits and practicalities
of specific OA business models, and which largely takes pressure off corporations such as
Elsevier that profit from scholarly publishing. Though these models (such as “green,” or self-
archived open access in a local university repository, or “gold” representing open access hosted
by the journal itself), would, under the right implementation, represent some improvement,
in practice they result in either fragmentation that preserves the leverage of corporations or
author-pay schemes that promote institutional inequality and fully replace sky-high profits.
11As of June 2020.
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Humanities scholars such as Kathleen Fitzpatrick have called for “creating collective, coop-
erative, scholar-organized and -governed publications on open networks” (Fitzpatrick, 2015),
which would directly cut corporate actors out of academic publishing in the humanities.
While embracing collective and non-corporate forms of open access would align with stated
humanities values around equity and resistance to marketization, the humanities lags behind
the sciences in awareness, action, and infrastructure for OA.
In Open Access and the Humanities, Martin Paul Eve draws on metaphors from the nat-
ural world to explain why the humanities has not embraced open access as a cause to the
same extent as the sciences. In Eve’s metaphor, scholarly journals are plants, and open
access is sunlight that benefits all. However, humanities journals experience other difficul-
ties—metaphorical dry climates, high altitudes, and rocky soil—that do not similarly plague
scientific journals. For example, humanities journals individually receive more submissions
from scholars, leading to greater editorial pressures, and both humanities journals and indi-
vidual humanities scholars receive fewer resources and less financial support from institutions
and the public compared to their counterparts in the sciences.
Eve’s metaphor of academic journals as plants that thrive under the right conditions
may, however, explain more than just the failure of humanities practitioners to engage with
open access to the same extent as scholars in the sciences. The humanities does not ex-
ist in isolation, and fundamentally scholarship need not be a zero sum game. In making
humanities scholarship accessible to the public, the academy gains advocates and resources
from the wider society. This does not mean that the academy or the humanities should
bend to pressure to be narrowly instrumental in an economic sense, but rather that at least
part of the work performed by humanities practitioners should be in some way available to
interested individuals in the broader community. Paywalls, only semi-permeable to scholars
and impassable to outsiders, have cut the academy, and humanities in particular, off from
the support of the public. To use Eve’s metaphor, the trees of the academy have gradually
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been starved of sun and soil, left to contend amongst themselves for finite and diminishing
resources.
4.7 Thought in the Wild
It is difficult to quantify the damage that has likely been incurred by the interposition of
paywalls between writers in the academy and the public. By definition, we cannot ascertain
consequences that manifest in absence—opportunities foreclosed and intellectual connections
never made do not leave traces or records. Yet the public, demonstrably, has an appetite
for forms of discourse traditionally associated with the humanities. Ongoing debates over
the decline of the public intellectual (Drezner, 2017; Herman, 2017; Kristof, 2017; Posner,
2003) and the corresponding rise of the “thought leader” (Drezner, 2017), show that the
public is increasingly disconnected from the academy, but also that the public continues to
have an appetite for ideas and meets this demand largely outside of direct engagement with
scholars. Since the early 2000s, “academic repackagers”—individuals, often journalists, such
as Malcolm Gladwell, Stephen Dubner, and Charles Duhigg who have made their careers
translating social science into life advice and prescriptions for industry and the public—have
experienced tremendous success. Others, such as non-academic Maria Popova, creator of
the blog Brain Pickings, have gained enormous popularity through work, interpretive and
critical, that would seem to come under the purview of the traditional humanities disciplines.
There are many potential causes for the rise of quasi-academic roles, such as thought
leaders and niche influencers, that have come to supplant the academy in public life. One
accusation frequently leveled at academics is an inability to write and communicate clearly
to the public. Daniel Drezner, writing on the rise of the thought leader, calls this argument
the “standard indictment” due to its prevalence in the discourse around the waning public
influence of the academy. Commentators such as Joseph Nye of the MacArthur Founda-
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tion and Nicholas Kristoff of the New York Times have offered versions of this argument,
which suggests that professionalization in the academy has resulted in turgid and inacces-
sible prose and that academics have done little to take advantage of technologies, such as
social media and blogs, that might increase their reach. Drezner, pointing to the academy’s
relatively successful response to these accusations on the public stage and the wide influence
of specific academics, argues that the standard indictment of the academy does not tell the
whole story. The standard indictment is more or less true of academic processes and struc-
tures—conventions like tenure and peer review incentivize writing that is defensive, technical,
and specialized, and advancement is based on optimal negotiation within this narrow frame-
work rather than engagement with the world outside the academy. Despite structures in the
academy being ill-suited to public engagement, however, a large number of individual aca-
demics have thrived on the public stage. Drezner argues that these academics, to the extent
to which they have found success in the world beyond the Ivory Tower, do so by behav-
ing less as the public intellectuals of the past—offering broad discourse to a wide audience.
Rather, they act like thought leaders, associating themselves strongly with a specific idea
or conceptual niche that serves as a brand. This approach frequently leverages media that
are immediately accessible to the public, such as blogs, podcasts, and mass-market books,
as has been the case with the yFreakonomics and Sapiens book-brand hybrids.
The success of individual academics who adopt the strategies of the thought leader suggest
infrastructural issues with the means by which academics publish and share their work.
Though there is considerable dysfunction around academic tenure and peer review processes,
the disciplinary culture within the academy also contributes to the creation of deep and
mutually reinforcing networks of knowledge, and these structures, though imperfect, provide
a context for investigations that could not take place outside the academy. Further, while
thought leaders may have a role, perhaps even an important role, in public discourse, they
largely do not replace either the public intellectual or the academic specialist. The gated,
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proprietary, and inaccessible nature of much academic scholarship has led to piecemeal,
inadequate representation of academic work to the public. Manifestations of this dynamic
are overhyped and undercited journalistic coverage of academic advances and the rise of
simplifiers and repackagers such as Malcolm Gladwell (Fitts, 2013; Gray, 2013). Neither the
academy nor the public are enriched by the rise of these intermediaries. Knowledge received
by the public in this way is at best oversimplified and at worst distorted or erroneous,
and good will and market value tends to accrue to the intermediary rather than support
the waning reputation and coffers of the academy or academics. Humanities, again, is
hit particularly hard by this dynamic. While disciplines such as physics, economics, and
psychology receive dedicated, if sometimes inadequate, coverage from thought leaders and
the press, the humanities is only sparsely served in the modern media environment.
We will shortly return to the issue of inaccessibility and gatekeeping, facilitated by propri-
etary infrastructure and business models, in scholarly publication and discourse. However,
at this stage one might reasonably ask: is there appetite for humanistic, and specifically
critical and hermaneutic, thought outside the academy? In engaging with humanities work
outside the academy, what I will call here “lay hermaneutics,” we will encounter interest
in critical and interpretive work. This includes both the emergence of alternate traditions
(such as TV Tropes or the “lore” movement), but also some signs of a willingness to engage
with approaches as they are practiced within humanities disciplines. This exploration will
show that we are not alone—lay humanists are out there, and arguably more critical and
hermaneutic work is taking place outside the academy than in it. But engagement with the
lay hermaneutic will also suggest alternate and contrasting infrastructural models, and we
may find that humanities can be practiced using modes of sharing that are more accessible,
sustainable, and inclusive then our own.
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4.8 Lay Hermaneutics
From the perspective of a humanist operating from within the academy, lay critical, interpre-
tive, or hermaneutic traditions can be, and tend to be, trivially dismissed. Most obviously,
interpretive work taking place outside the academy disregards the interdependent citations
and precedential attribution of ideas on which academic authority rests. In deploying ideas
but not linking them to prior academic scholarship, lay hermeneuticists tend to read as
ignorant or naive. As a corollary, lay hermaneutic communities on the modern web can
manifest a notable (for purposes of academic authority) disregard for the association of
ideas with people—what academics12 call attribution. While lay interpretive practices may
be citational, and even densely so, much knowledge is not attributed but held in common in
structures such as wikis, copypasta, or memes. Worst, for purposes of academic credibility,
is the amateurism of these communities in the classic sense of the word. Lay hermeneuticists
love their subjects, and mostly do not maintain the critical distance demanded by academic
propriety, especially when those subjects are not seen to have intrinsic literary or cultural
merit: “Read James Joyce’s Ulysses 100 times, write essays about it, parse it endlessly with
strangers on the Internet, and you’re a scholar, but do the same thing with a videogame and
you’re a . . . fanboy” (MacDonald & Killingsworth, 2016).
In lay hermaneutic communities, interpretation cannot be easily separated from fandom,
a relationship that makes such work suspect within the academy. This dynamic is perhaps
best seen in the disposition of academic humanities toward Sherlockiana, or the creation of
12For purposes of this section, I’ll reserve the word “academic” for those studying the humanities from
within our familiar institutions of higher learning. Though lay hermeneuticists do not typically self-identify
with the word “scholar,” I think it unfair to employ the term only for those producing knowledge within the
structures of the academy.
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non-canonical works about Sherlock Holmes and the Sherlockian game,13 or the application,
sometimes faux-serious, of hermaneutic methods to the Holmes canon. Ed Wiltse eloquently
sums up the relationship between lay hermaneutic traditions such as the Sherlockian game
and the more authorial interpretive tradition practiced within humanities disciplines:
[T]he Holmes stories have always occupied a place between high and mass cul-
ture, just as so much Sherlockiana lies between “fan” writing and “criticism.” . . .
Perhaps this accounts for current criticism’s inability either to include or exclude
Sherlockiana (they’re in the MLA Bibliography but we don’t have to cite them).
(Wiltse, 1998, p. 119)
Extradisciplinary interpretive traditions such as the Sherlockian game have been around long
enough, are large enough, and have enough impetus behind them that they do, somewhat
more than occasionally, rise to the attention of practicing academics in the humanities.
Despite this, the academic stance toward these alternate traditions is that there is little
or nothing to be learned from them. Wiltse, though an academic with a scholarly interest
in Sherlockiana, was dismayed to find that a journal engaged in the Sherlockian game was
cluttering up his searches on scholarly databases:
The long-standing tradition among Sherlockians of publishing the results of their
studies, not only in the usual fan media (newsletters, fan magazines, and these
days, the Internet), but also in monographs and refereed journals creates a unique
problem for academic critics of the stories. Surely I am not the first person to
13A strong case can be made that the Sherlockian game, which models itself after interpretive methods
developed for biblical hermaneutics, is a longer tradition than that of interpretation within the discipline of
English. Though English as a discipline predates the Holmes canon and the Sherlockian game, we mostly
did not turn our attention toward interpretation until the shift away from philology after World War I. (On
the other hand, English as a discipline might claim a longer tradition through the practices of rhetorical
analysis and oratory. On the other other hand, the Sherlockian game has approximately equal claim to
these antecedents.) The Sherlockian game began in a mock-serious or deadpan mode, and participants were
conscious of the juxtaposition between highly serious interpretation and its subject, which was considered
to be frivolous.
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find to his dismay not the expected few dozen references to the Holmes stories
in the MLA Bibliography for the past two decades, but a few hundred, the vast
majority of which refer to articles in The Baker Street Journal (the best-known
Sherlockian journal, and the only one indexed by MLA). (Wiltse, 1998, p. 120)
Though, as Wiltse acknowledges, there is an elitism to the prevailing academic disregard
for lay contributions to knowledge on specialized subjects, I will not argue here that aca-
demics need to fully incorporate contributions made by alternate traditions.14 There may
be legitimate reasons for not incorporating knowledge produced by groups with diverging
aims, norms, and methodologies into a disciplinary network of authority based on interde-
pendent citations. Rather, my focus here is infrastructural. Even if we do not incorpo-
rate knowledge produced in alternate traditions, we have much to learn about how that
knowledge is produced, and, in particular, how it is shared with the broader society. Un-
like our disciplines, which tolerate and even embrace inaccessible and exclusory models for
research and publication, lay hermaneutic traditions tend to be less walled in, and the knowl-
edge they produce is more available to society. While we should not adopt their methods
wholesale—sustainability, for example, is not exactly the watchword of the online lore move-
ment—these alternate infrastructural modes might, at least, allow us to look at our own
approach to research and publication with an eye toward improvement.
4.9 Lore Communities
“Lore,” as used as a term of art on the web, is the collected diegetic information about a
work, especially a game. According to a popular entry on Urban Dictionary, lore is “[t]he
collective history and the sum of all knowledge available about a certain fantasy or sci-fi
universe” (Twyzëas, 2015). That is, lore is the body of information, such as history, that
14Though I’m not arguing against it, either.
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operates as information or history inside a work, and which is independent of information
about the work. To once again use the Holmes stories as an example, a discussion about
whether Dr. Watson was shot in the shoulder or leg at the Battle of Maiwand would be
a question of lore, while a discussion of Conan Doyle’s motivations for killing off Sherlock
Holmes would not be based on lore.
Lore, as created for games and adjacent works, is made in anticipation of hermaneutic
readings and approaches. That is, lore—as constructed by authors and creators—assumes an
audience interested in catalogue, critique, and theory. Hermaneutic activity around games is
complicated by the fact that, according to new media scholar David Ciccoricco, “even those
videogames that are commonly considered ”pure action“ may require consultation of the clas-
sical hermeneutic tradition to be ”understood to the full“ (Ciccoricco, 2010). That is, the
consumption of many modern games requires specific literacies, including the consultation
of glosses and commentaries, and in that sense is hermaneutic in the sense of the classical,
philosophical, or biblical traditions. Other works demand, for full or even adequate engage-
ment, an attention to the hermaneutic more in keeping with the interpretive tradition as
practiced in contemporary humanities disciplines. For example, a naive playthrough of the
2011 Dark Souls, a game with a strikingly devoted lore community,15 is disappointing and
even, by all appearances, nonsensical. If the player follows instructions explicitly given by
characters in the game, they learn little and, in the final moments of a long and notoriously
difficult game, burn themselves alive to support a corrupt and decrepit status quo. However,
15There is no unified lore community, just as there is no single “fandom” community. It may be true that
there is a lore movement in the sense that the rise of lore as a concept has seeded a variety of communities
who care deeply about the lore of specific works, but there is generally not (yet?) a consciousness of lore as
a phenomenon, practice, or organizing principle.
In this section, I mostly use as an example Dark Souls, the 2011 game that is, perhaps, best associated
with lore activity, and which can be more directly compared to hermaneutic and interpretive work in the
academic humanities. Another valid choice would have been, for example, Undertale, which has a more
woman- and queer-identifying community, and which demands a similar level of interpretive engagement on
the part of a player. Lore activity around Undertale, however, is difficult to prise apart from other activity
within the fandom, such as the creation of fanfiction.
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if the player is interpretively inclined, attending to clues in the description of artifacts, pat-
terns and inconsistencies in architecture, and the internally consistent redefinition of specific
thematic terms (”humanity,“ ”fire,“ ”profane“), they can piece together their position in the
larger context and choose an alternate path. In The Stanley Parable, Dark Souls, and In-
tended Play, lay theorist Dan Olson notes that ”a reading of Dark Souls must encompass not
just the nominal story but also a breadth of possibilities and how those possibilities alter the
meaning. This added complexity means games as texts are harder to encompass“ (Olson,
2017).
Perhaps due to the specific hermaneutic, interpretive, and performative demands of
games, lore communities make use of a wide variety of infrastructure, most specifically wikis,
forums, video essays, chat services, and backer platforms (Patreon, Kickstarter). It’s tempt-
ing to say that platforms such as YouTube are a natural place for discussion of lore given
the difficulties associated with citation of games and a need to use one audiovisual medium
to address another. However, video essays are more likely to be a medium of choice be-
cause YouTube is simply where receptive audiences congregate in numbers. Viewership of
(often highly theoretical or abstract) video essays is frequently astronomical, and especially
by comparison to readership of academic journals or monographs. Academic readership, a
number presumably higher than citation counts, goes mostly untracked. PMLA claims a
“circulation of 27,801, . . . among the largest for a humanities journal” (PMLA, 2020), and a
generous upper bound on the readership of the most widely discussed papers in the academic
Likely due to the rise of community-oriented online platforms, an increasing number of works anticipate, or
even demand, a hermaneutic approach. Authors and creators, aware of this emerging dynamic, put out works
in which the primary action is below the surface. As one lay commentator observed, “Dark Souls players
fought side by side in crumbling ruins, crystal caverns, and basalt hellscapes, but it was the wikis and forums
where the community came together to excavate the game’s delphic depths. In a time where many games’
secrets are laid bare just days after release, Dark Souls evoked memories of playground whispered cheatcodes,
of arcane riddles, and of design confident enough to bury its most surprising encounters. For many, the game
captured a certain nostalgic essentiality. And perhaps . . . this is the quality that ensured its ubiquitous
metaphorization” (Rueben, 2018). Just as Joyce wrote in full anticipation of a scholarly discussion forming
around Ulysses, these works are created in confidence that a corpus of secondary texts will grow up around
them.
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humanities would be in the thousands. In contrast, VaatiVidya, who has been called “the
poet laureate of Dark Souls” and whose videos are primarily interpretive, has 1.58 million
YouTube subscribers, including viewership on specific videos in excess of 3,500,000,16 and
makes a substantial living from 1220 donors who have committed to ongoing support on
Patreon. The disparity in reach here is difficult to overstate: it is conceivable that the col-
lective viewership of VaatiVidya, a single creator and by no means unique, may exceed the
collective combined readership of every article published in any humanities journal for at
least the last two decades.
The point here is not to shame the academic humanities for its lack of reach, though
perhaps some small amount of shame is warranted. However, as we will see in coming
sections, the choices we have made in the academy around publication, and in particular
in the infrastructure we use to share our research with one another and the world, are not
cutting us off from a public that is uninterested in hermaneutic work, interpretation, or a
search for meaning. Rather, they are starved for it, at the same moment that we in the
academic humanities are starved for want of the support of the public.
Another conclusion we should avoid when comparing ourselves to lay hermaneutic com-
munities is that we must, or should, adopt their methods wholesale, or even in great part.
Specific lore communities may be engaged, accessible, energized, and popular where the aca-
demic humanities is cut off, demoralized, and—let us just say it—irrelevant. However, they
are also unstable and unsustainable, their memory as a collective or an institution short
and their works largely ephemeral. Though the best work of these communities may be in-
sightful, the structure of these communities is such that methodology is largely ignored and
16Just to be clear here, these aren’t videos of dancing cats. More than three million people are engaging
with, to choose one representative example, an in-depth analysis of a single arch as it appears in the game.
For myself, a non-specialist in Dark Souls lore, these videos are, frankly, pretty boring, in the way that
specialist work is frequently tiresome to outsiders. My point here is that there is substantial interest in
hermaneutic work in non-academic communities, and that in specific ways lay hermaneutic traditions such
as lore have developed their ability to engage the encircling society with a success that should cause us to
reflect on specific exclusory practices in the academic humanities.
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sloppy or naive thinking is endemic. The best work done within the academic humanities,
whether theoretical or interpretive, could not happen in a context similar to that of a lore
community.
In the next sections, we will “read” a piece of lay hermaneutic infrastructure, the web-
site and online community TV Tropes, considering as we do the ecology it encourages and
the assumptions and values it reveals in its construction. Here, the medium is the disci-
pline, the logics of the platform both reflecting and influencing the shape of the community.
In a further section, we will similarly engage with the interface to a proprietary scholarly
database, unfortunately our current interface between the academic humanities and an in-
terested member of the public. As we conclude our examination of negotiation between
the academic humanities and the encircling collective, we will highlight instances of con-
certed engagement with infrastructure within the academic humanities and briefly imagine
a realized humanities infrastructure that reflects our values.
4.10 TV Tropes
TV Tropes is, in its own words, the “all-devouring pop-culture wiki,” which “catalogs and
cross-references recurrent plot devices, archetypes, and tropes in all forms of media” (TV
Tropes, 2020). The site, which receives about 2 million unique visitors per month, was started
in 2004 as an offshoot of discussion of conventions in media on a forum for fans of Buffy
the Vampire Slayer. Though tropers, as participants call themselves, started off analyzing
patterns in television, the site now encompasses analysis of works across a wide variety
of media, from literature and film to “real life,” which apparently adheres to storytelling
conventions often enough to qualify as a medium in its own right.
The site is organized around articles which fall into one of two primary categories:
tropes—narrative devices or conventions used in media—and works—discrete media such
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Figure 4.1: The TV Tropes home page. The banner “lampshades” the fact that the title of
the site is a misnomer.
as a series, movie, or novel. Each article consists of a description, typically written in a
breezy yet authoritative style and densely peppered with links to works and other tropes,
followed by an examples section, arguably the most distinctive feature of the site. For trope
articles, this section enumerates works that exhibit the trope. For works, this section lists
the tropes that apply. In other words, trope pages are supported with relevant works, and
pages on works list the tropes that appear. Further, trope pages orient readers to the trope’s
position in a larger constellation of tropes by providing tropes related or contrasting tropes,
or by pointing out metatropes or subtropes.
I’ll argue here that TV Tropes is, more than the online lore community or the Sher-
lockian game, disciplinary in the sense that we mean it within the academy, and that this
disciplinarity is paired with a marked, and markedly successful, accessibility. This argument,
however, will be more legible following a reading of the structure of a specific trope page.17
Though there are over 42,000 trope pages on the site, we’ll briefly engage with “Ontological
17I, personally, find that research on TV Tropes is difficult, since the interlinked nature of the site has one
moving from page to page almost without thought. Minutes rapidly turn into hours.
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Mystery,”18 a trope related to abstract settings used in philosophical and existentialist works
such as Waiting for Godot, Dante’s Inferno, and the 1979 The Prisoner.
Figure 4.2: The initial portion of the TV Tropes article on Ontological Mystery, including
title, links to adjacent pages, and part of the description.
On opening the page for “Ontological Mystery,” the most prominent initial features are
the title, an epitaph, and a prose description of the trope. The epitaph, a quote from a
Talking Heads song, introduces the trope: “. . . And you may ask yourself, ‘Well, how did I
get here?” ’ The description, seemingly the core of the page, is relatively short:
The characters are locked in a strange room, have no idea how they got there, why
they’re there, or how to get out, nor do they know exactly who is behind their
predicament, if anyone. . . . The main thrust of such stories is the investigation
of the restricted environment in which the characters find themselves, with the
goal of mastering it, revealing its secrets, and eventually escaping. Often those
approaching the truth are sharply yanked back. . . . The genre is usually a
metaphor for the unknowns and Big Questions of Real Life: what is my purpose,
why are we here, what can be done to solve the unsolvable?
18Yes, I have chosen a relatively cerebral trope page. This is, after all, a PhD dissertation.
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Following this, the description begins to place the article in the context of a broader constel-
lation of tropes. (Note that, as per the convention on the TV Tropes website, trope names
are set apart, not only through title case but in their status as anchor text for hyperlinks.)
May overlap with Small, Secluded World, World Limited to the Plot, Alternate
Universe, Planet of Hats, Adventure Towns or Lotus-Eater Machine. Almost
always employs Failure Is the Only Option and a veritable swarm of Schrodinger’s
Butterflies to obfuscate issues. There’s usually a Straw Nihilist in the cast saying
it’s all pointless. . . . Compare Epiphanic Prison. Contrast Eerily Out-of-Place
Object, for non-personal ontological mysteries.
Following this context, and initially hidden in “accordion” drawers representing media such
as “Literature,” “Live-Action TV,” and “Toys,” are examples of works employing the trope
and the accompanying presentation of the trope in the work.
Figure 4.3: The further portion of the TV Tropes article on “Ontological Mystery,” consisting
primarily of the examples section. The accordion for the “Literature” category has been
expanded to show examples.
However, while the initial description of the trope that opens the article, and the ex-
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amples that close it, are critical, the essential core of TV Tropes as a form of disciplinary
infrastructure is the context, the situation of the article at a specific node in the network.
In the article “Epiphanic Prison,” for example, we learn that a common way that ontological
mysteries are resolved is through a protagonist’s epiphany. In “Eerily Out-of-Place Object,”
we find that Ontological Mystery is relevant “when the thing you find somewhere [that] you
can’t explain . . . is yourself.”
We will return, shortly, to one or two other notable features of this page as we reflect
on the accessibility of the site. We begin to see here, however, the essence of TV Tropes as
infrastructure, and as an instantiation of values that are disciplinary, or at least adjacent to
what we consider to be disciplinary. TV Tropes is, fundamentally, infrastructure for a specific
set of culturally-mediated conversations around analysis of media that mostly take place
elsewhere on the web, most archetypally forums. Though TV Tropes hosts such discussions,
and the articles themselves venture into interpretation more than, for example, Wikipedia,
the primary purpose of the site is to provide structure and resources for a particular tradition
of critical and analytical viewers, players, and readers, a group with its own specialized norms,
methodology, and vocabulary. If this tradition is not a discipline, then it is at least adjacent
to one.
Discipline, in the sense of an academic discipline, can be conceived in a number of ways.
Social scientists such as Ken Hyland, using approaches such as discourse analysis, conceive
of disciplines as professions that map to a network graph: “what academics do with words
is to engage in a web of professional and social associations” (Hyland, 2013). While details
of this form of analysis are of some interest—engineers “report” and biologists “describe;”
venues and citation practices differ widely among disciplines—this approach treats disciplines
and professions as essentially interchangeable, and ideas as little more than social glue.
A radically different, though certainly not invalid, approach to disciplines is historical or
etymological. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault lays out such a framework, tracing a
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broad concept of discipline to the emergence, from the 18th century onward, of specific
modes of control exercised within military, medical, and academic institutions. In the same
historical vein, discipline and disciplines, again broadly conceived, can be further traced back
to variably punitive medieval and early modern religious and scholastic traditions.
Though both approaches to discipline are apt enough,19 in focusing on the forest (top-
down institutional control) or trees (nodes in a professional network), they do not address dif-
ferentiation among individual disciplines in critical areas such as subject of study or method-
ology. Armin Krishnan offers a list of criteria and characteristics of disciplines, defined as
“structure for the organisation of learning and the systematic production of new knowledge”:
1. disciplines have a particular object of research (e.g. law, society, politics)
. . . ; 2) disciplines have a body of accumulated specialist knowledge referring
to their object of research, . . . not generally shared . . . ; 3) disciplines have
theories and concepts that can organise the accumulated specialist knowl-
edge effectively; 4) disciplines use specific terminologies or a specific tech-
nical language . . . ; 5) disciplines have developed specific research methods
according to their specific research requirements; and maybe most crucially
6), disciplines must have some institutional manifestation in the form of
subjects taught at universities or colleges. . . . Only through institutional-
isation are disciplines able to reproduce themselves from one generation to
the next. (Krishnan, 2009)
Is “tropology,” as the denizens of TV Tropes sometimes refer to their practices, a discipline?
Quite likely not. Yet there are similarities and productive points of comparison. Tropology
has a clear subject of study, one shared with a number of humanities disciplines. TV Tropes is
evidence that tropology has a body of knowledge unique to the tradition. Tropers and fridge
19Unfortunately.
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logicians20 have their own specialized argot and practices, some of which have made it into the
public consciousness. Troper concepts such as lampshading (pointing out an inconsistency
before it rises to the attention of others) and gaslighting (denying or subtly altering another’s
perception of reality), among many others, emerged in fan analysis but have entered the
public discourse. Tropers and fans have long recognized patterns, such as “Bury Your Gays,”
or the far disproportionate tendency for gay characters and especially couples to be killed off,
and “Stuffed into the Fridge,” or the gruesome murder of female characters for impact on a
male character, and their specialist understanding and nomenclature has led to real awareness
of, and action on, these issues. In terms of methodology, tropers deploy interpretive methods
such as close reading that are core to the academic humanities, and in general tropers display
an awareness of specific fundamental concepts and approaches deployed in the academy,
though they do not treat this knowledge as central in their own practices.21 Perhaps most
surprisingly, from a perspective within the academic humanities, tropers recognize their own
form of critical distance. In the article “The Goals of TV Tropes,” the community explicitly
lays out a number of core values, one of which is “in order to be accessible, we cannot be
locked into a specific fandom’s viewpoint” (TV Tropes, 2020). Though this goal, as exercised
within the community, has its own local meaning, it is fundamentally a call to adopt a specific
20Fridge logic describes a kind of armchair commentary that typically takes place shortly after the con-
sumption of a work, as when a television viewer heads to the fridge for a snack after the credits roll. This
can range from quibbles—“Why didn’t they just put a brick on the accelerator?”—to relatively elaborate
theorizing. Attentive writers can forestall fridge logic through the practice of lampshading, as explained
above. If a character expresses surprise or confusion diagetically, the viewer understands that the writer is
aware of the inconsistency.
21The TV Tropes community is frequently aware, at least in broad terms, of perspectives shared in dis-
ciplines such as Film Studies and English, and concepts such as authority and canonicity are held in com-
mon—see “Death of the Author” and “Canon,” respectively (TV Tropes, 2020). There is a further awareness
of a certain critical stance that is shared with academic humanists. From “TV Tropes Will Ruin Your Life”:
“[a] common complaint of people who take courses like Media or Film studies is that they never look at a TV
program, advertisement or film the same way ever again. . . . Analyzing a medium in depth and pulling it
apart by the seams teaches you to watch things critically. . . . Most tropers, academics, directors or writers
who do this start to find new ways to enjoy media. The subtle blends of plots, the new spins on old stories.
The rare and welcome times where a plot you weren’t expecting appears. But it is never the same” (TV
Tropes, 2020).
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mode of discourse across fields of interest and not to allow amateurism, or love of a work, to
interfere with discourse and analysis.
We, as academic humanists, are not tropers, and “tropology” is not the academic hu-
manities. Yet, in considering fan analysis as a proto-discipline, we can perhaps see that this
effort is in many ways not so distant from our own. If we acknowledge the analogy between
academic humanist and troper, the comparison becomes instructive for considering the state
of our own values and infrastructure. From the ground up, TV Tropes is founded on a core
set of clearly articulated principles:
1. The wiki is about tropes used to tell stories.
2. We will be accessible and fun to read.
3. The wiki is for reaching the reader.
4. In order to be accessible, we cannot be locked into a specific fandom’s view-
point.
The first item outlines the disciplinary purpose: the subject matter, method, and level of
analysis. From the outset, the site comprehends a tension between the disciplinary project
and other forms of fan activity. This is not exclusory—the site hosts and tolerates other
activity, but is not about that activity. The other points relate to the core value of the site:
accessibility. To be useful to the reader, to perform its role as infrastructure for a community
of fan analysts, the site must be accessible to that community. The site itself, in conception,
structure, and design, instantiates these values. Note the right-column side panel, visible
on every page of the site (see Figure 4.4). The toggles on the top right show an awareness
of how the site is likely to be accessed and for what purpose: on a laptop or phone before
bed (night vision), quickly browsing the site (sticky header), while consuming the media in
question (show spoilers), or while reading longer analyses or discussions (wide load). The
links below these toggles, such as “Ask the Tropers” and “Trope Finder,” make the advice of
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the community available to those browsing, and are essentially prompts to engage directly
with tropers. Organizationally, the site instantiates a negotiation between disciplinary (i.e.,
trope-related) activity and more typical or freeform fan activity by affording access to sub-
pages connected to specific tropes or works. For example, below the top heading on the
“Ontological Mystery” trope page are four links: “Main,” “Laconic,” “Quotes,” and a “Create
New” option. The “Main” designation, active and highlighted on the “Ontological Mystery”
article, designates a primary trope page, the name “Main” reinforcing the core value that
“[t]he wiki is about tropes used to tell stories.” The other links allow tropers to move sideways
from this primary activity into areas away from the core values of the site, such as sharing
quotes or creating elaborate fan theories (typically performed on pages designated “fridge”).
When moving from the “Main” trope article for “Ontological Mystery” to the connected
“Laconic” article, for example, we encounter a page hosting the shortest possible elucidation
of the trope: “Where are we? And why?” Through these related or non-main pages, the
site upholds its first value, recognizing that its primary concern is on tropes but nonetheless
providing spaces for tropes to connect with a broader constellation of fan activity.
TV Tropes proves a powerful example of values instantiated as infrastructure. While this
is not rare in itself, the adjacency, disciplinary and interpretive, of fan analysis communities
to the academic humanities should give us pause. In the next section, we will briefly analyze
a point of interaction between the public and the academic humanities, an article page in a
proprietary scholarly database. We will consider this interface, not necessarily because it is
core infrastructure for the humanities, but because it and similar pages are where members of
the public are likely to find themselves when searching for, or attempting to share, scholarship
in the humanities.22
22Our reading of this interface will be relatively brief, as I will assume more knowledge of scholarly
databases than was warranted for an analysis of TV Tropes.
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Figure 4.4: The right column of each TV Tropes page, showing toggles and links that
facilitate specific modes of reading.
4.11 SAGE
Let us imagine, for the moment, that a non-academic, engaged in a conversation with an
academic humanist, hears about Susan Leigh Star and her call to study boring things. The
concept resonates. What is their next step? Naturally, their course of action, in the current
year and for the past two decades, will be to run a query in a popular search engine. This
query might, for example, take the form of “susan leigh star boring infrastructure.”
The top result for this query, titled “The Ethnography of Infrastructure - SUSAN LEIGH
STAR, 1999,” comes from journals.sagepub.com. If our searcher would be satisfied with
a summary or discussion of the article, they might continue down the list of results. If
they are interested in reading the article, however, this first result would appear to be the
most promising. Clicking through, our member of the public would find at https://journals.
sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00027649921955326 a page that is largely typical of an article
entry in a proprietary scholarly database.
SAGE Journals, part of SAGE Publishing, hosts journals on the health sciences, life sci-
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Figure 4.5: Two searches for “susan leigh star boring infrastructure” on search engines,
DuckDuckGo (top) and Google (bottom). The first result from SAGE Journals is the subject
of our analysis in this section.
ences, materials sciences, social sciences, and the humanities. According to an informational
page for editors considering an agreement with SAGE, highlights of the journals program
are a sales team “with excellent knowledge of library markets,” a series of developing world
initiatives for institutions in the Global South that cannot afford high journal subscription
costs, metrics and impact factor tracking, a social media network for journal promotion, an
editorial workflow with resources for authors, and a for-charge gold open access program
(SAGE Publishing, 2018). SAGE Journals is hosted on Literatum, a proprietary platform
created by Atypon, now a subsidiary of publishing giant Wiley. In its marketing materials
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Figure 4.6: A SAGE Journals article page for “The Ethnography of Infrastructure” by Susan
Leigh Star. This is the top portion visible on initially loading the page on a device with a
wide screen, such as most desktop computers.
for Literatum, Atypon touts “[c]ontent recommendations and targeted ads . . . powered by
your visitors’ identities and site behavior—whether or not they are registered users” and its
eCommerce functionality: “[e]asier to buy means easier to sell” (Atypon, 2020). The article
page for “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” therefore, is representative of article pages
across the 1000+ journals hosted by SAGE, and shares much in common with a larger set
of articles hosted on the Literatum platform, other clients of which include Taylor & Francis
and Elsevier.
Our article page for “The Ethnography of Infrastructure,” as encountered by a non-
academic member of the public, has a three-column layout on large devices. Above these
columns, at the top of the page, is a navigation bar for SAGE Publishing, which gives options
such as “Browse” and “Resources” that refer to the SAGE Journals platform, not the specific
journal (in this case the American Behavioral Scientist). Below the navigation bar is a
header consisting of the name and impact factor of the journal foregrounded on the journal’s
logo. With one exception, the ISSN or standard serial number in the footer, this is the only
journal-specific “branding” on the page—that is, article pages on SAGE Journals tend to be
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largely uniform across journals.
In contrast to, for example, TV Tropes, this SAGE article page does not foreground the
text of the article or its context in a larger disciplinary conversation. Rather, the central
portion of the page, the place to which we have been conditioned to seek information, is
dedicated to a section titled “Access Options.” That section is divided into three subsec-
tions, “My Account,” “Institutional Access,” and “Purchase Content.” On investigation, “My
Account,” as an option, is less a path to access in itself than an alternate means to gain
access through one’s institution. To gain institutional access, one must be affiliated with a
university that can afford the high subscription fees for the journal, or more likely a bundle
of journals. Alternatively, one can purchase “24 hours online access to download content.”
For the article, the fee associated with this is $37.50, or $335.00 for the complete issue. It is
here, likely, that our member of the public would conclude their search. Without institutional
access or unusually deep pockets, our visitor is unlikely to further pursue this momentary
curiosity in the humanities, and certainly will not be drawn into a vibrant online world of
humanistic discourse.23
Though our curious member of the public has departed, let us spend a little more time
with our SAGE Journals article page and further consider the values it instantiates. Just as
TV Tropes makes sense given its unstated values—the site is about tropes, and will be acces-
sible and fun to read—a SAGE Journals article page becomes highly legible when considered
in light of the values and intentions motivating its construction. Taking a step back, let us
postulate that a SAGE Journals article page is not designed to provide access, but rather
leverage. We can actually derive SAGE’s intended audience through information provided
23Perhaps it may seem overly optimistic that humanities scholarship, if more readily available, could draw
members of the public into an extended humanities community. From where we are now, the prospect
does seem far off. But remember that lay hermaneutic communities, from the Sherlockian game to the lore
movement to TV Tropes, achieve this. These groups draw members of the public from initial curiosity to
learning to tentative participation to card-carrying membership, and their infrastructure facilitates movement
from one level of participation to the next.
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in the periphery of our article page. By clicking the “Need Help?” link under “Institutional
Access,” we find a relatively terse Help page that primarily serves to provide resources to
a specific set of listed constituencies: “Librarians,” “Authors,” “Editors,” “Reviewers,” “Re-
searchers,” and “Societies.” Fundamentally, the article page is designed for the consumption
of the librarian—the customer. Librarians, by and large, decide whether institutions will
pay for specific “content,” and the article page places specific forms of pressure on librarians.
Researchers, encountering an article to which they do not have access, will frequently reach
out to their institution’s library, placing pressure on librarians to either purchase subscrip-
tions or justify a choice to abstain. Authors, editors, and reviewers are necessary creators of
the “content.” Naturally, there is no designated constituency, or “Help,” for community or
public.
Worth highlighting here is how little use our article page for “The Ethnography of Infras-
tructure” is. Three sections of the page suggest some form of utility: the left sidebar, like
the TV Tropes toggles, sports buttons for “Download PDF,” “Cite,” “Share,” and “Request
Permissions.” The “Download PDF” button, predictably, does not download a PDF, but
rather directs a visitor a few inches to the right to the central “Access Options” section.
The “Cite” button is functional, if limited, allowing one to view a bibliography entry in one
of four major citation formats but providing no explicit integration with citation managers
like Zotero. The “Share” button provides a similarly limited interface to, for example, tweet
about the article. The “Request Permissions” button directs one, somewhat alarmingly, to
“Copyright Clearance Center’s RightsLink service,” where a visitor can employ a maximalist
web form to, for example, ask to print copies of the article for a class. The right sidebar, after
sharing limited information on the volume and issue in which the article appears, suggests
similar and related articles, though all of the recommendations are also hosted on SAGE.
A few other areas of the page, however, may actually prove useful to a researcher. These
include the article’s abstract and cited works, which appear below the central Access Options
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section, and the “Articles Citing This One” section, which provides links to works outside of
SAGE Journals. These sections, however, appear to draw from Google Scholar, and do not
appear to offer any functionality not already available on that platform.
4.12 De Facto Infrastructure
Our SAGE Journals article page is disappointing as humanities infrastructure because it
is not truly humanities infrastructure. That is, the proprietary databases that frequently
host humanities research are not built by humanists, and thus it is unsurprising that they
instantiate values not our own. At the core of the proprietary database as concept and
infrastructure is not scholarship. The use of the word “content,” rather than “writing,”
“thought,” or “scholarship,” in the implementation of these proprietary databases is telling.
“Content,” fundamentally, is the thing you put the ads around. While “content” is necessary,
for the purposes of these platforms it is not an end but a means. The core of the proprietary
database is not the dissemination of knowledge, but the furtherance of the model. These
pages are not created to disseminate knowledge, but to derive benefit from friction generated
when we reach for scholarship within our discipline. This dynamic, in which savvy strangers
interpolate themselves between us and the disciplinary corpus, should be familiar to us.
Just as Facebook sells us our friends and loved ones, commodifying the support of our
community as “likes,” the proprietary scholarly database sells us our own collective work as
interchangeable “content.”
Our work is transformed from living knowledge to grist for a profitable business model
through our inattention, as humanists and academics, to infrastructure. In “The Humanistis-
cope: Exploring the Situatedness of Humanities Infrastructure,” Patrick Svensson observes
that “when it comes to thinking about the humanities in terms of infrastructure, there seems
to be a lack of both everyday systemic awareness and extensive critical work. Humanists do
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not thus necessarily think of what they do as situated and conditioned in terms of infras-
tructure” (Svensson, 2015). Because we have not taken an active interest in the creation of
infrastructure, we, as humanists, have become dependent on a set of de facto infrastructures
that instantiate values not our own. Our above reading of a SAGE Journals article page
provides an example of infrastructure, created for us and not by us, that fails to reflect our
values.
Humanists, of course, should not be creating their own water processing plants.24 How-
ever, our infrastructural choices have effects on the lives of our students, the shape of our
research, and the nature of the university as an institution. In Austerity Blues: Fighting
for the Soul of Public Higher Education, Michael Fabricant and Stephen Brier draw a line
between infrastructural choices, including decisions made about platforms, and the politics
of disinvestment that has negatively impacted higher education in the United States. In a
moment in which tenured professors are being replaced by adjuncts, and in which the burden
of tuition continues to be shifted onto our highest-need students, public institutions such as
the City University of New York (CUNY) have spent disproportionate resources on infras-
tructural initiatives that primarily benefit large corporations. These include subscriptions to
proprietary services such as Blackboard and exploitative partnerships with for-profit edtech
initiatives such as MOOC2Degree. A notably pernicious example at the City University of
New York is CUNYfirst, a highly expensive and low quality internal platform contracted out
to Oracle:
“CUNYfirst,” an “enterprise resource planning” business software solution de-
veloped by Oracle’s PeopleSoft for CUNY to coordinate and “systematize” all
university academic and administrative functions, will have a reported cost of
more than $600 million in capital expenditure. That is not to mention the tens
of thousands of unreported hours of CUNY staff time spent over the past decade
24And if they do, it should be as a hobby after they receive tenure.
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of its implementation learning the complex procedures, time that could not be
devoted to CUNY student and faculty needs. It is important to reiterate that
this large cost has been incurred during a period of substantial student tuition
increases and public-sector disinvestment. Equally important, CUNYfirst is an
“off-the-shelf” system that has been plagued by many operating problems and
obstacles, thus delaying its full implementation. (Fabricant & Brier, 2016, p. 96)
CUNYfirst’s expense and demonstrably poor performance stand out, but the true missed op-
portunity here is the contracted, corporate, and off-the-shelf nature of the platform. Paying
Oracle $600,000,000 for prix-fixe software is its own kind of disinvestment in public institu-
tions. Imagine, instead, similar funding put toward building infrastructure tailored to the
needs of the university, and that itself could be shared with other public institutions. Rather
than a structure that instantiates the values of for-profit Oracle—CUNYfirst, for example,
has a vestigial page where faculty can check their stock compensation—the platform could
be built from the ground up for public higher education. The $600,000,000 sticker price
for this uncustomized software could pay for a team of 200, compensated with a generous
$200,000 in salary and benefits, to work for 15 years, and the presence of such a team would
constitute its own kind of investment in infrastructural expertise at CUNY. More reason-
ably, this funding would likely go much further than simply building one platform toward a
larger goal creating CUNY-specific infrastructure, investment that could help the university
assume a leadership role and which would develop its independent ability to take on more
ambitious infrastructural projects in the future.
This kind of speculation may seem ungrounded and unrelated to the humanities. How-
ever, ongoing work at CUNY has demonstrated the concrete benefits that arise from atten-
tion to and investment in local infrastructure, and humanists have been key to this current.
Started by Matthew K. Gold, a professor of English at The Graduate Center, CUNY, the
CUNY Academic Commons is a shared online space for CUNY students and faculty:
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[S]ince its 2009 launch, CAC has garnered more than eight thousand CUNY
faculty, staff, and graduate students who use its group sites, blogs, and wikis to
find one another; to share information and ideas; to support and enhance the
teaching of graduate-level courses . . . ; to collaborate on digital and other types
of academic projects; and to form and sustain intellectual, political, cultural, and
social communities. . . . CAC has contributed immeasurably to building a sense
of community and active intellectual engagement across the diverse and often
fragmented multicampus CUNY system. And, in the spirit of the open-source
idea, the CAC team has made the underlying software platform and computer
code available for free to all potential users worldwide in its “Commons in a Box”
program. (Fabricant & Brier, 2016, p. 217-218)
The CUNY Academic Commons and similar initiatives such as Blogs at Baruch and Queens
College’s Qwriting are tailored to their environment in a way that the monolithic CUNYfirst
is not. Perhaps more importantly, just as CUNYfirst represents a disinvestment in the public
university as an institution, the CUNY Academic Commons represents an investment, and
the second- and third-order effects of its creation have rippled out far beyond the institution.
The most obvious effect of investment in the CUNY Academic Commons is that the platform,
licensed as free software as part of the Commons in a Box project, has been adopted by a
wide array of public institutions, from the MLA to state universities in California, Texas, and
Florida. Boone Gorges, one of the original developers on the CUNY Academic Commons
while a graduate student in philosophy, remarks on the decision to share the infrastructure
more broadly:
Once CUNY Commons was up, we got requests from all over the world asking us
to tell them how to do the same. Commons in a Box is not only one-off software
but a community project where people can come for support, share their work,
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and contribute . . . . What I’ve seen anecdotally, people who otherwise could not
set up a community site now can in half an hour. People who never could have
done it before can create powerful online communities. (Slavin, 2013)
As part of CUNY Graduate Center Digital Initiatives, the CUNY Academic Commons
and Commons in a Box projects have inspired other infrastructural efforts, such as the NEH-
funded projects Social Paper, DH Box, and Beyond Citation, and the clustering of these and
other infrastructural initiatives has created an ecosystem of local expertise that particularly
benefits graduate students. As humanists participate, and increasingly lead, in the building
and maintenance of infrastructure, we not only allow ourselves to work in ways that exercise
our values, but we clear the path, and create the knowledge, necessary for more ambitious
work.
In other areas, humanists have answered de facto infrastructure with humanities infras-
tructure and, perhaps to our own surprise, succeeded. In 2006, the Center for History and
New Media at George Mason University released Zotero, a citation manager, and freely
licensed software. At that time, the citation manager environment was dominated by Ref-
Works, proprietary software that is now owned and released by a ProQuest subsidiary. Since
that time, Zotero has stood toe-to-toe with RefWorks and the similarly proprietary EndNote
and Mendeley, and Mendeley even incorporates Zotero’s open code into its citation processor
and plugin for word processors.
Directly creating alternatives is not the only way to answer de facto infrastructure. Lori
Emerson, for example, in her work at the Media Archeology Lab at the University of Col-
orado, works to excavate possibilities of interface that have been closed off by the unrelenting
ubiquity of tools such as Microsoft Word, “opening up how exactly interfaces limit and cre-
ate certain creative possibilities” (Emerson, 2014). In an interview with Jay Kirby, Emerson
describes her methodology for allowing others to create distance from the cognitive and cre-
ative hegemony of Microsoft Word, software that is a de facto standard for writing in the
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humanities:
That is what I use the Media Archeology Lab for. I sit people down at, say, an
Osborne I computer, and I invite them to use WordStar, which is entirely text-
based and requires you to use about 90 different commands. Next, I ask them
to read WordStar against Microsoft Word so that they can begin to actually see
how other word processors have different or more capabilities than Word, and
hopefully they begin to realize Word isn’t natural—it isn’t the only, or even the
best, word processor. There are other ways you can process your documents and
have very different, creative results. So to me, pedagogically, the best way to get
students to think critically about interfaces is to read the past and the present
against each other. (Kirby & Emerson, 2016)
Emerson creates and uses infrastructure—her Media Archeology Lab and its associated his-
torical hardware and software—and studies infrastructure—in this case, Microsoft Word.
Indispensable to this approach are core methods of the humanities, in this case critical in-
terpretation and pedagogy. There is no tension between these approaches—infrastructural
knowledge, the ability to see and think in terms of infrastructure, naturally extends Emer-
son’s critical faculty. This work is humanities work, and the results, in Reading Writing
Interfaces and elsewhere, speak for themselves.
4.13 Tear Down This Wall
In the 1945 article “As We May Think,” Vannevar Bush famously put forward the concept
of the Memex, a kind of universal machine for research and reading. Bush framed the need
for such a device in what we would now regard as an argument for accessibility:
If the aggregate time spent in writing scholarly works and in reading them could
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be evaluated, the ratio between these amounts of time might well be startling.
Those who conscientiously attempt to keep abreast of current thought, even in
restricted fields, by close and continuous reading might well shy away from an
examination calculated to show how much of the previous month’s efforts could
be produced on call. Mendel’s concept of the laws of genetics was lost to the
world for a generation because his publication did not reach the few who were
capable of grasping and extending it; and this sort of catastrophe is undoubtedly
being repeated all about us, as truly significant attainments become lost in the
mass of the inconsequential. (Bush, 1945)
Today, we have, in the form of the web and its associated infrastructure, surpassed the
Memex in every area—every area, that is, save for academic research. The world can gorge
itself on knowledge, except that knowledge created by the one institution, the academy,
notionally concerned with its creation and dissemination. Though the sciences wrestle with
the interposition of gatekeepers between themselves and their work, we in the humanities are
explicitly concerned with values such as equity and justice. A complacency that keeps our
work from academic humanists in less privileged institutions, from researchers with print and
mobility disabilities, and from an interested public is unequal, and unjust. Further, while
there is no guarantee that engagement with infrastructure, critically and practically, will
reverse the ongoing crisis in the humanities, we cannot pretend to relevance while the only
portal to our work lies in the hands of corporations with little interest in its dissemination.
This chapter, implicitly, has argued for an engagement with infrastructure. Other human-
ists, among them Alan Liu, Lori Emerson, Matt Gold, Patrick Svenson, Stephanie Boluk,
Tara McPherson, and Tung-Hui Hu, have persuasively made this case, both explicitly and
in their work on infrastructure. Infrastructure, however, should not be considered only as
a new avenue of research in the humanities. It is also a necessary mode of negotiation, a
mode critical to preserving our autonomy, exercising our values, and sharing the work in our
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disciplinary tradition.
As we will explore in the conclusion to this project, there is a trend, a trajectory, a weft
that encloses humanity, as conceived in the conventional sense but also in the sense of the
humanistic. When considering the humanities and our negotiation within the larger collec-
tive, this manifests as a specific trajectory. The humanities faces an inability to effectively
coordinate, a dispirited and underemployed cadre of junior scholars, and record low enroll-
ment. It faces an array of savvy corporations buoyed on flows of capital, working tirelessly
to grist “content” of our understanding and “value” of our values. We are no longer at the
center of the university, and the university is no longer the center of culture. We may fail.
We may already be failing.
Yet let us take heart. There is no reason to hold back. We have our methods and our
values. We have our texts and our students. We read and think, speak and write. We are
not lectureships, grants, or wood paneling. We have lost prestige, and need not fear the loss
of prestige. We can change, and learn.
For the same reasons the humanities is in decline, the humanities is needed. However,
to persist, and eventually to resist, we must take what we can from other traditions while
preserving that which is essential in our own. Those who do not share our values have
built the world out from under us, and the platforms they have created only sell us back to
ourselves. To seek autonomy, to negotiate, we must fully explore the boundary between the
humanities and the encircling collective, and we must learn from other traditions. We are
not the only flame.
In the next chapter, a conclusion to this project, I will gesture toward the Abstraction,
an imperfect term for a structure or entity with which the broadest collective—the universal,
humanity, or das Man—must contend. Just as the individual must negotiate with the imme-
diate physical and social environment, and collectives such as the humanities must negotiate
with the broader society, humanity—the universal—must negotiate with an environment of
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its—our—own creation. Part of the concern with this structure, this agaia, is that it can
only be usefully described in its constituent parts and not in its totality, and so we will draw
on the work of a variety of scholars who describe interlocking concerns at the edge of our
collective comprehension. Perhaps more practically, we will also engage with the local, ad-
vocating for a techne of autonomy in opposition to a technology—a Technology™—in service
of dependence and inequity. As the humanities continues to engage with infrastructure, it is
my hope that we will discover our own techne, an art that reflects our disciplinary methods,
concerns, and values and preserves our autonomy.
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5.1 Two Futures and a Present
Consuelo Ramos, the protagonist of the 1976 novelWoman on the Edge of Time, finds herself
in a present on the verge of two futures. In the opening lines of the novel, we encounter a
tension between the precarity of Connie’s immediate situation and the presence of a link to
something other:
Connie got up from her kitchen table and walked slowly to the door. Either I
saw him or I didn’t and I’m crazy for real this time, she thought.
“It’s me—Dolly!” Her niece was screaming in the hall. “Let me in! Hurry!”
“Momentito.” Connie fumbled with the bolt, the police lock, finally swinging the
door wide. Dolly fell in past her, her face bloody. Connie clutched at Dolly,
trying to see how badly she was hurt. “Qué pasa? Who did this?” (Piercy, 1997,
p. 3)
As we meet her in these opening lines, Connie is in a moment of crisis at the end of a
long road punctuated by personal tragedy and grinding systemic injustice. Though talented,
perceptive, and empathetic, she has been dragged under by a society that devalues and
disempowers her and people like her. This first passage introduces an immediate crisis
in the present: in the scene that follows, Connie, after attempting to defend her niece,
is involuntarily committed to a mental hospital, beginning a process that will lead to a
profound loss of personal autonomy and dignity. This passage, however, is not only about
the present, but about a presence. Connie, living at a crucial point in history, is experiencing
a connection with a potential future—“[e]ither I saw him or I didn’t and I’m crazy for real this
time.” The contrast between Connie’s present and this potential future turns on autonomy.
After Connie’s involuntary incarceration, she grieves for the loss of control over herself and
her environment:
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How she would celebrate her release! Her dingy two rooms with the toilet in the
hall shone in her mind, vast and luxurious after the hospital. Doors she could
shut! A toilet with a door! Chairs to sit in, a table of her own to eat on, a TV
set that she could turn on and off and tune to whatever program she wanted
to watch, her own bed with clean sheets and no stink of old piss. Her precious
freedom and privacy! (Piercy, 1997, p. 25)
Throughout the novel, Connie is, by turns, physically injured, insulted, and ignored at the
hands of authority figures—social workers, mental ward attendants, doctors, and police. Yet
perhaps most galling for her is the denial of autonomy over her immediate physical and social
space, a betrayal not only of a connection to a wider community but also the immediate and
necessary circumstances of life.
As Connie is ground down in the present, first in poverty and later in incarceration, she
also begins to forge a strange link to a potential future, one contrasting sharply with the
circumstances in which she finds herself. These visitations from the future come in the form
of encounters across time with Luciente, an occupant of the year 2137. Luciente’s future
is a radical culmination and extrapolation of the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s,
including second-wave feminism, the women’s health movement, early environmentalism, gay
liberation, ecological anarchism, and civil rights, among others. When Connie, through her
connection to Luciente, later visits the Mattapoisett of 2137, she finds a society that opposes
social domination, traditional concepts of gender, and environmental expropriation. Along
with attention to ecology, mental health, and personal growth, Luciente’s society places
particular emphasis on autonomy:
“Corydora’s your boss?”
“We coordinate by lot . . . for six months at a time.”
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“Why do it that way?” Connie asked. “Some people know how to run a lab, and
some people don’t, right?”
“Whenever we decide we’re ripe to join a work base, we fuse as full members. We
share the exciting jobs and the dull jobs. We don’t think telling people what to
do is a real world skill. . . . ” (Piercy, 1997, p. 131)
Throughout the novel, Luciente’s future, in which systems of oppression based on gender,
race, and cognition have been largely dismantled, provides a contrast with the injustice and
humiliation experienced by Connie in the present. The Mattapoisett of 2137, however, is
not the only future that Connie visits in the novel. Connie receives flashes of another even-
tuality, one in which oligarchs dominate humanity through rigid control and categorization:
“Control of genetics. Technology of brain control. Birth-to-death surveillance. Chemical
control through psychoactive drugs and neurotransmitters” Piercy, 1997, p. 242. In this
future, Connie encounters Gildina, a woman who has undergone extensive surgery, including
lightening her skin, to make herself more attractive to a hegemonic, and exclusively male,
ruling caste. In this future, life outside controlled indoor spaces is intolerable due to envi-
ronmental degradation, and practices such as cooking are unknown to Gildina and others in
her position. For Gildina, there is only exploitation and entertainment—the situation into
which she has been forced is without community, curiosity, purpose, or growth.
Each of these futures has seeds in Connie’s present, and information from Luciente’s
future suggests that Connie is at a historical crux. This sense, that society and the world
stand at the edge of two futures, resonates with the social movements of the era—there
were, and are, no guarantees that rights won and change fought for could be retained and
built upon in the decades to come. Connie’s present, and her connection to two futures,
also represent two radically divergent understandings of technology, and of how technology
mediates the relationship between the local and the universal.
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Woman on the Edge of Time, in its futures, does not depict technology as a binary, a
simple agent for weal or for woe. Nor is technology some agnostic force, in the right hands a
boon and in the wrong hands an ill. Technology, in broad form and writ large, is not itself
a particularly useful concept in distinguishing between these futures. Consider Connie’s
confusion when introduced to Mattapoisett:
“More evolved!” Connie snorted. “I’d say things have gone backward!”
“Our technology did not develop in a straight line from yours,” Luciente said
seriously, looking with shining black gaze, merry, alert in a way that cast grace
notes around her words. “We have limited resources. We plan cooperatively. We
can afford to waste . . . nothing. You might say our—you’d say religion?—ideas
make us see ourselves as partners with water, air, birds, fish, trees.”
“We learned a lot from societies that people used to call primitive. Primitive
technically. But socially sophisticated.” Jackrabbit paced, frowning. “We tried to
learn from cultures that dealt well with handling conflict, promoting cooperation,
coming of age, growing a sense of community, getting sick, aging, going mad,
dying—” (Piercy, 1997, p. 132)
For Connie, the technology on display at Mattapoisett is something of a disappointment.
Technology should be striking, imposing, rather than integrated into the existing context.
For Connie, and for us, technology is associated with specific aesthetics—it should evoke
awe, fear, or wonder. The aesthetic form most strongly associated with technology is the
sublime, or the mode connected to confrontations with the vast, the new, or the ineffable:
The sublime . . . is an essentially religious feeling, aroused by the confrontation
with impressive objects, such as Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon, the New York
skyline, the Golden Gate Bridge, or the earth-shaking launch of a space shuttle.
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. . . [T]he emotion, although ineffable, is not inevitable. Over time, the same
objects cannot always be counted upon to evoke the sublime response. Their
power often decays, and other alternatives are sought. Ultimately, the constant
is not the technological object per se; it is the continual redeployment of the
sublime itself . . . (Nye, 1994, p. xii)
When Connie first steps into Luciente’s future, she envisions a world of dominating,
thrusting structures: “[r]ocket ships, skyscrapers into the stratosphere, an underground mole
world miles deep” (Piercy, 1997, p. 69). Instead, the structures she does encounter are
personal and broadly accessible, horizontal rather than vertical: “[a]rm in arm they strolled
toward the meetinghouse, a building long and low like a loaf of bread” (Piercy, 1997, p. 194).
On arriving in this future, Connie is dismayed to see chickens and goats, an aesthetic of low
agriculture rather than high technology. Luciente’s response suggests a more deliberate
approach to technology, one less concerned with grand visions and more concerned with
deliberation and context: “ ‘Connie, wait a little, trust a little. We have great belief in our
ways. Let me show you . . . . No! Let our doing show itself. . . . It has taken a long time to
put the old good with the new good into a greater good” ’ (Piercy, 1997, p. 72).
5.2 Techne
Through these futures, Connie encounters two radically different interpretations of the phe-
nomenon we call “technology.” On the one hand, we have high technology, Technology™, or
simply tech. This understanding positions technology as a force for social disruption, and so
tech is associated with the new and the novel. On the other hand, we have what I will call
here techne—technology that might also be called craft or art, that is personally accessible,
and that blends into, rather than breaks, the context.
Discourse around technology tends to be almost painfully reductive, ossified into a set
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of hard aesthetic and historical distinctions. Even as the position of technology in society
changes, the tenor of the discussion does not:
Even when the debate concerns technological change, the terms of the debate do
not seem to change at all: technology—or some aspect of it—is either celebrated
or decried, cast as utopian or dystopian, in terms of its capacity either to serve
“humanity” or to threaten it. The repetitiveness of these arguments results from
the fact that they take the definition of technology for granted. For all the
discussion of the implications of technological change, remarkably little attention
has been devoted to possible changes in the conception of technology. (Rutsky,
1999, p. 2)
Technology—the word—no longer means what it once did. Increasingly, the term is used
not to indicate the application of knowledge to real-world problems, but to describe a new
form of mediated sociality. Concerns about, for example, “what happens when kids are per-
petually exposed to technology” (Detwiler, 2015), are not concerns that children are spending
too much time looking through telescopes, hacking and making at their workbenches, or us-
ing their own spectroscopes to evaluate the effects of dissolved oxygen on marine ecosystems.
Rather, technology, in this context, has a particular and narrow meaning: using a small set
of specific, proprietary services on a small set of specific, proprietary devices. The term
evokes first a set of interfaces, in particular smartphones and social media apps. Secondar-
ily, it evokes a sector, the big 4.51 tech corporations that have come to dominate data and
discourse in our society. Third, perhaps, might come a somewhat less narrow set of intensely
hyped technologies—machine learning or cryptocurrency. Only after these associations—if
then—might we consider more fundamental applications of knowledge: immunization, ad-
1People seem to agree on the core four, and disagree about the fifth. Google, Facebook, Amazon, and
Apple tend to get top billing. Microsoft is a little bit of an also-ran in this context. Netflix is sometimes
chosen in order to round out a catchy acronym, like FAANG.
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vances in solar energy, the Human Genome Project. Sherry Turkle employs this new usage
of the word technology in making a diagnosis of a sickness at the heart of our discourse:
Distracted at our dinner tables and living rooms, at our business meetings, and on
our streets, we find traces of a new “silent spring”—a term Rachel Carson coined
when we were ready to see that with technological change had come an assault
on our environment. Now, we have arrived at another moment of recognition.
This time, technology is implicated in an assault on empathy. (Turkle, 2016, p.
4)
When we use “technology” in the familiar way that Turkle does above, we refer not to
the broad but to the narrow. This conception of technology, tech, feels less and less like
something that belongs to society. Instead, it is something placed between us and the world,
a secret flame held by a technocratic elite, a narrative of progress that fails to live up to its
triumphalism.
Our strong association of technology with tech is profoundly limiting. Technology, funda-
mentally, is a shared knowledge of doing, yet we do not recognize a full range of knowledge
and practice when we use the word “technology.” Is close reading not technology? Is a
family recipe not an algorithm? Is a support group not a platform? Is a personal library
not infrastructure? Certain forms of technology are glorified, even fetishized, while essen-
tial ways of knowing and doing are systematically undervalued. A technology, ultimately,
is knowledge put into practice. Why do we hold up technologies of control, technologies
of corporations, governments, and the powerful, while eliding, downplaying, disparaging, or
ignoring the technology of individuals and localities, small groups and “little” disciplines?
Techne2 is a word from ancient Greek roughly translating to the knowledge of making
and doing, or what we would call craft or art. Through its use in Homer, we learn that the
2In these sections, I spell tékhnē, (Ancient Greek) in the latinized form techne.
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term has its earliest origin in the craft of woodworking:
The literary tradition begins with the Homeric poems, in which “techne” has a
variety of meanings. It names the “skill” of the shipbuilder who works with wood;
the “craft” of Hephaestus, who forges metal bonds to hold even the mighty Ares;
the “craftiness” of Proteus, who is able to change his form at will; and the “plan,”
or “stratagem,” Aegisthus devises to murder Agamemnon. In short, the meaning
of the word in the Homeric poems is multifaceted. (Roochnik, 1996, p. 18)
Words synchronous with the early Greek conception of techne might include craft, knack,
practice, art, do, jutsu, or ken. These terms connote a practical instrumentality, cleverness
or trickery, and the everyday products of manual work. The word “knack,” for example, can
refer to a specific or unusual manual skill, a clever trick, or a small craft item (as in “knick-
knack”), and is connected to the knacker, the historically low-status profession focused on
rendering horses into tallow.3 Techne, traditionally, was associated primarily with the lower
classes, and as deployed in Aristotle contrasts with episteme, or knowledge that is an end in
itself:
For Aristotle, techne was a very particular kind of knowledge. It was not con-
cerned with the necessary and eternal a priori truths of the cosmos, nor with the
a posteriori contingencies and exigencies of ethics and politics. Rather, techne
was instrumental reason, concerned with actualizing the potentialities of beings
that had no capacity to do so on their own, and which could be otherwise. More-
over, this was a kind of knowledge associated with people who were bound to
necessity. That is, techne was chiefly operative in the domestic sphere . . . .
(Young, 2009, p. 191)
3Conceptually, these terms are adjacent to the archetype of the modern hacker, who is concerned with
making, tricks, and instrumental knowledge. Traditionally, some of these terms—craft, jutsu, art—are also
connected to instrumental occult and magical practices.
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Though in Plato techne is sometimes connected with the skills of the political classes, such
as rhetoric and generalship, these applications tended to be comparative or dialectical—it
is an open question whether rhetoric is techne, but sewing, ox handling, medicine, and
cooking were obviously techne. In a real sense, techne was low and necessary knowledge,
knowledge of survival and of living. Though there was an element of techne to the broader
ethical, philosophical, and administrative concerns of the polis, techne was best understood as
specific and instrumental knowledge for the maintenance and improvement of the immediate
environment, practiced not by philosophers and rulers but by the lower classes.
This concept, techne, may help us to reframe our discourse around technology and “tech.”
Technology, as a term, likely deserves the negative connotations that have grown up around
it. Tech has come to be associated with a discrete set of centralized and corporate projects
with universal aspirations, such as to organize the world’s information, sell any form of
material good, or build an intermediating platform through which all human thought and
communication are conducted. These projects, tech, are not technologies in the sense of those
drawn from basic research that have so fundamentally altered life on earth over centuries,
and which range from the quotidian (the barometer) to the miraculous (antibiotics) to the
terrifying (nuclear weapons). While this conception of technology may be morally and
practically ambiguous, neither are these technologies controlled by a single individual or
organization. These fundamental technologies, though they may have extensive foreseen and
unforeseen negative effects on humanity and the earth, cannot control and be controlled as
can the modern tech platform. Further, the set of projects that define tech, in their broad
scope and universal aims, cannot but violate our autonomy and trample local concerns and
needs. To build an everything store, or to collect and control all human knowledge, is
necessarily to call on das Man, and perhaps even to invoke something beyond, and even
more inimical, than the human universal.
When we think of tech, we think of paradigms situated on the level of macro-scale entities
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and institutions—societies, nations, and corporations. This form of “technology” reaches,
from on high, down into our lives. It offers us capabilities and connections, identity and
convenience. It leverages iterative design, social science, and algorithm to nudge, rather than
compel, recalcitrant humanity into engaging systems that control, flatten, and measure. We
are grist in a highly abstract mill, our thoughts content, our relationships network effects,
our differences market segments, and our common humanity an exploited vulnerability. Tech
empowers, but only to the extent that we further render ourselves powerless.4
We begin to see, perhaps, that the word “technology” fails to serve us. We can, broadly
and without fine distinctions, consider the term “technology” to refer to three separate phe-
nomena. The first, scientific technology or “technology classic,” describes applications of
basic research, and is characterized by unpredictable second- and third-order effects and
sweeping social changes. Technologies in this vein might include the steam engine, anes-
thesia, heavier-than-air flight, radio, birth control, computation, nuclear energy, antibiotics,
and chemical fertilizers. These technologies, which shocked and shaped the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, can be associated with the aesthetic of the sublime in that they provoked
awe and fear, the sense of the small in the presence of the surpassing and the ineffable. The
second, tech, poses as scientific technology, self-consciously embracing the aesthetic of the
technological sublime while delivering a calculated, rather than an uncontrolled, disruption.
The essential difference between scientific technology and tech is in this retained control.
Google is tech, and not technology, because any advances it represents do not escape its
ambit. The horse may pull society, but its reins are firmly held. Prometheus has descended
from the mountain, but we must beg for the light.
Culturally, we have come to expect, and perhaps to rely on, the unifying experiences pro-
vided by the technological sublime and the larger narrative of progress they uphold. Starting
4Teach one to fish, and one will never be hungry. Sign up for a billion-dollar fishing platform, and one
will subsist on fish sticks while wondering what the chewy stuff is made from.
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in the late 1990s, and with little fanfare, tech, rather than scientific technology, began to
supply these cultural experiences. In the relative absence of major cultural disruptions or
novums from scientific technology, tech has meted out a succession of upgrades and updates
to platforms, providing conveniences that have grown into necessities and preserving the
sense that society is moving forward technologically.5 By preserving a simulacra of tech-
nological progress, tech has presided over a reallocation of market power unprecedented in
5This point, that there has been little (scientific or fundamental) technological advancement in the 21st
century may be surprising to some, though it is growing increasingly difficult to ignore. The slowdown is
difficult to perceive partly because tech, or the platformification of society, has provided substantial cultural
disruptions over the first two decades of the new century. As even the simulacrum of technological advance
that has been provided by tech slows, however, the lack of significant new applications of basic research to
day-to-day living is becoming more widely recognized.
A hard look at the scientific and technological advances developed over the first two decades of the twenty-
first century reveals that they are immediately recognizable as incremental at best, and many or most can
be associated with hype and potential rather than obvious or broad utility. One set—e-readers, home
automation, online streaming—have disrupted specific industries and generated enormous value for a small
number of corporations. Another set—3D printing, machine learning, gene editing, blockchain, augmented
and virtual reality—have created fortunes based primarily on a perceived future potential that has largely
not been actualized. Other technologies are useful, if incremental: a better artificial pancreas, e-cigarettes,
tokenization for payment, new techniques for endoscopy.
The most immediately recognizable achievement, and perhaps the representative cultural symbol, of the
twenty-first century, is, of course, the smartphone. The smartphone perhaps best represents the shift from
scientific technology to tech, and probably alone accounts for the survival of a rhetoric of progress this far
into the new century. Though it is suggestive of a fundamental advance, the smartphone as a piece of
tech has been entirely controlled by two corporations, and has facilitated widespread platformification. It
is a tool that transforms moments of reality—interactions between individuals, or with the built or natural
environment—into engagements with a strictly controlled hyperreality. As an artifact, the smartphone is
in no sense manipulable by its owner. It is unmodifiable and unrepairable. Though meaningful functional
changes are rare, the smartphone must be frequently replaced, both for profit and to maintain an aura
of steady technological progress. Unlike advances in scientific technology, the smartphone represents no
new understanding that can be built upon, except, perhaps, for a new understanding of the malleability of
humanity in the aggregate.
The question of why advances in scientific technology have slowed is a difficult one. It is possible that low-
hanging fruit has been picked, though contemporary science is also underfunded and hyperspecialized. On the
technological side, concentration in industry and rising inequality mean that measures of entrepreneurship
such as the new startup rate have been declining for decades (Fairliei & DesaiII, 2020; Haltiwanger et al.,
2014; Litan & Hathaway, 2014). At the same time, subsidies have disproportionately gone to applied, rather
than basic, research (Akcigit et al., 2013) and maintaining steady progress in measurable fields such as
transistor density has required an exponential increase in number of researchers (Drezner, 2017). In 2020, an
Oxford geographer, Danny Dorling, released Slowdown: The End of the Great Acceleration—and Why It’s
Good for the Planet, the Economy, and Our Lives, which among other claims supports the idea that basic
science and technology are not performing as they did in the twentieth century. Though I believe a slowdown
in technology following from basic research is a reasonable conclusion, the discussion in the literature around
a possible slowdown is at an early stage and the contention is yet controversial.
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recent history, a transfer that has placed a small number of firms in a position to extract
exorbitant rents, acquire or drive out competition, create new classes of contingent labor,
and influence the political sphere. While scientific technology acted as a cultural wildcard,
creating unpredictable second- and third-order effects, tech seeks to create a more predictable
form of disruption in which power accrues to the firm and negatives, such as the decline of
journalism or an increase in political polarization, are borne by the broader society and the
public.
Tech has been the primary beneficiary of a confusion between scientific technology and
tech. Semantic and cultural conflation in the modern usage of “technology” benefits tech
in a number of ways. Tech has been given significant political leeway in part because the
political sphere is hesitant to interfere with a narrative of progress. Because tech is positioned
as an instantiation of technology, the political classes and society at large frequently turn
toward tech when confronted with large or intractable problems.. Even if tech can provide
no solution or only a minor mitigation, these corporations’ rhetorical position as doers, the
only set of institutions not in steep decline, makes them valuable partners. A little hope can
carry a politician through a news cycle or election, and partnering with Google or Apple
suggests initiative. Most importantly, tech’s donning of the mantle of scientific technology
obscures what these firms really are. Google is not seen as an advertising company, but a
research outpost for AI, a provider of high-speed internet, and a pioneer of the smart city.
Facebook is not seen as an advertising company, but a provider of free internet services to
the Third World, a leader in chat interfaces, and a cryptocurrency innovator.6
When most conceive of technology, the knowledge of doing, they think of scientific tech-
nology or, more recently, tech. However, people have been doing, and knowing how to do,
long before scientific technology, and certainly long before tech. If scientific technology and
6All of these initiatives, other than Google’s AI research, have failed, either being discontinued or back-
burnered.
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tech are contenders for the cultural space occupied by technology, we should also consider
techne, a modern craft of doing grounded in local understanding, as a potential contestant.
Tech, fundamentally, functions to abstract people—users—from the world, forcing interac-
tions through a platform. Tech creates distance and attenuation, a world viewed through an
abstract filter in which our goals must first intersect the goals of the platform and those who
control it. Not all ways of doing abstract in this way, however, and in fact most knowledge
forges a stronger connection between us and the world. If I order coffee from Amazon, I am
abstracted. If I make tea from a northern spice bush near my apartment, I am grounded.
If I create a website on Squarespace, I give up control. If I serve some HTML files I wrote
myself, I gain understanding. If we open Venmo, we view our community distantly. If we
organize a susu7, we connect with our community closely. If my university pays for Black-
board, Blackboard sits between me and my students. If we develop an alternative locally,
we are bound together in our values.
It is tempting to think of techne entirely as only a reconnection with the traditional,
a rejection of inimical circumstances through a return to the past. To limit techne in this
way, however, is to cede the future. Techne is the artist remixing traditional music on a
Pocket Operator, the college student putting up her own website to sell homemade soap, the
Pakistani hacker making a hearing aid from obsolete parts. These acts do an end run around
extractive abstraction, drawing a line to the world that does not run through some grasping
platform. Techne is technology of the local over the universal, autonomy over imposition,
and continuity over disruption. Techne tends to create more than it extracts, to be gnarly
rather than slick, to prefer the long game to the fast exit. Techne can be kind of janky—what
humanity is there in perfection?
Techne and abstraction are not entirely incompatible. Technology that empowers others,
7A susu is an informal savings club where participants pay in a set amount each month, and each month
one member is given the collected proceeds. The term (and the concept) originated in West Africa and the
Caribbean.
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that respects real difference, that encourages growth, or that cedes control to others can
be techne, and can respect and encourage techne. Raspberry Pi, the $35 credit card-sized
minicomputer, is, in a sense, a platform. However, the Pi, and the foundation that produces
it, cede control: the device can be used for anything a small computer can be used for. In
its mild jankiness, the Pi encourages real learning and growth.8 In its lack of expense, the
Pi makes possible projects and pedagogy that would otherwise be out of reach. In these
qualities, the Pi, as a platform, builds, rather than exploits, community, and creates oxygen
rather than sucking it from the room. There is nothing perfect about the Pi, but in its
imperfection it is a thing of techne, and far from the slick affordances of tech.
However, this form of modern techne, which cedes control while seeking to empower
others, faces serious issues when confronting forces, including but not exclusively tech, that
do not share its values. The seminal example of this dynamic in the twenty-first century
has been the World Wide Web. Upon its inception in the early 1990s, this system of linked
documents enabled a Cambrian explosion of individual and community creativity. The early
web had a highly local feel—users, necessarily, actively moved from one page to another,
rather than having information presented to them, and the early web had no practical
facility for commercial transactions. The early web, fundamentally, was a thing of techne,
enabling the sharing of handcrafted pages organized into local communities such as web
rings. The web, however, was the precondition necessary for the rise of modern tech. In a
2018 interview, Tim Berners Lee expressed concern that the web had led to the emergence
of something else, a superstructure based on centralized power that, fundamentally, stands
against the interests of humanity:
“We demonstrated that the Web had failed instead of served humanity, as it was
supposed to have done, and failed in many places . . . The increasing centraliza-
8The learning comes as users try to answer questions, such as “What are all these little holes?” “Is this
thing on?” and “Which part is most likely to draw blood if I poke it the wrong way?” Learning can be painful.
Really, though, the Pi is an amazing device, and I’m glad it exists, as both a machine and a community.
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tion of the Web . . . [has] ended up producing—with no deliberate action of the
people who designed the platform—a large-scale emergent phenomenon which is
anti-human.” (Brooker, 2018)
The preconditions set by developments in scientific technology during the twentieth cen-
tury—especially, but not exclusively, computation—have led to unprecedented forms of ab-
straction. Developments such as the web have encouraged novel forms and permutations of
techne, including new modes of expression and art, widely available repositories of knowl-
edge, and local communities that extend beyond geography. However, in parallel, tech and
other centralizing forces have come to displace local autonomy and agency. Intermediat-
ing interfaces that flatten intent, algorithmically-curated streams, and the aggregation and
analysis of personal data has allowed tech to bootstrap its way to a set of more traditional
abuses: monopoly and monopsony9, regulatory capture, aggressive acquisition of other firms,
bundling or tying, blacklisting10.
5.3 Mankind Is Not Everybody
In Erewhon; Or, Over the Range, a 1872 utopian novel by Samuel Butler, the protagonist
finds himself in the eponymous Erewhon, a hidden country invented to hold up a mirror
to Victorian society. While Butler satirizes, among other targets, Britain’s religion, penal
system, and mental institutions, one three-chapter section of the novel stands apart. In
Erewhon, machines of any sophistication or complexity have been outlawed following an
9A monopoly is an advantageous market condition in which there is only one seller. A monopsony is an
advantageous market condition in which there is only one buyer, as when large firms agree not to “poach”
employees, resulting in depressed wages.
10Bundling is the practice of forcing the use of one service by tying it to another. This practice is ubiquitous
in tech, and examples range from Apple giving preferential treatment on its devices to its own services to
the combination of most Google services into the same interface. Tech firms also use a form of blacklisting in
which competitors or upstarts are removed or deranked in searches on a specific service, a favorite practice
of Google and Amazon. Honestly, there are so many dirty tricks in this playbook that you could write a
book just enumerating them and providing examples.
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arduous and costly civil war. The war, and the formation of the winning faction, the “anti-
machinists,” is precipitated by the publication of a book: The Book of the Machines. The
three chapters represented as a transcription of the book open with a question:
There was a time, when the earth was to all appearance utterly destitute both
of animal and vegetable life, and when according to the opinion of our best
philosophers it was simply a hot round ball with a crust gradually cooling. Now
if a human being had existed while the earth was in this state and had been
allowed to see it as though it were some other world with which he had no concern,
and if at the same time he were entirely ignorant of all physical science, would
he not have pronounced it impossible that creatures possessed of anything like
consciousness should be evolved from the seeming cinder which he was beholding?
Would he not have denied that it contained any potentiality of consciousness?
Yet in the course of time consciousness came. Is it not possible then that there
may be even yet new channels dug out for consciousness, though we can detect
no signs of them at present? (Butler, 1872, p. 190)
The Book of the Machines is remarkable in its departure from an anthropocentric, and even
an animal-centered, understanding of consciousness. It chooses not to dwell on relatedness,
or the mutual intelligibility of consanguinity, but considers consciousness as an emergent
property that arises as a system works toward an end:
We find it difficult to sympathize with the emotions of a potato; so we do with
those of an oyster. Neither of these things makes a noise on being boiled or
opened, and noise appeals to us more strongly than anything else, because we
make so much about our own sufferings. Since, then, they do not annoy us by
any expression of pain we call them emotionless; and so quâ mankind they are;
but mankind is not everybody. (Butler, 1872, p. 194)
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Butler, considering the Venus flytrap’s ability to snap shut over its prey, asks: “Curious!
that so unconscious a thing should have such a keen eye to its own interest. If this is
unconsciousness, where is the use of consciousness?” (Butler, 1872, p. 192) Similarly, Butler
observes that the common potato, stranded in a cellar, “has a certain low cunning about him
which serves him in excellent stead,” sending out shoots toward the light and, if encountering
earth on the way, turning the discovery to its own ends (Butler, 1872, p. 193).
Just as cells, acting in concert, comprise a system that works toward larger goals, Butler
makes the argument that a combination of organic and inorganic, human and machine,
might coalesce into a system of incredible breadth, one that might work toward its own
ends. The Book of the Machines was inspired by two fundamental observations. The first,
drawing on Darwin’s 1859 Origin of Species, is that emergent characteristics that serve an
entity, that allow it to survive or thrive, are more likely to persist. The second, inspired
by the development of networked technologies of transportation and communication such as
the telegraph and the steam engine, is that the organic is not cleanly separable from the
inorganic, and that the inorganic is woven throughout entities we think of as exclusively
organic.
This thesis—that an organism, or inorganism, can emerge from a concert of meat and
machine—has since been taken up in many forms, some rejecting simple binaries such as
consciousness and unconsciousness, organic and inorganic, and others attending to the rise
of superstructures or self-perpetuating trends in which we are enmeshed. Donna Haraway’s
1985 “A Cyborg Manifesto” takes up the former thread, crafting a figure, the cyborg, that
is a hybrid of machine and organism, lived reality and fiction, in order to take “pleasure in
the confusion of boundaries” (D. J. Haraway, 2016, p. 7):
The last beachheads of uniqueness have been polluted . . . Biology and evolu-
tionary theory over the past two centuries have simultaneously produced mod-
ern organisms as objects of knowledge and reduced the line between humans
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and animals to a faint trace. . . . The second leaky distinction is between an-
imal–human (organism) and machine. . . . [M]achines were not self-moving,
self-designing, autonomous. They could not achieve man’s dream, only mock
it. . . . Late twentieth-century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the
difference between natural and artificial, mind and body, self-developing and ex-
ternally designed, and many other distinctions that used to apply to organisms
and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighten-
ingly inert. (D. J. Haraway, 2016, p. 11-12)
Haraway’s complication of the boundary between organic and inorganic aligns with Butler’s
critique of these distinctions: “Who can draw the line? . . . Is not everything interwoven
with everything? Is not machinery linked with animal life in an infinite variety of ways? The
shell of a hen’s egg . . . is pure pottery” (Butler, 1872, p. 192). For Haraway, as for Butler,
the breakdown of categories such as human and animal or organic and machine presages the
emergence of a threatening new order. In Butler’s case, this is machine supersession—that
is, not our literal replacement by machines, but our incorporation into superstructures of
human and machine, yoked to their conflicts and goals and thus subordinate in intent,
meaning, and purpose. For Haraway, this meant the emergence of a new dynamic Haraway
calls an “infomatics of domination” or an “integration/exploitation into a world system of
production/reproduction and communication” (D. J. Haraway, 2016, p. 32).
The larger point here is that, fundamentally, in the absence of comfortable but porous
categories such as organic and inorganic or conscious and unconscious, agency can be produc-
tively ascribed to a much wider variety of entities, systems, and phenomena. In an argument
that biologists should not hesitate to ascribe intention to entities such as cells, organs, or
jellyfish, Michael Levin and Daniel C. Dennett make the case that cells are simultaneously
individually agentic and part of a larger superstructure:
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. . . individual cells are not just building blocks, like the basic parts of a ratchet or
pump; they have extra competences that turn them into (unthinking) agents that,
thanks to information they have on board, can assist in their own assembly into
larger structures, and in other large-scale projects that they needn’t understand.
(Levin & Dennett, 2020)
Cells have agency, in the clear sense that they have goals and the ability to act on those
goals, often in sophisticated ways that require altered responses in reaction to changing
circumstances. Thinking of them as agents, as possessed of intent and cognition, is not
a fallacy of anthropomorphism, but a rejection of anthropocentrism. Further, considering
systems such as cells to be agentic, to have goals and thus intent, is not simply a useful
metaphor, but represents a better understanding. Levin and Dennett attempt to articulate
this:
Now, we agree that attributing purpose to objects profligately is a mistake; Isaac
Newton’s laws are great for predicting the path of a ball placed at the top of a
hill, but they’re useless for understanding what a mouse at the top of a hill will
do. So, the other way to make a mistake is to fail to attribute goal-directedness
to a system that has it . . . We reject a simplistic essentialism where humans
have “real” goals, and everything else has only metaphorical ‘as if’ goals. (Levin
& Dennett, 2020)
The key insight here is not that we should exalt cells, or viruses, or any other entity
or system that demonstrates agency. Rather, it is that we should step away from our
own exaltation of ourselves as humans. By defetishizing our own unique consciousness and
cognition, by ceasing to apply ourselves as a universal yardstick to every bug, cell, and blade
of grass, we can better understand that we are not everybody, that there is thought, intent,
and feeling that does not arise from, or depend upon, the human mind.
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5.4 The Abstraction
The implications of this insight should disturb us, and not because humanity has an ingrained
need to see itself as separate, special, and superior. Rather, it is in extrapolating this
insight from smaller agentic systems—cells, mice, mitochondria, swarms, viruses—to larger
ones, and specifically ones that may incorporate us. In some ways, ascribing agency in this
direction is more intuitive. We are comfortable recognizing agency in organizations at many
scales, from committees and corporations to nations and peoples, as long as humanity is
considered the most important constituent. However, we tend not to ascribe agency to large
systems in which the role of humanity is more peripheral.
Serious thought has gone into theorizing the nature of large, goal-directed systems and
entities of which humanity is only one component. In addition, a wide variety of scholars
and commentators have identified trends, phenomena, patterns, or entities that influence,
envelop, or incorporate an unwilling humanity. While I will engage with a variety of theo-
ries about the nature of these systems and the disparate phenomena that support them, this
treatment will not, and cannot, be comprehensive. Indeed, if there is a single notable feature
of systems, phenomena, or entities at this level of abstraction, it is that they are incompre-
hensible, and beyond any unified or systematic understanding at the level of the individual.
In this section, and for the remainder of this project, I will refer to this enclosing entity, the
system at its broadest level of encirclement, as “the abstraction.” This term is used partly to
gesture to the inescapable reality that, while we can theorize such a system through study
of its Nth-order effects11, differences in scale, cognition, and goals render direct analysis
difficult and discussion or dissemination of information a matter of practical impossibility.
This theorized entity, the abstraction, poses the final challenge for negotiation: how do we
contend with an encircling system so complex as to be incomprehensible? Further, how can
11That is, the second-, third-, and fourth-level effects, and so on.
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we narrativize our resistance to an entity so vast as to resist depiction?
In a sense, the abstraction is the logical extension of, and mirror to, das Man, that
universalizing identity that effaces difference by offering a broad and easily understood ideal.
Das Man is a story that sticks in the mind, a transmissible meme, an abstraction that
stops at a point that is convenient in its narrative commensurability. The abstraction—the
Abstraction—encircles more, claims more, than does das Man, and in doing so lurks outside
our understanding. If das Man is powerful—and dangerous, and limiting—by reducing to
the level of the comprehensible, the power of the abstraction lies in an irreducible and
inaccessible complexity. In this, it resembles the policy too convoluted, technical, or boring
for the public to care about, but which has enormous downstream effects.12
If the Abstraction is the largest self-directed process or entity that encloses all humanity,
and if this enclosing entity is, almost by definition, too vast, entangled, or alien to be
individually comprehended, an obvious question presents itself13: How can we narrativize,
or even productively discuss, something that exceeds the bounds of comprehension, and
resists useful forms of description? Here, one might appeal to feeling and intuition. That,
perhaps, in fits and starts, in pockets and at the margins, in think pieces, in books, and
at the dinner table, we grow aware that some totalizing force, some presence or trend or
trend of trends, works against humanity. That scholars have described, in both sweeping
12An example issue that, in its technical nature, is difficult to discuss in the public sphere, and yet has
dramatic downstream effects on society, is the link in the United States between property taxes and school
funding. The decision to have public schools funded by local property taxes leads to underfunded schools in
low-income areas, which in turn contributes to increased segregation and wealth and income inequality. The
separation of the policy decision from its effects makes the connection apparent only, or at least primarily,
to those with the greatest interest in its propagation. Another example might be proposals of a wealth tax
compared to (mostly nonexistent) proposals for higher capital gains. A wealth tax is comprehensible to the
public, and yet is less fearsome to the wealthy—money is largely only visible as it moves, and countries
that have implemented a wealth tax have seen widespread evasion. When the public hears the term “capital
gains,” it begins to nod off. Despite the fact that implementing a progressive capital gains tax would cause
the wealthy to sweat, its, for lack of a better word, boringness makes it a non-starter as a point around
which to rally.
13Well, two questions, the other being, “What do we do about it?” We’ll end this chapter, and the project,
on that note.
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visions and exhaustive detail, phenomena in which humankind is an unwilling participant,
or of which it is a component, input, or symbiote. That these describable and (relatively)
verifiable processes are overlapping and interlinked, and that the whole is, at minimum, the
sum of the parts. That our backs are a little more bent, and Moloch a touch closer to heaven.
But this would be a retreat from the task. As Hobbes observes in, perhaps appropri-
ately, Leviathan: “Fear of things invisible is the natural seed of that which every one . . .
calleth religion” (Hobbes, 1651, Chapter XI). And, fortunately, scholars in a wide variety of
disciplines have engaged with humanity’s situation in larger processes, whether geological,
biological, or artificial.
Beginning in the 1960s, scholars in a wide array of fields have identified trends and systems
working on society that share a set of common themes: abstraction from the physical and nat-
ural world, the emergence of symbiotic/parasitic relationships between people and machines,
changes to cognition following developments in media and computation, and the rise of an
increasingly byzantine global political and technical superstructure. Lewis Mumford wrote of
a “megatechnics” in which a “dominant minority will create a uniform, all-enveloping, super-
planetary structure, designed for automatic operation” (Mumford, 1971, p. 3). Haraway
wrote of an “infomatics of domination,” a technological and social world order of particu-
lar concern to women (D. Haraway, 1991). Herbert Marcuse saw in our “one-dimensional
society” a “technological rationality,” focusing specifically on control through consumerism
(Marcuse, 2002). Hannah Arrent saw a “future man . . . possessed by a rebellion against
human existence . . . which he wishes to exchange . . . for something he has made himself”
(Arendt, 2019, p. 2), and which she found presaged the central political questions of the
twentieth century. Neil Postman identified an emerging “technopoly,” a post-technocratic
society in which culture serves technology, rather than technology serving culture (Post-
man, 1992). Closer to the present, Sherry Turkle has warned of an interpersonal “silent
spring” brought about by dependence on smartphones (Turkle, 2016), and Nicholas Carr
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has aggregated research on tech-induced cognitive and attentional changes in The Shallows.
Lori Emerson has criticized the affordances of “slick interfaces” (Emerson, 2014), and Jaron
Lanier has described characteristics of major tech platforms as BUMMER, or “Behaviors of
Users Modified and Made into Empires for Rent” (Lanier, 2018). Finally, scholars such as
Benjamin Bratton have considered a modern unified global landscape spanning the social,
political, and infrastructural. This list, of course, is not remotely comprehensive. However,
it seems clear that scholars and commentators sense great change occurring at the crux of
technology (especially computation), politics, culture, and cognition. Further, these obser-
vations and diagnoses, sweeping in themselves, must, almost necessarily, point to a larger
system, trend, or entity when considered as interconnected phenomena.
One of these frameworks, frequently misunderstood, may provide a basis for some un-
derstanding of this larger, interconnected system that, in its breadth and complexity, resists
direct understanding. In 1965, while working at the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, en-
vironmentalist, scientist, and engineer James Lovelock began to formulate what he would
later call the Gaia hypothesis. In a description of a meeting with Lovelock, Bruno Latour
provides a summary of this theory:
At first glance there is nothing simpler than the Gaia hypothesis: living things
do not reside in an environment, they fashion it. What we call the environment
is the result of living things’ extensions; their successful inventions and appren-
ticeships. This is not proof that the Earth is “living,” but rather that everything
we experience on Earth is the unforeseen, secondary, and involuntary effect of
the action of living organisms. . . . The first Gaia idea came about with the
following line of reasoning: “If today’s humans, via their industries, can spread
chemical products over the Earth that I can detect with my instruments, then
it is certainly possible that all terrestrial biochemistry could also be the product
of living beings. If humans can so radically modify their environment in so little
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time, then other beings could have done it as well over hundreds of millions of
years.” Earth is well and truly an artificially conceived kind of technosphere for
which living things are engineers as blind as termites. (Latour, 2018)
Fundamentally, the Gaia hypothesis provides a template for an understanding of Earth as an
artifact. The planet, with its familiar balance of gases in the atmosphere, salinity in seawater,
soil composition, and maintenance of temperature and precipitation is conceived not as a
progenitor, but in its current state as the end product of successive cycles of adaptation
by organisms. Latour uses the example of “termite mounds and beaver dams, which are
not living in themselves, but without living organisms there would be no mounds or dams”
(Latour, 2018).
The implications of Gaia are many. First, that the Earth in its current form is not
semi-permanent as historically conceived, but relatively fragile and influenced by changes
in the behavior of organisms, as we have discovered in the age we now sometimes call
the Anthropocene. Second, that entities or environments of which we are a part can be
usefully conceived of as processes, subject to positive or negative feedback loops—that is, the
environment can amplify or resist change, depending on the nature of the environment and
the nature of the change. In other words, the environment is not passive in its construction by
organisms—as we build something, something builds back. Finally, Gaia suggests that some
conception of very large systems can be useful for understanding some local circumstances.
While this is no guarantee that conceiving of the Abstraction, or the largest self-directed
process of which humanity is a part, will lead to insight about local circumstances, it at least
provides a model from which to work.
Gaia, the scientific theory, already encompasses the chemical exhaust of humanity and
our structures and machines—Lovelock, an inventor of high-precision instruments, originally
formulated the theory by observing previously undetectable gas emanations from industry.
In 1965, however, machines were not the stratum for cognition that they are in the third
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decade of the twenty-first century. If industry was, on Lovelock’s electron capture detector,
a factor in the composition of the planetary biosphere in 1965, cognition and computation
affect the biosphere in ways that can be seen with the naked eye. To provide one, credulity-
straining, example: a single paper of nine pages in length (Nakamoto, 2008) has led to
computation consuming about 1% of all power usage on the planet (Bradbury, 2020), a
figure that, when compared to the power usage of nations, stands somewhere between the
power use of Pakistan and the Netherlands. Another example, likely showing the beginning
stages of a new trend, is the creation of machine learning model GPT3, trained on 199 billion
tokens (a unit of data corresponding to approximately one word or semantically equivalent
symbol) as inputs. According to a technical analysis of the training process by Lambda
Labs, the “GPT-3 175B model required 3.14E23 FLOPS of computing for training. Even
at theoretical 28 TFLOPS for V100 and lowest 3 year reserved cloud pricing, . . . this will
take 355 GPU-years and cost $4.6M for a single training run” (Li, 2020). GPT3, widely
considered a success due to its almost uncanny ability to perform well on tasks for which it
has not explicitly been trained, validated the theory that a massive quantitative increase in
inputs to a machine learning model could result in a qualitative difference in performance on
tasks. Following this success, there is likely to be a boom in corporate and state investment
in the training of massive models, and it is difficult to predict the scale of computation that
might be undertaken in the coming decades.
Energy usage provides some sense of the size and scope of these new forms of human
activity, and is also suggestive of the kinds of impact on the biosphere, due to release of
gasses such as CO2, that are well described in the Gaia hypothesis and which inspired its
articulation. However, they will not, perhaps, be in themselves the most significant con-
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sequences of the emerging global character of human computationally-enabled cognition.14
As computation, and computationally-enabled communication and cognition, become a, or
the, central activity of humanity, as the infosphere increasingly influences and parasitizes
the biosphere, as the global imposes on the local, we may find that the environment we are
building develops emergent properties that are different and surprising.
Gaia, as a theory, was founded on insights from chemistry and engineering, and focuses
on feedback between organisms and the biosphere we have collectively constructed. While
it is not unreasonable to interpret Gaia as incorporating all human activity, including our
cognitive and computational processes, the theory focuses on our not insignificant chemical
exhaust, considering these activities as an extension of industry. While Gaia, as a model
of the biosphere, covers these processes, what if we were to consider more explicitly the
infosphere, along with the biosphere, as part of Gaia? Alternatively, and reflecting on the
rapid changes in the centrality, consolidation, and scale of the infosphere, what if we were
to apply the basic framework of Gaia to our memetic ecology?
Let us call this Gaia, for the moment, Agaia, a refocusing of Gaia that is alternative,
14Though they could be. The larger purpose of outlining these trends is to show the difficulty of nego-
tiation in contexts where the global imposes on the local, and the ensuing loss of agency and narrative for
individuals and small (or even large) groups. In this context, anything goes. Climate change is a tragic
and monstrous process, and has already wrought damage to the biosphere that is painful to contemplate. It
could, potentially, be the last and biggest challenge for humanity. Yet there are other dangers here, more
difficult to collectively oppose or even discuss given that their nature resists narrative.
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accelerated, and abstractive.15 Gaia, in considering the Earth as an environment that is, in a
real sense, constructed by organisms, suggests the fragility of that environment—that is, life
can and does affect the biosphere. In the same way, memetic units, ideas16, can directly affect
the composition of the infosphere. Further, just as the meme, in its original formulation, was
noted to propagate—and evolve—far faster than the gene (Dawkins, 1990, p. 189), changes
to the infosphere take place at a rate far faster than changes to the biosphere as posited
under Gaia. In modern information ecosystems, cycles of feedback are incredibly tight, and,
through abstraction, can make themselves tighter. For example, consider social media and
the algorithms now used by platform owners to select and present specific information as
part of a feed or stream. On the first and most basic level of abstraction, digital platforms,
since the early days of email, have allowed viral or otherwise “sticky” memes to propagate
at speed through the facilitation of low-effort sharing across the network. In the late 2000s
and early 2010s, however, platforms, most notably social media sites such as Facebook and
link aggregators such as Reddit, found that detecting “sticky” content early and surfacing it
rapidly to users could result in a quality of “stickiness”—really, addictiveness—adhering to
the platform itself. Rather than logging into a platform and seeing an algorithmically simple
15Obviously, using the term Agaia is most suggestive of a model that is anti-Gaia. I think this is appro-
priate, especially given the history and valences of the name Gaia as used in the Gaia hypothesis. There is a
bit of an odd relationship between the model presented in the theory and the name Lovelock used to label it.
On initial inspection, “Gaia” is appropriate enough to identify the theory, given that it is a hypothesis about
the whole Earth. However, to the layperson, the term strongly evokes the idea that the Earth is not merely
a (somewhat) unified and constructed environment, but that it is, itself, a life. The first symposium on
Gaia as a hypothesis was entitled “Is the Earth a Living Organism?” Even within the scientific community,
there was controversy centered on the imprecise articulation of the theory. Biogeochemist James Kirchner
criticized the theory as actually proposing multiple hypotheses ranging from the self-evident to the “highly
speculative” (Kirchner, 1989). Many of the discussions around Gaia centered around movement between a
weak version of the Gaia theory, which was limited in its articulation and fairly uncontroversial, and a strong
version, in which the Earth is a teleological system, meaning that it, to some greater or lesser extent, works
toward the maintenance of life on the planet. The highly metaphorical naming of the Gaia theory likely
contributed to its broader dissemination, and even today it is frequently mischaracterized or overstated by
those who have a more transcendent view of the Earth as a living entity.
It seems appropriate to describe an Agaia focused on an infosphere that is, in many ways, antithetical
to the biosphere, even if my main articulation of the concept isn’t centered on this antithesis. This feels
symmetrical to the relationship between Gaia as theory and Gaia as metaphor.
16Luciano Floridi has coined the term “inforgs” to describe what I here call “memetic agents.”
CHAPTER 5. NEGOTIATING THE ABSTRACTION 177
content set—reverse chronological content as with blogs, email, or RSS, or a list of friends
with whom to individually communicate, as with early messengers—the user is presented
with a set of content chosen for its virality or its potential to engage or convert17. This
form of algorithmically-generated feed is more advantageous to the platform owner for a
number of reasons. First, the nature of content in the feed becomes that of constant, if
artificial, interest. While a feed of news, as in a newspaper, might consist of some stories
that are, subjectively, of interest and some that are, subjectively, boring, everything you see
in your feed is pitched to strike a nerve, whether to make you feel comfortable and affiliated,
to provoke righteous anger, to elicit laughter or tears, or to cause fear and uncertainty.
Second, not knowing what will surface next in the feed generates an environment of variable
reward, which, as with slot machines, has a more addictive quality than predictable rewards.
Perhaps most insidiously, however, modern algorithmic feeds allow for feedback to work both
ways—that is, they allow for experiments to be performed on users and, more commonly,
user segments. This, in turn, leads to the next level of abstraction, and the further tightening
of positive and negative feedback loops within the ecosystem of the feed. At this level, time
spent on the platform not only provides feedback about what information is sticky and what
is not, but furnishes platform owners with the data needed to further train and tune the
algorithm. At this level, algorithms become so finely tuned to specific populations, and
segmentation becomes so rapid, that a highly personalized, and even by modern standards
highly addictive, feed can be generated after as few as four or five platform engagements.
Thus far, this stage has been manifest in its most elemental form by short video platform
TikTok.
The capability of entities operating within the infosphere to go up one level of abstrac-
tion, recursively using tight feedback loops to further tighten feedback loops, creates an
17Conversion is an industry term for the process of turning someone from a non-paying to a paying
customer.
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information ecosystem that is not simply fast, but accelerating. On the first level, an al-
gorithm optimizes the presentation of content in order to maximize some metric of use to
the platform owner, such as engagement (Twitter and Facebook) or watch time (post-2012
YouTube). While this is highly lucrative in itself, moving up another level of abstraction
provides far greater rewards. By optimizing not only for engagement, but also for learning
how to increase engagement, platforms place a virtuous circle within a virtuous circle, not
just tightening algorithms, but tightening algorithm-tightening algorithms. At this level, it is
not simply market power and network effects that contribute to the success of the platform,
but also the model. The term “model,” as used in the bench sciences and quantitative social
sciences, but most relevantly computer science, is a constructed, predictive abstraction. In
a somewhat trivial sense, the common map is a model. A map is a reduction created for the
purpose of prediction. Maps are untrue in the sense that they necessarily leave out more
than they keep. And yet maps are demonstrably useful, most especially when created for a
specific purpose. Models are concrete abstractions, instantiations of a set of insights an inch
across and a mile deep. They are, like a function, map, or key, a transformative element.
Given X and Y, predict Z. Given Z and M, predict how to better predict Z. Given Z, M, and
P, refine P. While the model instantiates or crystallizes knowledge in a domain, allowing for
increased accuracy of prediction within that narrow sphere, the training of the model also
tends to result in insights about how to further refine models.
Agaia, then, as a view of specific processes within the global infosphere, is characterized
by acceleration. This is not, however, The Acceleration, or the Singularity predicted in books
such as Ray Kurzweil’s The Age of Spiritual Machines—that is, a broad and accelerating
technological capability to broadly accelerate technological capability, or, put another way,
intelligence sufficient to increase intelligence. As previously discussed, if anything, applica-
tion of developments in basic science to day-to-day life has slowed, at least in most fields.
Rather, these hybrid legacy corporate and technological systems are like enormous flywheels:
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spinning freely and without traction, they have little effect, but anything coming into direct
contact is rapidly transformed or obliterated.
To put this another way, Agaia is less a general process for working toward a general
intelligence18, but a general process for working toward highly specific intelligences. At
the highest level of abstraction, it is the global capability of the infosphere to increase its
ability to model and disrupt specific economic, cultural, cognitive, or social domains. On the
ground, we do not see a global transformation. Rather, we see what appear to be random
acts of postmodernity, whether the quick destruction and replacement of an industry, the
hollowing out of a hallowed institution, or the undermining of some foundational or unifying
narrative.
So far, we have considered a few potential approaches to the Abstraction, the universal at
the greatest potential remove from the local, or the most remote enclosure or system within
which we are contained. The first approach, admittedly something of a cheat, appealed
to instinct, the suspicion that some force impedes or resists the better efforts of humanity
along many critical dimensions. The second aggregated the diagnoses of major maladies and
dysfunctions at the juncture of culture and technology and suggested that these phenomena
must necessarily be interconnected. The third offered the dark reflection of an ecological
theory and metaphor, Gaia, extrapolated to the modern infosphere and outlining the possi-
bility of an environment, constructed by organisms, that is in some sense self-regulating or
otherwise agentic.19
We have had to approach the Abstraction indirectly, rather than simply pointing to it.
The Abstraction is, almost by definition, inaccessible to direct analysis, at least by some
one individual. We have our suspicions as to its nature—complex, interconnected, a hybrid
18Used here in the sense of Artificial General Intelligence, or AGI, arguably the holy grail or philosopher’s
stone of computational research.
19In our nightmares this would parallel the “strong” theory of Gaia, being then a system with a goal, end
state, or teleology.
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of organic life and machine, and potentially inimical to the values of some or many of the
entities it encloses. Due to its scale and complexity, there is an odd disconnection between
the entity or metaprocess of the Abstraction and its effects as felt in the local. Conceptually,
intellectually, we can only grasp so much, and our own personal abstractions can only reach
so high. We might digest some of the complexities of a specific state, or of geopolitics, or of
transistor technology, or of the local economics affecting a stone quarry, or of the migratory
patterns of Monarch butterflies, or of the biology of a species of moss. We might also
grasp how some of these individual complexities overlap and interconnect. At some point,
however, and likely sooner rather than later, understanding fails. Processes, or a collective
metaprocess, that operate beyond this threshold resist comprehension. Further, even if this
veil can be pierced to some extent, any insights may prove largely incommunicable.
To put this more baldly, the Abstraction kills story. To qualify this slightly, it kills useful
story, narrative around which coalitions can be built or through which specific challenges can
be identified and addressed. This does not mean that narrative cannot or will not continue
to be situationally useful. There will continue to be demagogues and idealists, foxes and
hedgehogs20, wonks and saints. The narratives wielded by these individuals, and the groups
they support and represent, will still work for weal or for woe, and will address, well or
poorly, issues present in the world. Narrative will continue to be the sea of ideas in which
we bathe. However, a space, large and increasing in size, exists outside the reach of our
collective narrative capability. Because social interaction increasingly takes place through
mechanism, and because our global society is increasingly interconnected, we can only dimly
apprehend the nature of the systems of which we are both victim and component. We cannot
fight without a cause, or strive without story. And our stories fail against the complexity of
the Abstraction.
20As per Isaiah Berlin’s The Hedgehog and the Fox. “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows
one big thing.”
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5.5 Reaching Forward
At the conclusion of Woman on the Edge of Time, Connie, backed into a corner, faces a
dark and damning choice. In the institution in which she is incarcerated, Connie becomes
the subject of an experiment, and is implanted with a device designed to make her more
docile, a better fit for society’s expectations. After this operation, her receptivity to potential
futures, which has allowed her to touch Luciente’s time, directs her to other, more frightening
alternatives. Among these are the front lines of a war in which Luciente is a soldier, a
war in which per21 side is losing ground. Connie senses that the bright future, Luciente’s
original future, is slipping away due to circumstances in her present, and in particular the
development of the controlling technology now implanted in her body. In response, she
formulates a dark and consequential resolution. The night before she puts her plan into
effect, Connie fights to reconnect with Luciente’s bright future for a final conversation:
“I blather.” Luciente drew Connie away. “Such hardness in your mind tonight
makes me babble more than usual. I fear for you.” . . . Lazy flakes drifted onto
the arm of the borrowed jacket.
“Luciente, do you think it’s always wrong to kill?” . . .
“How can I face something so abstract?” (Piercy, 1997, p. 404)
Connie has been backed into a corner. To defend her mind, to defend the future she has
come to love, she contemplates a violation of her own principles, a compromise that will strip
her of the little flame that she has carried with her through hardship and that has allowed
her to see across centuries. Piercy holds little back in the final paragraphs of the text:
She washed her hands in the bathroom, she washed them again and again. . . . “I
killed them. Because it is war.” Her hands shook like a willow branch used by
21Luciente’s future uses the gender-neutral pronoun “pers.”
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dowsers in Texas, a willow branch pulled by water deep in the ground. “I’m a
dead woman now too. I know it. But I did fight them. I’m not ashamed. I tried.”
. . . She thought of Luciente, but she could no longer reach over. She could no
longer catch. She had annealed her mind and she was not a receptive woman.
She had hardened. But she thought of Mattapoisett. Piercy, 1997, p. 410-411
The response elicited by Piercy at the end of this novel is not celebration at a strike against
iniquity, but the kind of sickness felt in the stomach at the contemplation of deep wrong.
Connie, and we, are not allowed to know whether this terrible act has preserved Luciente’s
Mattapoisett. Yet in the confrontation of this vast and unknown future, and possibly also
in the resistance to oppressive consensus, there is hope.
In “A Ten-Day Voyage,” a chapter in R.D. Laing’s 1967 The Politics of Experience, the
author transcribes the account of an individual, a sailor, who breaks with reality, and who,
perhaps more notably, returns:
I wasn’t just living on the – the moving moment, the present, but I was moving
and living in a – in another time dimension added to the time situation in which
I am now. . . . I feel that it was not senseless – although I suppose to others
about me I was – er – mad in as much as I was not living in this present time,
and if I was not living in this present time I was therefore incapable of coping
with it properly. But I had this feeling all the time of – er – moving back –
even backwards and forwards in time, that I was not just living in the present
moment. And I could much more easily go back than I could go forward because
the forward movement was a bit too much for me to take. (Laing, 1970)
In the ontology encountered during this ten-day experience, we, beings, grow in under-
standing as we move forward. Though the traveler, unstuck in time, can move forward to
encounter or glimpse a greater state of understanding and comprehension, such encounters
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must be brief. We are not yet enough. “[T]he journey is there and every single one of us has
got to go through it, and – um – everything – you can’t dodge it. The purpose of everything
and the whole of existence is – er – to equip you to take another step, and another step, and
another step, and so on” (Laing, 1970, p 129-130).
For Laing, the experience of the traveler embodies a specific idea about the nature of
the relationship between the individual and society. The society, in its system, imposes
a consensus reality. To operate within this consensus defines sanity. To step outside this
imposed context into a broader context, or a context that rejects or disregards barriers and
constraints, is to venture into a realm that society calls “madness.” The traveler “trusted
his experience of having entered into a state of more, not less, reality, of hyper-sanity, not
sub-sanity” (Laing, 1970, p. 129).
In the previous section, we considered the potential existence of an Abstraction, an entity
or contiguous system at the furthest remove from the individual or small group. Fundamen-
tally, the challenge posed by the Abstraction is one of negotiation. It is challenging enough
to encounter, and contend with, adverse circumstances in the immediate built environment
(Chapter Two), collective narrative (Chapter Three), or larger organizations and structures
(Chapter Four). At the broadest level of encirclement, however, we are imposed on from a
great remove. At this scale, distance, and complexity, understanding the nature of the envi-
ronment and its influence on us becomes less a matter of reading than a matter of sensing.
We cannot, as limited and contingent beings, know the full nature of the system in which
we find ourselves. Despite this, we must choose our stance, whether one of hope or despair,
and determine how we will negotiate, whether merely to survive or, perhaps quixotically, to
effect change.
In her final exigency, with her back to the wall, Connie chooses to kill, to destroy life,
in the defense of a future and in defiance of a present. I cannot say, at least with any
certainty, that such choices are wrong. Sometimes, and perhaps even often, systems, and
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their component beings and things, must be opposed, and opposed with every bit of power
and control that can be laid hands on. Sometimes, choices are not so much made as forced.
Yet, it may be, that in seizing any power, in exerting any available control to steer the
world toward the bright future, we find that the brightness dims, and the future recedes.
Those building the Abstraction, or who spread their wings to catch a tailwind from above,
also steer the world toward their own imagined utopias. In seizing power, it is difficult not
to replicate the systems that justified the seizing of power. In jailing the jailers, we build
prisons. In killing, we become killers.22
It is my utmost hope that your back is not yet against the wall, and that you are in the
privileged position to have some little latitude, that you can survive, or strive, on something
resembling your own terms.23 If this is the case, then the following thoughts, the last in
this project, consider approaches and stances toward negotiating the Abstraction. They are
rooted in the exercise of autonomy and, specifically, the use of local knowledge and action
yet with the hope or aspiration to effect larger change.
To resist, engage, or even conceptualize something as overwhelming as our theorized
Abstraction requires a specific cast of mind. In The Principle of Hope, Ernst Bloch observes
that we are all in a process of continuous becoming, that “much in the world is still unclosed.”
No thing could be altered in accordance with wishes if the world were closed,
full of fixed, even perfected facts. Instead of these there are simply processes,
i.e. dynamic relationships in which the Become has not completely triumphed.
The Real is process; the latter is the widely ramified mediation between present,
unfinished past, and above all: possible future. Indeed, everything real passes
over into the Possible at its processual Front, and possible is everything that is
22I am sure it is the case that some systems are beyond redemption. But this may also be true less often
than we wish to think.
These are broad thoughts necessarily applied in local circumstances. As with all abstractions, much is
lost.
23If not, if your back is to the wall. . . give them hell.
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only partially conditioned, that has not yet been fully or conclusively determined.
(Bloch, 1995, p. 196)
To see the system and to step outside it in the imagination is, as suggested by Laing’s account
of the traveler to the past and future, a form of madness. To envision ways to carve out a
space for ourselves or for our community, we must be mad enough to leave consensus reality,
but also mad enough to come back. After touching the universal, or glimpsing a future, we
must step back to the local as our site of action and change.
As we explored in Chapter Two, the idealized figure of the hacker also effects changes in
larger systems through application of deep local knowledge. The hacker leverages her own
hyperlocal understanding—the obscure bug, the misconfigured server, the unanticipated in-
put—to identify a weakness in a dynamic system. From there, the hacker can choose to repair
and maintain through propagation of local knowledge upward, following the paradigm of the
white hat. Alternatively, donning the black hat, the hacker can “escalate” to undermine,
coopt, or otherwise subvert the system. We have theorized the Abstraction as a system, and
all systems have weaknesses. Some of this hacking might be technical—the “mispurposing”
of a commercial application24, the clever repair of the community coffee maker, the exfiltra-
tion of data to enable the blowing of a whistle. More critical, however, will be the broader
application of the hacker sensibility to enable the carving out of spaces of resistance. We all
understand our family, our block, our neighborhood, and our community better than does
the Abstraction. The squatter, the union organizer, the herbalist: they, too, know when to
sow and when to reap, can spot the crack in the sidewalk or the whispered conversation and
gauge the time to act. Only structures with scale can be seen from a great height. Do the
things that cannot scale in the small spaces the Abstraction cannot see.
One might ask, then, how one might scale the unscalable. How can the Abstraction be
undermined without replacing it with a system more total in its size and apparatus? How can
24No day in which you violate a commercial Terms of Service agreement is a day wasted.
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a rigid and carefully tended garden cultivated by the Abstraction be replaced by anything
other than something equally artificial, equally rigid? Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing provides an
approach to resistant unscalability via the metaphor of the matsutake forest:
Contrast the matsutake forest: unlike sugarcane clones, matsutake make it ev-
ident that they cannot live without transformative relations with other species.
Matsutake mushrooms are the fruiting bodies of an underground fungus associ-
ated with certain forest trees. The fungus gets its carbohydrates from mutualistic
relations with the roots of its host trees, for whom it also forages. Matsutake
make it possible for host trees to live in poor soils, without fertile humus. In turn,
they are nourished by the trees. This transformative mutualism has made it im-
possible for humans to cultivate matsutake. . . . Matsutake resist the conditions
of the plantation. (Tsing, 2015, p. 40)
Tsing offers a contrast between the plantation, emblematic of rigid homogeneity, exploitative
relationships, and oppressive design, and the matsutake forest, in which complex interrela-
tionships facilitate growth and creation that does not survive abstraction to scale. These
mushrooms grow only in uncultivated places. To the extent that commercial forces wish to
extract these mushrooms as resources, they must preserve intact the web of local relation-
ships that make their existence possible. This kind of mutuality makes it more costly to
exploit or destroy the local by rendering it legible to the universal.
While preserving existing interdependent local complexity is crucial, it is also possible to
cultivate uncultivated spaces. Cider brewer25 and orchardist Andy Brennan has developed
a philosophy around the cultivation of feral orchards, or orchards that were once cultivated
that have reasserted themselves as autonomous.
25The author of this dissertation may or may not have brewed 13.5 gallons of cider in his New York
apartment during the writing of this chapter. In addition, ten apple pies may or may not have been baked.
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I’m very uneasy about pinning my hopes on anything connected to a financial
economy dependent on growth. After all, some things cannot be scaled up. . . .
Love, wonder, true art, inspiration—all these things are about the intimacy of
direct relationships; they exist in unscalable worlds, and it’s in those worlds that
wild apples have their highest value. So I’m hoping to keep wild apple trees
and artisan cider independent of the pressures of conformity. . . . To belabor this
point: Independence is the most important thing I could cultivate (or uncultivate)
in the forchard [feral orchard]. (Brennan, 2019, p. 163)
There is a tragedy to mass cultivation of apples. Apples are the most sprayed crop, and
in cultivated orchards they stand, cloned, grafted to alien rootstock for survival. In the
wild, or in a feral orchard, however, they are transformed into hardy and long-lived trees.
Apple trees are naturally social, and do best at the edges of forests and in other locations
where they can be with trees of other species. They attract and feed a diverse array of
creatures. Heterozygous, all apple trees produce unique fruit, so every uncultivated apple
tree encountered represents a new strain of apple.
Extractive systems, including the Abstraction, are powerful engines, but in their artifi-
ciality there is an element of fragility. Often, they are forced to take longcuts where shortcuts
might do. By encircling so much, by growing large, they become unaware of knowledge at
the level of the local. By acting at scale, by coordinating the effort of many from above,
they lose the ability to act simply. While there is a tailwind to be found by reaching up
into the Abstraction to take advantage of centralizing and extractive trends, those working
locally may be able to walk to where the Abstraction could visit only by building a highway.
By cultivating thickets, dense webs of interdependent relationships, we obscure our work
from above and protect spaces from whence further resistance might grow. Though growing
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literal thickets has its benefits,26 seeding various forms of richly interdependent community
can preempt enclosure by abstractive forces. Wikipedia provides an example of one such
thicket. Its presence makes economically unviable various forms of knowledge aggregation
and resale, and its dense ecosystem of community relationships raises the cost of cooptation.
Another way to seed resistant local communities is through the encouragement of tech-
nologies, or techne, that naturally move users from passive consumption to active creation.
Certain technologies do this almost inadvertently. For example, the early social media site
MySpace has been credited for providing a path for young women into coding, since it
required knowledge of HTML and CSS for more advanced customization of a profile.
After high school Dalia made her own online shop, where she sold things like
band pins and earrings, and that’s when her MySpace skills came in handy. “I
was doing the website and there were things that would bug me . . . so I started
to just go into the code and see a lot of the HTML and CSS that I had learned
before. And from there I learned JavaScript.” (Hinojosa, 2016)
Though MySpace, as a commercial platform, tended to be restrictive in its use, it did en-
courage the development of skills that might be used to develop alternative spaces. Other
systems, such as Apple’s HyperCard, had a similar influence, and the web abounds with
stories of those who learned computers, or programming, after discovering it on early Macs.
As a child, I struggled to pick up programming. My brain didn’t think abstractly
enough at the time. . . . Programming didn’t click with my artistic mind. . . .
26A no-mow movement, recognizing that lawns are ecological dead zones and that the environment is
better served by allowing yards to grow wild with non-invasive plants and animals, has gained momentum in
the United States since the late 2010s. In arid regions of the United States, lawns account for 75% of water
use, and use of fertilizers and pesticides on lawns are a major contribution to the contamination of ground
water (Ignatieva & Hedblom, 2018). One homeowner who decided to let her lawn grow writes on the rapid
ecological transformation: “The unmowed plants in our yard attract plant-eating bugs and rodents, which
in turn attract birds, bats, toads and garter snakes that eat them. Then hawks fly in to eat the snakes.
Seeing all this life emerge in just one growing season made me realize just how much nature manicured lawns
displace and disrupt” (Pullano, 2019).
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I instantly fell in love with HyperCard. . . . I spent hours upon hours building
little HyperCard decks, teaching myself their programing [sic] language called
HyperTalk, and mostly just drawing. (Freeman, 2020)
Though technologies such as MySpace, HyperCard, and Flash are proprietary and, therefore,
do not provide certain essential freedoms to their users, they do have some properties of
what J. Ryan Stinnett and Konrad Hinsen call malleable systems and which Adam Wiggins
has called end-user programming. Malleable systems, according to Stinnett and Hinsen,
follow a number of principles. They should be easy to change, enable arbitrary reuse, have
open-ended potential, allow users to retain ownership and control, facilitate free sharing,
permit modification in the course of use, and be thoughtfully crafted (Stinnett & Hinsen,
2019). End-user programming, in turn, embraces the principles of embodiment, meaning that
system logic is transparent in the interface; in-place modification, meaning that a separate
tool or environment is not needed for making changes; and living system, meaning that
the time between making a tweak and seeing results is as close to immediate as possible
(Wiggins, 2019). According to Stinnett and Hinsen, interest in malleable systems peaked
in the 1970s and 1980s with Lisp machines and the Xerox Alto. On both these systems,
all elements of the computer, including the interface, could be trivially customized, without
even the necessity of restarting the computer to propagate changes. While some popular
systems, such as WordPress, have a few elements of malleable systems, in general the full
capabilities of malleable systems have not been explored. Malleable systems are, in a sense,
haccessible—that is, they make relatively straightforward the kinds of customization for
accessibility that can otherwise only be achieved with great difficulty. By investing in the
creation of malleable systems, we can allow the development of community infrastructure in
ways that are impossible to anticipate, and we can also further capabilities and knowledge
in individuals and groups that are commonly left out of more conventional approaches to
making and building.
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Malleable systems are one potential avenue for what, in this chapter, I have called techne,
or technology that increases autonomy rather than serving to disempower and exploit. If
“tech” represents a specific playbook—leverage cheap capital to outspend and outgrow com-
petitors, exploit community cohesion as network effects, employ dark patterns to steer users
to desired behaviors and outcomes—then it is past time to develop a coherent playbook for
the creation of technology that relinquishes control to individuals and small groups. Start-
ing points for explorations of techne in the realm of bits might be the free and open source
software movements discussed in Chapter Two, the subversive and joyfully brutalist web-
sites of underground artists such as porpentine, or the infrastructural adaptability of the lay
hermaneutic communities discussed in Chapter Four.
However, techne cannot and should not be confined to the digital. In recognizing and
furthering techne, we should place emphasis on the cultivation and incorporation of manual
and domestic disciplines such as herbalism, carpentry, cooking, brewing, knitting, gardening,
and mechanics. Like the internal and external martial arts and movement disciplines such as
parkour, running, and buildering, traditional and modern manual and domestic disciplines
are essential for building local community and driving advocacy for the preservation and
expansion of common spaces. These disciplines also allow the independent development and
maintenance of local infrastructure, are key to encouraging physical and mental health, and,
historically, have inspired forms of political Resistance.27 This form of practice, in which
coding, engineering, and traditional manual disciplines are blurred, exists in some specialist
communities such as makerspaces. Creating new physical and digital spaces for gathering,
learning, and building, and democratizing existing specialist spaces, suggest one way forward
27The development of many, perhaps even most, martial arts can be linked to political resistance. Capoeira,
for example, was developed by enslaved Africans in Brazil, and incorporates movements that resemble dance
to facilitate training in secret. Other physical disciplines such as night climbing, or the scaling of buildings
under cover of darkness, can be considered forms of civil disobedience. The manual discipline of lockpicking
is so commonly practiced among computer hackers that almost every major conference on computer security
hosts sessions on it.
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for a techne with potential to reverse a daunting trend toward abstraction and alienation.
This chapter has outlined a process, system, or entity, the Abstraction, composed in part
of dynamics and trends that incentivize alienation from community, prediction for profit,
the modeling and manipulation of populations, and the replacement of local autonomy with
control from above. We have also considered the Abstraction as undermining narratives that
enable useful political action—as we explored in Chapter Three, certain kinds of complexity
resist the formation of galvanizing or coordinating stories. While we have examined some
suggestive ways forward, one may reasonably look at local effort, local approaches based
on local knowledge, as fundamentally paltry. How can our little work, undertaken with our
little understanding, challenge an energetic, global, and centralized leviathan? How can we,
in our smallness, confront a construct that has engulfed the world in its totality? Should
not we fight size with size, scale with scale, control with control? To defeat the Abstraction,
must we not raise another, new and perfect and of our own design?
We should not embrace the thinking behind the Abstraction in order to resist it. While we
cannot truly understand the entirety of the system that encloses us, this lack of understanding
works both ways. Systems at scale will never truly understand the local. Just as we find
ourselves subject to random acts of postmodernity as the Abstraction finds purchase, ideas
of small origin cannot be fully anticipated or incorporated into the models built to predict
our thoughts and actions. The map is not the territory, and we are the smudged lines that
mark the secret places.
It may seem that our actions are futile against the scale of the system that stands against
us. This is a reasonable fear. Most of our efforts, almost by definition, will make little dent
in the edifice that encloses us. The Abstraction is vast and strong. A given individual’s
contribution has never been so meaningless. And yet—the specific contribution, the one
that does or will make a difference, has never been so meaningful. In an interconnected
world, the right insight, shared at the right time, can seed a new form of community or
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start a movement. But without preparing the ground—creating thickets, maintaining local
networks, pushing back against new forms of exploitation—there will be no tinder for a stray
spark to ignite.
Like many, I carry around a vision of what the world might be. In this world, the
interfaces would talk to each other. The people would talk to each other. We would use
computers in ways that fit our bodies and minds. We would read without intermediaries,
teach without intermediaries, build without intermediaries. Infrastructure would exist for
our adaptation, encouraging creativity over conformity. Our goals, and the texture of our
lives, would not be neatly divided between the trivial, that which is anticipated for us, and
the impossible. Such a vision for the world, however, cannot be implemented, constructed,
or imposed. It must grow. To make the universal serve us, small and awkward creatures
forced to live in fixity, we must write the book and leave the last page blank. We must create
in hope for use, but not in its anticipation.
As we have seen, the future is always in a process of becoming. We stand at a perpetual
crux. We pursue and seek to create worlds we cannot contain in the present, worlds for
which glimpses are gifts and, we hope, guides. We each carry our own vision. I see it in
others as a flame—guttering—perhaps, but with the potential to spread from mind to mind.
It illuminates our locality, and in that tight space casts back the Abstraction. In gathering,
we create not a sun, but a sky deep with stars, mysterious and bright. And, though the
challenge before us is great, we must take seriously the possibility that we are equal to it.
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